FIRE BAPTIZED HOLINESS CHURCH OF GOD OF THE AMERICAS, INC.,
Plaintiff, v. CARL MCSWAIN, VIRGINIA MCDOWELL, THELMA CHAMBERS,
JEFFREY ROSS, and JACKIE WILLIAMS, TRUSTEES OF FIRE BAPTIZED
HOLINESS CHURCH OF GOD OF THE AMERICAS, a/k/a MT. SINAI BAPTIST
CHURCH, a/k/a WESTSIDE PRAISE AND WORSHIP CENTER; and FIRE
BAPTIZED HOLINESS CHURCH OF GOD OF THE AMERICAS, MT. SINAI
CHURCH, a/k/a MT. SINAI BAPTIST CHURCH, a/k/a WESTSIDE PRAISE AND
WORSHIP CENTER, Defendants
1. Churches and Religions--connectional relationship--directed verdict--judgment
notwithstanding the verdict
The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff-church denomination's motions for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of the fee simple
ownership of property in possession of defendants, representing the local church, because
although plaintiff was a connectional church organization in relation to defendants prior to
defendants' split from plaintiff, defendants were not in a connectional relationship with plaintiff
with respect to property matters.
2. Churches and Religions--denomination's published rules
Although the language of plaintiff-church denomination's published rules indicate that
properly recorded local church property belongs to the denomination, and that a local church
seeking to secede from the denomination could not keep such property, the trial court did not err
in determining that plaintiff is not entitled to the pertinent property in the possession of
defendants, representing the local church, because the deeds for the property were not recorded
as set forth in the denomination's published rules since: (1) the denomination clearly expressed
its disapproval of defendants' plan to acquire the pertinent property; (2) defendants acquired the
property, despite the disapproval, by using its own money; and (3) plaintiff did nothing to
enforce the published rules at the time of its violation.
3. Churches and Religions--local church--no prior ownership
Although defendants, representing the local church, did not own property independently
before joining plaintiff-church denomination, the trial court did not err in concluding plaintiff
and defendant lacked a connectional relationship with regard to property matters because a
seceding church's property rights, the local church in the instant case, are not limited to the
property it owned prior to joining a denomination.
4. Evidence--lay opinion--harmless error
Even if the trial court erred in admitting, over objection, certain lay opinion testimony
regarding the ownership of church property, the error was harmless because it merely
corroborated unchallenged testimony from other witnesses without adding any new substantiveinformation. Appeal by plaintiff from judgment filed 2 February 1998 by
Judge Timothy L. Patti in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 16 March 1999.
Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by Matthew M. Sawchak
and Mary M. Dillon, for plaintiff-appellant.
Ali Paksoy, Jr., and Brenda S. McLain, for defendant-
appellees.
LEWIS, Judge.
Plaintiff Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the
Americas, Inc. ("the denomination") filed a complaint on 20 March
1996 against defendants ("the Shelby church"), seeking a
declaration that it was the fee simple owner of property then in
possession of the Shelby church. In its answer and counterclaim,
the Shelby church asked the trial court to declare the newly
formed Westside Praise and Worship Center the fee simple owner of
the property.
At the close of all the evidence at trial, the jurors were
asked to determine two issues: first, whether the denomination
was a connectional church organization; and second, whether the
Shelby church, prior to 20 October 1994, was in a connectional
relationship with the denomination with respect to property
matters. The jury found that the denomination was a connectional
church but that the Shelby church was not in a connectional
relationship with the denomination with respect to property
matters. Judgment was entered for the Shelby church, and thedenomination's claims were dismissed with prejudice. The
denomination's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
was denied, just as its earlier motion for a directed verdict at
the close of its evidence had been. From the judgment filed 2
February 1998, the denomination appeals.
To better understand the nature of this case, it is
important to first understand some background of the denomination
and the Shelby church. The denomination is now over one hundred
years old, with a claimed international membership of over
24,000. It is organized into three dioceses, each headed by a
bishop. The bishops ordain elders to act as the bishops'
representatives to local churches. The denomination assigns
pastors to its local churches, and the local churches raise the
money to pay these pastors. The Shelby church joined the
denomination in the 1930s. The Shelby church raised money to
submit at the denomination's annual convention, and the
denomination would sometimes give money to the Shelby church for
various expenses.
