Workers' Compensation--temporarily leaving work station--fall in parking lot--injury
arising out of and in course of employment
Plaintiff employee's injury when she slipped and fell in the employer's parking lot after
she temporarily left the production line to check on a co-worker arose out of and in the course of
her employment. A finding that plaintiff left her work station without her supervisor's
permission in violation of company policy did not prohibit plaintiff from receiving
compensation benefits where plaintiff testified that it was routine to leave the work station with
the permission of other members of the production team, and she had such permission; the
supervisor admitted that she would have allowed plaintiff to leave if she had asked; the plant
manager admitted that plaintiff would probably not have been fired for going outside without
permission; and plaintiff's statement that the rule was routinely violated was not contradicted.
Judge GREENE dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from an Opinion and Award entered 7
February 1997 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 5 January 1999.
Donaldson & Black, P.A., by Jay A. Gervasi, Jr., for
plaintiff-appellant.
Orbock Bowden Ruark & Dillard, PC, by Barbara E. Ruark, for
defendant-appellees.
HUNTER, Judge.
Wanda J. Choate (plaintiff) appeals from the Opinion and
Award of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission)
which denied plaintiff's claim for benefits under the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The Commission found
as a fact that plaintiff fell in the employer's parking lot on 27
January 1994. The issue on appeal is whether that fall arose out
of and during the course of plaintiff's employment.
Evidence before the Commission tended to show that at thetime of the incident, plaintiff had worked for defendant for
twenty-seven and one-half years as a seamstress. Plaintiff
worked with several other workers in a production team, and her
pay was based on productivity. On 27 January 1994, plaintiff was
informed by a distraught co-worker, Shelly Bright (Bright), who
is married to plaintiff's nephew, that plaintiff's nephew had
just been in an automobile accident and that Bright was leaving
work in order to check on him. Bright left the plant, and
plaintiff asked her teammate in front of her in the production
line if she (plaintiff) could go outside to see if Bright needed
assistance. Plaintiff's teammate replied in the affirmative.
Plaintiff informed members of her team and went to Bright in the
parking lot. While in the parking lot, plaintiff fell due to icy
conditions. As she was falling, plaintiff grabbed Bright's car
door with her left hand and fell on her back. After her fall,
plaintiff offered to accompany Bright and inquired if there was
anything she could do to help Bright in her distressed situation.
After being informed that Bright did not need plaintiff to do
anything else, plaintiff encouraged Bright to be careful due to
her condition and inclement weather. Plaintiff then returned to
her work station.
Plaintiff did not immediately report her fall; however,
sometime before lunch, she informed her supervisor Carol Bottomly
(Bottomly) about the fall and reported that her shoulder was
hurting. Bottomly completed an accident report while plaintiff
worked at her sewing machine. Plaintiff also reported her injury
to the plant nurse at 5:30 p.m. Due to continued pain, plaintiffconsulted several physicians, including an orthopedist and a
neurologist.
Plaintiff contends that the Commission erred in finding that
her injury did not arise out of and in the course of her
employment. The Commission made findings of fact, among others,
that “[c]ompany policy prohibits personnel in the parking lot
except at authorized times unless the employee has the permission
of a supervisor” and “[p]laintiff's presence in the parking lot
was not related to her employment, but was a direct result of an
automobile accident involving her nephew.” The Commission made
specific conclusions that plaintiff's fall did not arise out of
her
employment, that her location in the parking lot at the time of
her fall was not calculated to further the employer's business
either directly or indirectly, and that plaintiff's decision to
check on her niece did not bear a reasonable relationship to her
employment nor was it related to her job duties. For those
reasons, the Commission found that plaintiff's claim is not
compensable under the provisions of the Act. We disagree.
The standard of appellate review of an opinion and award of
the Commission is limited to a determination of (1) whether the
Commission's findings of fact are supported by any competent
evidence in the record; and (2) whether the Commission's
findings justify its legal conclusions. Aaron v. New Fortis
Homes, Inc., 127 N.C. App. 711, 714, 493 S.E.2d 305, 306 (1997).
