Taxation--nonbusiness income--reverted pension funds
Reverted funds from an overfunded pension plan, used to
avoid a hostile takeover, constituted nonbusiness income because
the reversion did not occur in the regular course of the
corporation's trade or business (the transactional test) and
there was no evidence that the pension plan was essential to the
business's regular course of manufacturing and selling chemicals
(the functional test). N.C.G.S. § 105-267.
Judge HORTON dissenting. Reconsidered in light of Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349
N.C. 290, 507 S.E.2d 284 (1998), pursuant to 30 December 1998
order of the North Carolina Supreme Court. Originally heard in
the Court of Appeals 19 March 1998.
Alston & Bird, LLP, by Jasper L. Cummings, Jr.; Morrison &
Foerster, by Paul H. Frankel; and Union Carbide Corporation,
by Jerry L. Robinson, for plaintiff-appellee.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney
General Kay Linn Miller Hobart, for defendant-appellant.
LEWIS, Judge.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's order we have reconsidered
the issues presented, and we affirm our prior decision.
Plaintiff Union Carbide Corporation is a New York
corporation domiciled in Connecticut and qualified to do business
in North Carolina. Its principal business is the manufacture and
sale of chemical products. Fearing a hostile takeover after a
1984 chemical gas leak in Bhopal, India, Union Carbide adopted a
restructuring plan designed to increase stock prices. In 1985,
Union Carbide's defined benefit pension plan trust held more
assets than legally necessary to provide benefits to Union
Carbide employees; it was substantially overfunded because of
better than expected investment returns. Although Union Carbide
had some input in investment decisions, it did not own or managethe pension plan trust, and individual employees were the
beneficiaries of the plan. As part of the corporate
restructuring, Union Carbide effected a reversion of pension plan
funds from the overfunded pension plan. Federal law permits such
reversions under certain circumstances, and Union Carbide sought
and received permission to effect a reversion of the excess funds
by removing part of the pension trust's assets and creating a
trust for a new plan. Union Carbide used the removed assets to
purchase annuities to pay for employee benefits. The excess funds
after the annuity purchase ($500 million) were used to buy the
company's stock. Union Carbide thus used a reversion from the
overfunded pension plan to avoid a hostile takeover.
Union Carbide classified the $500 million as nonbusiness
income under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4(a)(1) (1985) and
allocated the entire amount to Connecticut for taxation there.
The state of North Carolina reclassified the reversionary income
as business income and levied tax on the $500 million. Union
Carbide brought this action under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-267
(1986), seeking a refund of taxes paid. In our first decision,
we addressed three issues: whether the reversion was business
income to Union Carbide, whether Union Carbide made timely
protest, and whether interest was properly awarded. The latter
two parts of our decision are unaffected by the recent PolaroidII decision, and we decline to revisit them in the absence of a
mandate to do so. Accordingly, the lone issue we decide is
whether the pension plan reversion income is properly classified
as business income or nonbusiness income under the two-prong test
of Polaroid II. We hold that the reversionary income is
nonbusiness income, and we affirm our prior decision.
The statutory definition of business income has not changed
since 1985. Business income is
income arising from transactions and activity in the
regular course of the corporation's trade or business
and includes income from tangible and intangible
property if the acquisition, management, and/or
disposition of the property constitute integral parts
of the corporation's regular trade or business
operations.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4 (a)(1) (1997). Nonbusiness income is
"all income other than business income." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-
130.4(a)(5) (1997). Our previous Union Carbide decision was
based squarely on our decision in Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 128
N.C. App. 422, 496 S.E.2d 399 (Polaroid I), rev'd, 349 N.C. 290,
507 S.E.2d 284 (Polaroid II) (1998), and as such we applied only
the transactional test in determining that the reversion was non-
business income. Pursuant to Polaroid II, however, we must
consider two tests for business income - the transactional test
and the functional test - in determining if the reversion is
business income. See Polaroid II, 349 N.C. at 301, 507 S.E.2d at293.