At the center of the present debate is ownership of certain
property in Shelby. The facility on Pickney Street that housed
the Shelby church beginning in 1937 was condemned in 1970. The
Reverend Samuel Ervin, the pastor of the Shelby church in 1970,
located another church building on Blanton Street owned by the
Davidson Memorial Baptist Church, which agreed to sell this
property to the Shelby church and to acquire the condemnedproperty on Pickney Street. In January 1970, Davidson Memorial
deeded its property to the "Trustees of the Fire Baptized
Holiness Church of God of the Americas, Mt. Sinai Church"; this
same name appeared as the grantor on the deed to the Pickney
Street property. The Shelby church purchased the Blanton Street
property for $25,000 by making a down payment of $5,000 ($2,500
in the form of property traded, and the remaining $2,500 to be
raised by the Shelby church) and by covering the balance with a
$20,000 mortgage.
This transaction was undertaken without the approval or
permission of the denomination, and in spite of a statement made
by a bishop within the denomination that both the Blanton Street
property and its accompanying financial obligations were too
large and unnecessary for the Shelby church. The denomination
nevertheless provided a matching gift of $1,000 toward the down
payment, but the Shelby church raised money for the remaining
portion of the down payment, the mortgage payments and funding
for subsequent renovations.
In a 1983 condemnation action brought against the "Trustees
of the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas, Mt.
Sinai Church," the City of Shelby paid the Shelby church
approximately $28,800 for a parking lot and boarding house on the
Blanton Street property. This was done without the permission or
approval of the denomination. The Shelby church used these
proceeds to buy three new parcels of property and to pay forchurch renovations, relocation of the fellowship hall, and
improvements to the church sanctuary. When the condemnation
proceeds did not cover all of the renovation expenses, the Shelby
church took out a second mortgage on the church property, without
the permission or approval of the denomination, for $25,000 in
1990. The Shelby church neither sought nor received assistance
from the denomination in making these renovations.
In October 1994, the Shelby church voted to end its
affiliation with the denomination. On 3 January 1996, the
trustees of "the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the
Americas, Mt. Sinai Church" conveyed the church property to
themselves as trustees of the Westside Praise and Worship Center.
It was this conveyance that led to the denomination's legal
action against the Shelby church, and the Shelby church's successat trial has led to the denomination's appeal to this Court.
[1]The denomination's first argument on appeal is that the
trial court erred by denying the denomination's motions for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Within this argument the denomination makes three separate
contentions: (1) that the jury's finding that the denomination
is connectional, with nothing more, justified judgment for the
denomination; (2) that the nature of the deed required judgment
for the denomination; and (3) that "the verdict that the Shelby
church and the [denomination] lacked a connectional relationship
on property matters does not support the judgment."
Although constitutional guarantees and the concept of
separation of church and state preclude us from ruling on purely
ecclesiastical issues, our courts "do have jurisdiction as to
civil, contract and property rights which are involved in, or
arise from, a church controversy." A.M.E. Zion Church v. Union
Chapel A.M.E. Zion Church, 64 N.C. App. 391, 412, 308 S.E.2d 73,
85 (1983), disc. review denied, 310 N.C. 308, 312 S.E.2d 649
(1984). In deciding these issues, a central question is whether
the church is connectional or congregational. As established in
Simmons v. Allison, 118 N.C. 763, 24 S.E. 716 (1896) and
summarized more recently in Looney v. Community Bible Holiness
Church, 103 N.C. App. 469, 473, 405 S.E.2d 811, 813 (1991),
[c]onnectional churches are governed by large
bodies and individual congregations bear the
same relation to the governing body as
counties bear to the State. Congregationalchurches are independent republics, governed
by the majority of its [sic] members and
subject to control or supervision by no
higher authority. Although congregational
churches often associate together for mission
purposes, these associations are strictly
voluntary and have no governmental authority
over the individual congregations.
Id. (citations omitted). One early Supreme Court case in this
state cited the Protestant Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian and
Roman Catholic churches as examples of connectional churches and
the Baptist, Congregational and Christian churches as
congregational. Conference v. Allen, 156 N.C. 524, 526, 72 S.E.
617, 618 (1911).
There seems to be little dispute that the denomination and
the Shelby church were generally in a connectional relationship
prior to the Shelby church's split from the denomination. The
question before us is whether this is dispositive of the issue of
property ownership, or whether the relationship could be
connectional in some respects and congregational in others. In
Looney, the jury determined that the denomination was a
connectional church organization but that the local church was
not in a connectional relationship with the denomination with
respect to property matters. Looney, 103 N.C. App. at 470-71,
405 S.E.2d at 811-12. This Court found no error in the verdict
based on "the nature of the property transactions themselves."