Even if there is conflicting evidence, the Commission's findings
of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is any competentevidence to support them. Weaver v. American National Can Corp.,
123 N.C. App. 507, 509-10, 473 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1996). “[T]his
Court is 'not at liberty to reweigh the evidence and to set aside
the findings . . . simply because other . . . conclusions might
have been reached.' . . . 'This is so, notwithstanding [that]
the evidence upon the entire record might support a contrary
finding.'” Baker v. City of Sanford, 120 N.C. App. 783, 787, 463
S.E.2d 559, 562 (1995), disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 651, 467
S.E.2d 703 (1996).
An injury is compensable under the Act only if the injury
(1) is an “accident” and (2) “aris[es] out of and in the courseof the employment.” Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C.
350, 354, 364 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1988); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6)
(1991). When an employee is injured while going to or from his
place of work, is upon premises owned or controlled by his
employer, and the employee's act involves no unreasonable delay,
then the injury is generally deemed to have arisen out of and in
the course of the employment. Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258
N.C. 226, 128 S.E.2d 570 (1962). Plaintiff contends that the
rule from Bass applies in the present case because her act of
entering the parking lot was certainly no more personal and no
less related to her work than leaving at the end of the day would
have been. Plaintiff went to the parking lot to check on her co-
worker and contemplated leaving work if her co-worker needed
assistance. Plaintiff did not injure herself while leaving work;
therefore the rule enunciated in Bass, while persuasive, does not
control our decision in the present case.
The words “arising out of the employment” refer to the
origin or cause of the accidental injury, and the words “in the
course of employment” refer to the time, place, and circumstances
under which an accidental injury occurs. Roberts, 321 N.C. at
354, 364 S.E.2d at 420. There must be some causal relationship
between the injury and the employment before the resulting
disability or disablement can be said to “arise out of the
employment.” Pittman v. Twin City Laundry, 61 N.C. App. 468,
472, 300 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1983). An accident arises out of and
in the course of the employment when it occurs while the employee
is engaged in some activity or duty which he is authorized toundertake and which is calculated to further, directly or
indirectly, the employer's business. Perry v. Bakeries Co., 262
N.C. 272, 136 S.E.2d 643 (1964). According to the general rule,
“[w]here any reasonable relationship to the employment exists, or
employment is a contributory cause, the court is justified in
upholding the award as 'arising out of employment.'” Smallwood v.
Eason, 123 N.C. App. 661, 665-66, 474 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1996)
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (injuries sustained by
employees as result of vehicular collision with forklift driven
by co-employee on road adjacent to employer's facility arose out
of and in the course of employees' employment for workers'
compensation purposes). Where the evidence shows that the injury
occurred during the hours of employment, at the place of
employment, and while the claimant was actually in the
performance of the duties of the employment, the injury is in the
course of the employment. Harless v. Flynn, 1 N.C. App. 448,
162 S.E.2d 47 (1968). In order to be compensable, plaintiff must
prove both the “arising out of” requirement and the “in the
course of” requirement; however, as stated by former Chief
Justice Branch, analysis of those factors sometimes blends:
[T]he two tests, although distinct, are
interrelated and cannot be applied entirely
independently. Rather, they are to be
applied together to determine the issue of
whether an accident is sufficiently work-
related to come under the Act. Since the
terms of the Act should be liberally
construed in favor of compensation,
deficiencies in one factor are sometimes
allowed to be made up by strength in the
other.
Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 252, 293S.E.2d 196, 199 (1982).
In Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 321 N.C. 350, 364
S.E.2d 417, the employee was killed while aiding a motorist on
the highway during a business trip. The North Carolina Supreme
Court stated that an injury to an employee while he is performing
acts for the benefit of third persons does not arise out of the
employment unless the acts benefit the employer to an appreciable
extent. Id. at 355, 364 S.E.2d at 421. The Court stated:
The record here contains no evidence
that anyone other than decedent involved in
the events surrounding his accidental death
had any connection to Burlington. So far as
this record reveals, decedent acted solely
for the benefit of a third party. We thus
hold that his death did not arise out of the
employment.