The first clause of the definition of business income
creates the transactional test. See Polaroid II, 349 N.C. 295,
507 S.E.2d at 289. Three aspects of the income must be
considered under this test: "the frequency and regularity of
similar transactions, the former practices of the business, and
the taxpayer's subsequent use of the income." Id. The main
inquiry "revolves around the nature of the particular transaction
giving rise to the income." Id. (emphasis added). In our
previous Union Carbide opinion, we determined that the reversion
of excess pension funds, rather than the operation of the pension
plan itself, was the transaction that created income. The
removal of funds from an overfunded pension plan by Union Carbide
was a rare and extraordinary event; the evidence indicates no
such removal occurred before or since the reversion at issue. As
such, the reversion to Union Carbide did not occur in the
"regular course of the corporation's trade or business." N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-130.4 (a)(1). The reversion is not business
income under the transactional test.
We now address for the first time whether the monies
received from the reversion of pension plan funds constitute
business income under the second clause of the definition, the
functional test. Polaroid II directs that the definition ofbusiness income is to be read grammatically as follows:
"[business income] includes income from tangible and intangible
property if the acquisition, management, and/or disposition of
the property constitute integral parts of the corporation's
regular trade or business operations." Id. at 298, 507 S.E.2d at
290-91. Polaroid II explains the test in differing ways,
however. First, "[u]nder the functional test, income is
classified as business income if it arises from the acquisition,
management, and/or disposition of an asset that was used by the
taxpayer in the regular course of business." Polaroid II at 296,
507 S.E.2d at 289 (emphasis added). Later, we see another
phrasing, directing us that "reading the second clause as a
whole, business income includes income obtained from acquiring,
managing, and/or disposing of property which is essential to the
corporation's business operation." Id. at 301, 507 S.E.2d at
292-93 (emphasis added). We believe that the second version,
which follows more closely the terms of our statute, is the true
directive intended by the Supreme Court, and we will apply that
interpretation.
Under the functional test, the extraordinary or infrequent
nature of the event is irrelevant. Id. at 296, 507 S.E.2d at
289. The relevant inquiry addresses the character of the property
that generated the income; extraordinary transactions maygenerate business income if the relevant asset was an integral
part of the corporation's regular trade or business. Id. at 296,
507 S.E.2d at 289-90. Polaroid II further explains the
functional test and says that "the phrase 'acquisition,
management, and/or disposition' contemplates the indicia of
owning corporate property." Id. at 301, 507 S.E.2d at 292.
Moreover, "integral" means "essential to completeness." Id.
Therefore, we discern three important inquiries in determining if
income is business income under the functional test as set forth
in Polaroid II: (1) whether there are indicia of corporate
ownership of the property; and (2) whether the property is
"essential to completeness" of the (3) regular trade or business.
Id. at 301, 507 S.E.2d at 292-93.
The State asserts that Polaroid II, in finding that the
patent infringement suit proceeds were business income, is
dispositive of this case. We disagree. In Polaroid I and
Polaroid II, there was no dispute about the ownership or the
integral nature of the patents. Indeed, Polaroid's primary
source of income was sale of products on which the corporation
owned patents. As such, Polaroid owned the property at issue,
and the patents were integral to the regular course of Polaroid's
business. Each of the three factors above was satisfied, and the
income was found to be business income under the functional test.
Here, however, Union Carbide did not own any interest in the
pension plan trust. Union Carbide's only role was a legally
created one of fiduciary; the trust was held and managed by a
trustee and the beneficiaries were individual employees and
retirees. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the pension
plan was or is essential to Union Carbide's chemical business.
It was not legally mandated; its creation by Union Carbide was
voluntary. A pension may be an attractive aspect of a
compensation package, but it is not indispensable to operating a
profitable chemical business. And, unlike Polaroid which relied
on its patents to create income in its regular course of
business, Union Carbide does not rely on its employees' pension
plan to create corporate income.
Therefore, we hold that there is no evidence that Union
Carbide's pension plan was essential to its regular course of
manufacturing and selling chemicals. As such, any income derived
from the management, acquisition, or disposition of it is
nonbusiness income to Union Carbide under the functional test.
Since the income also is nonbusiness income under the
transactional test, we affirm our prior decision in full.
Affirmed.
Judge GREENE concurs. Judge HORTON dissents.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***