Id. at 474, 405 S.E.2d at 813. The Court noted that under the
facts of that case,
[w]hen the defendant local church affiliatedwith the plaintiff denominational church, the
property was deeded to trustees of, or for,
the local church, not to the denominational
church or to trustees of, or for, the
denominational church. This pattern was
followed in all property transactions during
the entire period of affiliation. Thus this
evidence created a jury question as to
whether as to church property the local
church intended to establish a connectional
relationship with the denominational church.
Id. Because Looney established that a church could be
congregational as to property matters though connectional in
other ways, the denomination's argument that the jury's finding
of a connectional relationship was enough, standing alone, to
justify judgment for the denomination is unconvincing.
Unlike the local church in Looney, however, the Shelby
church never owned any property before it was associated with the
denomination. The first Shelby church property was purchased in
1937, and the deed for this property granted it to the “Trustees
of the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas/Mt.
Sinai Church and their successors in office." Subsequent deeds
involving the local church in 1970, 1984, 1986, and 1996 were
similarly titled with the name of the denomination followed by
the name of the local church. The denomination claims that
General Statute section 61-3 required judgment in its favor.
[2]According to the denomination, section 61-3 "provides
that all church property 'shall be and remain forever to the use
and occupancy of that church or denomination . . . for which the
[church property was] so purchased, given, granted or devised.'" See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 61-3 (1989). Such a reading ignores the
language of the statute that specifies that this be done
"according to the intent expressed in the conveyance, gift, grant
or will . . . ." Id. The Shelby church argues that the lack of
specificity in the deeds, which named both the denomination and
the Shelby church as the grantees of church property, fails to
demonstrate the intent of the grantor and that this question was
properly resolved by the jury. The denomination, citing A.M.E.
Zion, 64 N.C. App. at 414-15, 308 S.E.2d at 86-87, claims any
dispute on this point was not a question of fact for the jury but
a question of law to be resolved by the trial court by consulting
the church discipline.
The rules of the denomination are enumerated in the
Discipline of the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God of the
Americas ("the Discipline"), published by the denomination. In
the 1970 Discipline, Section 4 of Article XVI, "Directions
Regulating Deeds, Titles, Etc.", read as follows: "Let it be
specified in each deed to church property that it shall be for
the use and benefit of the ministry and membership of the Fire
Baptized Holiness Church of God of the Americas." In the 1994
Discipline, Article XVIII bore the same title as Article XVI
above, and Section 4 stated, "It shall be specified in each deed
to church property that it shall be for the use and benefit of
the ministry and membership who are worshipping according to the
customs and usages of the Fire Baptized Holiness Church of God ofthe Americas."
The deeds presented as evidence at trial and included as
exhibits on appeal do not make these required specifications.
There is no mention of the purpose of the property or any
reference to the customs and usages of the denomination.
Instead, the deeds simply include the names of both the
denomination and the Shelby church as grantees.
Under the language of the Discipline, it seems clear that
local church property that is recorded as specified in the
Discipline belongs to the denomination, and that a local church
seeking to secede from the denomination could not keep such
property. Here, though, the deeds were not recorded as set out
in the Discipline. Furthermore, evidence at trial indicated that
the decision to move into a new sanctuary in 1970 did not meet
with the approval of the denomination. According to Section 2 of
the Discipline's articles on property in both 1970 and 1994, the
local church's board of trustees was required to receive the
approval of the bishop or ruling elder before securing any
warranty deeds. This was not done by the trustees of the Shelby
church. In fact, the denomination clearly expressed its
disapproval of the Shelby church's plan to acquire the property
now in dispute, but the Shelby church nevertheless did so, using
its own money. We find that it would be inequitable, if not
unconstitutional, for a court of this state to enforce the
Discipline against the Shelby church nunc pro tunc when thedenomination made no effort to enforce it at the time of any
violations. As was true in Looney, “[t]he discipline of the
denominational church manifest an implied assent of local
churches to denominational control of local church property.
This evidence, if not contradicted, would make the plaintiffs'
case.” Similarly to Looney, this evidence was contradicted. The
question at trial then became one of the Shelby church's desire
for independence prior to its ultimate secession from the
denomination, and this question was one of fact to be resolved by
the jury.