Id. Unlike Roberts, the present case involves numerous
connections to the employer. The plaintiff fell on the
employer's premises after temporarily leaving the production line
in order to aid a fellow employee, who also happened to be the
wife of plaintiff's nephew. The facts are very similar to those
in Bellamy v. Manufacturing Co., 200 N.C. 676, 158 S.E. 246
(1931).
In Bellamy, the plaintiff had finished work early but was
still “on the clock,” when she took a friend to seek employment
in the same mill. During that errand, plaintiff was injured in
an elevator. The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the
superior court, stated:
The mission she went on, while she was “on
duty” was in the mill, was a temporary
purpose, and not such a departure from the
employer's business that we could say from a
liberal construction of the act that it wasnot in the course of the employment. In
fact, she went with a friend to get her
employment in the mill, and in doing so did
not leave the mill. Under the facts and
circumstances of the case and the conduct of
the plaintiff, what she did was too casual to
bar a recovery.
Bellamy, 200 N.C. at 680, 158 S.E. at 248. As in Bellamy,
plaintiff in the present case was on the employer's premises when
the accident occurred. Even more convincing, she was temporarily
attending to a co-worker, whereas the plaintiff in Bellamy was
helping a friend find employment.
In another similar case, the Court found that the worker was
entitled to benefits under the Act when he was temporarily absent
from his work station. In Gordon v. Chair Co., 205 N.C. 739, 172
S.E. 485 (1934), plaintiff went to work with a co-worker during
icy conditions, and asked his son to follow in case his employer
was to be closed due to the weather. Plaintiff got to work,
learned that his employer was in operation, then went to the
outside platform at the front of the plant to tell his son not to
wait on him. While on the platform, he slipped and fell on the
ice and was injured. The Court found that the facts of the
Gordon case came within the decision in Bellamy, and the
plaintiff was granted workers' compensation benefits. Gordon,
205 N.C. at 742, 172 S.E. at 487.
The Gordon Court cited an early United States Supreme Court
case as authority, where that Court held that a worker was “on
duty” when he was struck and killed while on a personal errand,
but still within the railroad yard of his employer:
Assuming . . . that the evidence fairly
tended to indicate the boarding-house as hisdestination, it nevertheless also appears
that deceased was shortly to depart upon his
run, having just prepared his engine for the
purpose, and that he had not gone beyond the
limits of the railroad yard when he was
struck. There is nothing to indicate that
this brief visit to the boarding-house was at
all out of the ordinary, or was inconsistent
with his duty to his employer. It seems to
us, clear that the man was still “on duty,”
and employed in commerce, notwithstanding his
temporary absence from the locomotive engine.
Id. at 742, 172 S.E. at 487 (quoting N. C. R. R. Co. v. Zachary,
232 U.S. 248, 260, 58 L. Ed. 591, 596 (1914) (emphasis added)).
In Guest v. Iron & Metal Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596
(1955), an employee was on a business trip when he stopped at a
filling station to inflate the tires on his vehicle. The filling
station operator gave the employee permission to use his air hose
to inflate the tires, but before he could finish, another
customer was unable to start his car. The filling station
operator requested plaintiff to assist in pushing the car off
from a standing position so as to get it started and in order to
move it away from the gas pumps. Plaintiff complied with this
request, and was struck and injured by another car while pushing
the disabled car on the highway. The Court found that the
circumstances of mutual aid being exchanged between the employee
and filling station owner were such that “the inbound aid being
for the employer's benefit, the aid received and the aid given
are so closely interwoven that an injury to the employee under
such circumstances must be held connected with and incidental to
his employment.” Guest, 241 N.C. at 453, 85 S.E.2d at 600.
While not the basis for upholding the award of benefits in Guest,
the Court noted that “[w]here the deviation is of such nature asto constitute a total departure from the employment, compensation
is denied; but where the deviation is of a minor character,
compensation is awarded.” Id. at 454, 85 S.E.2d at 601 (citing
Parrish v. Armour & Co., 200 N.C. 654, 158 S.E. 188 (1931)).
