Trusts--termination--distribution of property--terms of
incorporated will--codicil
The trial court did not err in a declaratory judgment action
to determine the parties' rights to land described in a Trust
Deed by determining that the trust corpus passed to petitioner,
although the action was remanded to the trial court for
clarification of the language of the judgment, where Mrs. Wheeler
executed a Trust Deed in 1990 to insure that her material needs
would be taken care of during her lifetime; she incorporated into
the Trust Deed a 1986 will by reference; she executed a second
will on 16 June 1992 which expressly revoked all prior wills and
codicils; and the trial court concluded that the trust corpus
passed under the will dated February 26, 1986. The Trust Deed
was not transformed by the incorporation of the 1986 will into a
testamentary document, subject to revocation by a later drafted
will. However, the judgment was remanded to clarify that the
trust corpus did not pass under the will but according to the
Trust Deed, which included the 1986 will incorporated by
reference. Appeal by respondent from judgment entered 10 September 1997
by Judge Robert H. Hobgood in Granville County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 September 1998.
Royster, Royster & Cross, LLP, by T.S. Royster, Jr., and
Burnette & Wilkinson, by Michael P. Burnette, for
petitioner-appellee.
Edmundson & Burnette, by R. Gene Edmundson, J. Thomas
Burnette, and James T. Duckworth, III, for respondent-
appellant.
LEWIS, Judge.
On 13 December 1990, Myrtle P. Wheeler executed a "Trust
Deed," which she recorded the following day. The Trust Deed
stated that in consideration of ten dollars, Myrtle Wheeler
"hereby give[s], grant[s], bargain[s], sell[s] and convey[s]
unto" Billy L. Wheeler, Trustee, "his successors and assigns, for
the purposes and upon the limitations hereinafter specifically
defined, a one-half undivided interest in" two parcels of land.
The property is described as measuring 142.587 acres.
The Trust Deed continues in relevant part:
I give and bequeath all of my tangible
and intangible personal property to my
grandson, Billy Todd Queen, to be his
absolutely.
D. Upon the death of my daughter, Ruth
Jean Wheeler Queen, this trust shall
terminate and the property then remaining in
the trust shall be delivered to my grandson,
Billy Todd Queen, free and discharged of the
trust. In the event my grandson, Billy Todd
Queen, should die prior to the termination of
this trust as above provided, the trust shall
them [sic] terminate and all of the trust
property shall be delivered to and become the
property of my son, Billy L. Wheeler, free
and discharged from the trust.
Mrs. Wheeler executed a second will on 16 June 1992, which
expressly revoked all prior wills and codicils. The 1992 Will
names as executor the testator's son, "Billie L. Wheeler," and it
contains the following relevant provisions:
ITEM TWO: I hereby will, devise and
bequeath, all monies of which I die seized
and possessed, to my son, Billy L. Wheeler,
completely.
ITEM THREE: In the event my son, Billie
L. Wheeler, predeceases me, then I hereby
will and bequeath all monies of which I die
seized and possessed to my grandson, Billy
Todd Queen, completely.
ITEM FOUR: I hereby will, devise and
bequeath all the rest and residue of my
property of which I die seized and possessed,
whether the same be real, personal or mixed,
to my grandson, Billy Todd Queen, absolutely and in fee simple.
Myrtle Wheeler died on 26 December 1995.
Billy L. Wheeler filed this lawsuit against Billy Todd
Queen, seeking a judgment that would declare the parties' rights
with respect to the land described in the Trust Deed. The
superior court judge concluded that the 1986 Will "was properly
incorporated by reference into the Trust Deed . . ., effectively
merging the two documents into one and passing title to the land
at decedent's death to Billy L. Wheeler, as Trustee, under the
decedent's Will dated February 26, 1986." Defendant appeals.
The writing that Myrtle Wheeler recorded in 1990 expressed
Mrs. Wheeler's intention to create a trust in order to provide
for her own support during her lifetime. It identified specific
property as the trust res--an undivided one-half interest in
certain real estate in Granville County--and it conveyed this
property to Billy Wheeler as trustee. A valid, express, inter
vivos trust was established. See Baxter v. Jones, 14 N.C. App.
296, 306-08, 188 S.E.2d 622, 627-28, cert. denied, 281 N.C. 621,
190 S.E.2d 465 (1972).
We are asked to determine how the real property within the
trust was to be disposed of once the trust ended. Our
responsibility is to ascertain the intent of the settlor and to
carry out that intent. Callaham v. Newsom, 251 N.C. 146, 149, 110 S.E.2d 802, 804 (1959). We derive the settlor's intent from
the language and purpose of the trust, construing the document as
a whole. Davison v. Duke University, 282 N.C. 676, 707, 194
S.E.2d 761, 780 (1973).
The case turns on our interpretation of Paragraph Four of
the Trust Deed. Again, that paragraph reads,
Upon the death of Myrtle P. Wheeler, this
Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall
be discharged, and all of the property which
remains in the Trust Estate including corpus
and accumulated income, if any, shall pass as
directed under the terms and provisions of
the Last Will and Testament of Myrtle P.
Wheeler dated February 26, 1986, which Will
is incorporated herein by reference.