[3]The denomination's third contention within its first
argument is that the verdict that the Shelby church and the
denomination lacked a connectional relationship with regard to
property matters did not support the take-nothing judgment
against the denomination. The denomination emphasizes that in
both A.M.E. Zion and Looney, the local churches were permitted to
keep the property they owned independently before joining the
connectional denomination. According to the denomination, the
verdict in this action is inconsistent with A.M.E. Zion and
Looney, since the Shelby church owned no property before joining
the denomination and it therefore cannot keep the property
acquired during its affiliation with the denomination.
We do not read A.M.E. Zion or Looney to limit a seceding
church's property rights to that property it owned prior to
joining a denomination. It is our understanding that referencesin these cases to taking property "independently owned prior to
and retained during its limited affiliation with the general
church", see Looney, 103 N.C. App. at 473-74, 405 S.E.2d at 813
(citing A.M.E. Zion, 64 N.C. App. at 413-14, 308 S.E.2d at 86),
were based on decisions prior to Looney's explicit acceptance of
a connectional church being congregational as to property
matters. In A.M.E. Zion, we remanded the case and stated that
"upon remand, the major question to be answered . . . is whether
the defendant local church was in fact in a hierarchical
relationship with the plaintiff parent body with respect to
property matters." A.M.E. Zion, 64 N.C. App. at 416, 308 S.E.2d
at 87. Because that case involved different names on the deeds,
we further stated that "[u]pon retrial, a determination must be
made as to whether 'Union Chapel Methodist Church' would be
entitled to fee simple ownership of lands deeded to a Methodist
Episcopal Church in the 1873 deed and to an A.M.E. Zion Church in
the 1976 deed." Id. at 416, 308 S.E.2d at 88. This indicates to
us that ownership of property acquired over 100 years after the
local church joined the denomination could have been kept by the
local church when it left the denomination, depending upon the
nature of the relationship between the denomination and local
church. Although Looney recited the same "independently owned
prior to" language as A.M.E. Zion, the ultimate result was that
the local church was permitted to keep both the church property
it acquired prior to joining the denomination in 1955 and the newsanctuary it constructed in 1972 and 1973, before leaving the
denomination in 1988. In light of this interpretation of these
cases, the denomination's argument fails. The trial court
properly denied the denomination's motions for directed verdict
and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
[4]The denomination's second argument on appeal is that the
trial court erred by admitting, over objection, certain lay
opinion testimony regarding the ownership of church property.
The denomination objected to the testimony of Jackie Williams,
who testified that the words "Mt. Sinai" were on the deeds
"because it belonged to the members of Mt. Sinai"; of Jeffrey
Ross, who stated that it was his understanding and intent as a
trustee that the property belonged to the Shelby church; and of
Reverend Verlon Pompey, who claimed it was his understanding that
the property was to be held by the trustees of the church for the
Shelby church. The denomination argues on appeal that the
court's admission of the opinions expressed on these points by
these witnesses was improper. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule
602 (1992) (stating that lay witness must testify from his
personal knowledge); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 701 (1992)
(limiting lay opinions to those which are "(a) rationally based
on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in
issue"); see also Beam v. Kerlee, 120 N.C. App. 203, 216, 461
S.E.2d 911, 921 (1995) (precluding testimony of the legalconclusion that a party "owns" property by adverse possession),
cert. denied, 342 N.C. 651, 467 S.E.2d 703 (1996).
We hold that even if the trial court erred in admitting this
testimony, the error was not reversible. "Where improperly
admitted evidence merely corroborates testimony from other
witnesses, we have found the error harmless." State v. Wynne,
329 N.C. 507, 519, 406 S.E.2d 812, 818 (1991). Reverend Ervin,
who served as pastor of the Shelby church at the time of the 1970
property change, testified without objection that the
congregation of the Shelby church intended to own the property
and that "Mt. Sinai" was on the deeds “because the people thought
they were buying the church for Mt. Sinai.” Clara Louise
Williams, a trustee of the Shelby church at that same time,
stated without objection that she intended and understood that
the trustees of the Shelby church would own the building and
property. Similarly, the denomination did not object to Reverend
Pompey's testimony that his understanding during the transactions
in the 1980s was that the Shelby church owned the property and
that he understood and intended throughout the time of his
affiliation with the Shelby church that the property belonged to
the local congregation.
In light of these facts, the testimony to which the
denomination objected merely corroborated the unchallenged
testimony without adding any new substantive information. Any
error in admitting the challenged testimony was harmless, anddefendant's second argument is without merit.
For the reasons set out above, we hold that the parties to
this action received a fair trial, free of prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges GREENE and HORTON concur.
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