Under Bellamy, Gordon, and Guest, we find, therefore, that a
causal connection existed and plaintiff's accident during a
temporary absence from her work station arose out of and during
the course of her employment. The Commission erred in its
conclusions of law on this issue. Its finding of fact that
“[p]laintiff's presence in the parking lot was not related to her
employment, but was a direct result of an automobile accident
involving her nephew” can be properly regarded as either a
conclusion of law, or mixed finding of fact and law, or finding
of jurisdictional fact, and is therefore not binding upon us.
Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 96 N.C. App. 293, 385 S.E.2d 515
(1989).
While company policy may not have permitted plaintiff in the
present case to leave the production line without her
supervisor's permission, our Supreme Court has held that habitual
disregard for company policy negates a defense in this regard,
stating:
[T]he more recent cases have not viewed minor
deviations from the confines of a narrow job
description as an absolute bar to the
recovery of benefits, even when such acts
were contrary to stated rules or to specific
instructions of the employer where such acts
were reasonably related to the accomplishment
of the task for which the employee was hired.
Hoyle, 306 N.C. 248, 254, 293 S.E.2d 196, 200. In Watkins v.
City of Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 225 S.E.2d 577 (1976), a firefighter was injured while working on a co-employee's personal
automobile. The Court affirmed a finding of workers'
compensation coverage, even though a published rule prohibited
repair of personal vehicles on the premises without prior
approval of the assistant chief on duty. The Court noted that it
was customary for fire fighters to make repairs during lunch,
that their superiors were aware of these activities, and these
repairs to an appreciable extent benefitted the fire department.
Watkins, 290 N.C. at 285, 225 S.E.2d at 582.
Likewise, plaintiff in the case sub judice testified that it
was routine to leave the work station with the permission of
other members of the production team. Supervisor Bottomly
testified that employees were not supposed to leave the plant
without permission, but also admitted that she would have allowed
plaintiff to leave if she had asked. The plant manager, Todd
Dixon, admitted that plaintiff would “probably not” have been
fired for going outside without permission. Plaintiff's
statement that the supposed rule was routinely violated was never
directly contradicted by the other employees. No evidence was
presented that plaintiff, or anyone else, was disciplined for her
specific actions. The Commission found that plaintiff left
without a supervisor's permission. The Commission evidently
considered that purported fact in determining that plaintiff was
outside her employment at the time of her fall; however, the
Commission made no conclusion of law based on this fact. This
finding, therefore, does not prohibit the plaintiff from
receiving an award of workers' compensation benefits under thelaws of this state. See Spratt v. Duke Power Co., 65 N.C. App.
457, 310 S.E.2d 38 (1983) (employee's disobedience of the
prohibition against running was not sufficient to break causal
connection between injury and employment when employee slipped
and fell en route to canteen to get pack of chewing gum).
The fact that the defendant did not reprimand plaintiff nor
discipline plaintiff for acting on Bright's behalf is further
evidence that plaintiff's actions appreciably benefitted the
defendant. Plaintiff certainly had reasonable grounds to believe
her actions would benefit her employer and create a feeling of
good will. Our Supreme Court has stated:
[W]here competent proof exists that the
employee understood, or had reasonable
grounds to believe that the act resulting in
injury was incidental to his employment, or
such as would prove beneficial to his
employer's interests or was encouraged by the
employer in the performance of the act or
similar acts for the purpose of creating a
feeling of good will, or authorized so to do
by common practice or custom, compensation
may be recovered, since then a causal
connection between the employment and the
accident may be established.
Watkins, 290 N.C. at 283, 225 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Guest, 241
N.C. at 452, 85 S.E.2d at 599-600).
For the reasons stated above, we hereby reverse the Opinion
and Award filed 7 April 1997 and remand the matter to the
Industrial Commission for entry of a revised Opinion and Award in
favor of the plaintiff and further determination not inconsistent
with this opinion. The order of the Commission is
Reversed and remanded.
Judge JOHN concurs. Judge GREENE dissents.
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