If we were to read these words without considering them in the
context of the entire Trust Deed, we might perceive an intent by
Mrs. Wheeler for the real property within the trust literally to
"pass" under her 1986 Will. Moreover, we could further this
perceived intent by inferring that the Trust Deed conveyed to the
trustee only an estate for the life of Mrs. Wheeler, and that
Mrs. Wheeler retained an interest, fully devisable, in the lands
conveyed into the trust. Thus, it would be possible for the real
property in the trust to "pass" under Mrs. Wheeler's 1986 Will.
The interest in the trust lands that Mrs. Wheeler retained would
pass, under the 1986 Will, to petitioner as trustee for
respondent.
Upon closer scrutiny of the Trust Deed, a better
interpretation emerges. This trust was created by Myrtle
Wheeler, a widow with grandchildren, primarily to ensure that her
material needs would be taken care of during her lifetime. To
that end, she appointed her son trustee of certain real property
and instructed him to deal with it so as to produce income for
her support and maintenance. Specifically, Mrs. Wheeler directed
her son to "manage, lease, encumber, sell, construct, assign,
alter, invest, reinvest and otherwise deal with said property and
all additions thereto." It was Mrs. Wheeler's further
instruction that support payments should first be paid "out of
the income of the trust property" and second, only if "desirable
or necessary," out of the "corpus of the Trust Estate."
The trustee was expressly authorized to sell the trust
corpus. It was contemplated by the settlor that these sales
would convey estates in fee simple: The trust instrument
provides for distribution of "all of the property which remains
in the Trust Estate" at Mrs. Wheeler's death (emphasis added).
Indeed, given the purpose of this trust, it would have made
little sense for Mrs. Wheeler to have given the trustee only a
life estate in the trust lands. It might have become necessary,
for example, for the trustee to sell or encumber some or all of
the trust property to pay emergency medical expenses; doing so would be far more difficult, and would generate far less income,
if the trustee could convey only a life estate. There would be
little if any market for such property.
Furthermore, the Trust Deed does not state that the trust
corpus and accumulated income "shall pass under the 1986 Will";
it states that the trust property "shall pass as directed under
the terms and provisions" of the 1986 Will, "which Will is
incorporated herein by reference" (emphasis added). This
incorporation by reference effectively inserted the 1986 Will in
its entirety into the Trust Deed. Booker v. Everhart, 294 N.C.
146, 152, 240 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1978).
Construing the document as a whole, we read the
dispositional language of the Trust Deed as evincing an intent by
Mrs. Wheeler that at her death, the trustee must distribute any
property remaining within the trust to those persons designated
to take it under her 1986 Will. The 1986 Will contains neither a
specific reference to the 1990 trust nor a residuary clause.
Instead, it makes a simple disposition of all her personal
property to Billy Todd Queen, and all her real property to Billy
Wheeler as trustee for Billy Todd Queen.
It must be that when Mrs. Wheeler executed the Trust Deed in
1990 and incorporated the 1986 Will by reference, she intended
that any real property remaining in the trust at her death should be distributed to those persons taking real property under her
1986 Will, and that any accumulated income should be distributed
to those persons taking personal property under her 1986 Will.
This is so even though the Trust Deed states that at Mrs.
Wheeler's death, "the Trustee shall be discharged." A trustee's
duties continue until the trust beneficiaries receive all the
property due them under the trust. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v.
Taliaferro, 246 N.C. 121, 128, 97 S.E.2d 776, 782 (1957).
Here, of course, no distribution of the real property
remaining within the 1990 trust was necessary. Upon Mrs.
Wheeler's death, Billy Wheeler retained legal title to the real
property within the 1990 Trust, but he assumed the duty of
managing that property as trustee for Billy Todd Queen under the
terms and provisions of the trust set forth in the 1986 Will.
Mrs. Wheeler's execution of a second will in 1992 did not
alter the terms of the 1990 trust. When the 1990 Trust Deed
incorporated the 1986 Will by reference, it was not thereby
transformed into a testamentary document, subject to revocation
by a later-drafted will. Rather, the Trust Deed became a
document with instructions for disposing of trust property upon
termination of the trust, instructions which the Trust Deed
otherwise lacked. The effect of this incorporation by reference
was to make the 1986 Will part of the 1990 Trust Deed, not the other way around. Booker, 294 N.C. at 152, 240 S.E.2d at 363.
The trial court concluded that the trust corpus passed
"under the decedent's will dated February 26, 1986." In the
sense that the provisions of the 1986 Will determined the
disposition of the trust property, the court's statement is true.
We hold that the trust property passed under the provisions of
the Trust Deed as amended by the incorporation of the 1986 Will
by reference.
In conclusion, we agree with the trial court that the trust
corpus passed to petitioner upon Mrs. Wheeler's death. However,
we remand to the trial court with the recommendation that it
alter the language of its judgment to clarify that the trust
corpus did not pass "under" Mrs. Wheeler's will, but that it
passed according to the 1990 Trust Deed, whose terms included the
provisions of the 1986 Will incorporated therein by reference.
Perhaps it is little more than semantics, but we would clarify
that what survived the revocation of "all other wills and
codicils" by the 1992 Will was not a will but rather the original
and amended Trust Deed.
Remanded.
Judges MARTIN, John C. and WALKER concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***