KEMESHA HOBBS, MICHAEL HOBBS and MICHELAE HOBBS By and Through
Her Guardian Ad Litem, ANNE WINNER, Plaintiffs v. NORTH CAROLINA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, WAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES, WAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, WAKE COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES, MARIA
SPAULDING, individually, and in her capacity as DIRECTOR OF WAKE
COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES, MARY DEYAMPERT, individually, and in her
capacity as DIRECTOR OF THE NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, THOMAS W. HOGAN, individually, and in his capacity as
DIRECTOR OF THE WAKE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, JAMES
W. KIRKPATRICK, JR., individually, and in his capacity as
DIRECTOR OF WAKE COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES, DELICE COFFEY, individually, and in
her capacity as a Wake County Social Worker, HORACIO SANCHEZ,
individually, and in his capacity as a Wake County Social Worker,
MARTHA F. WATERS, individually, and in her capacity as a Wake
County Social Worker, SANDRA DELOATCH, individually, and in her
capacity as a Wake County Social Worker, FILICO C. BELL,
individually, and in his capacity as a Wake County Social Worker,
ROSA LEECH, individually, and in her capacity as a Wake County
Social Worker, TOBIAS H. SMITH, individually, and in his capacity
as a Wake County Social Worker, JOHN C. HARVEY, individually, and
in his capacity as a Wake County Social Worker,
Defendants
1. Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--jurisdiction
Defendants Wake County DSS, Wake County Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities
and Substance Abuse Services, and Wake County Human Services could not argue on appeal
that there was no statutory authority for suit against them where they failed to raise the issue in
their motion to dismiss in the trial court and stipulated to the Court of Appeals that they were
properly before the trial court.
2. Immunity--public duty doctrine--foster child placement--special relationship
Dismissal of an action for negligence in the placement of a foster child into plaintiffs'
home for failure to state a claim was inappropriate as to Wake County DSS, Wake County
Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse Services, and Wake County
Human Services where those defendants argued that they were protected by the public dutydoctrine, but the facts arguably suggested a special relationship and special duty in that the
parties had considerable direct contact and discussion, defendants visited in plaintiffs' home, and
plaintiffs alleged that they specifically asked and specifically were given assurances that the
foster child would not be a threat to their small daughter.
3. Public Officers and Employees--official capacity suits--redundant
The dismissal of negligence claims against individuals in their official capacities was
inappropriate where the dismissal of claims against the agencies was inappropriate. Official
capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the government entity and
are redundant.
4. Public Officers and Employees--social workers--public officials
Dismissal of negligence claims against certain defendants in their individual capacities
arising from the placement of a foster child was affirmed where these defendants were acting as
public officials since they were acting for and representing the director of social services. Foster
children and the families who provide homes for them present a wide range of circumstances,
staff members who work with foster children and families certainly cannot rely on fixed and
designated facts , and the process must involve defendants' personal deliberation, decision and
judgment. Taking into account the language of N.C.G.S. § 108A-14(b) and Meyer v. Walls, 347
N.C. 548, these defendants were acting as public officials who cannot be held liable for mere
negligence and there were no allegations of corrupt or malicious acts or omissions or of acts
beyond the scope of their duties. Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 11 May 1998 by Judge
James C. Spencer, Jr., in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 29 April 1999.
Elizabeth F. Kuniholm, by Elizabeth F. Kuniholm and Toni M.
Benham, for plaintiff-appellants.
Wake County Attorney's Office, by Michael R. Ferrell and
Corinne G. Russell, for defendant-appellees.
HUNTER, Judge.
The record in this case tends to show that the adult
plaintiffs, Kemesha and Michael Hobbs (“plaintiffs”), applied and
became licensed to be foster parents in Wake County in the spring
of 1993. The licensing process was rather involved. Plaintiffs
filled out considerable paperwork and provided information about
themselves and their family life, including information about
their daughter, Michelae, who was two-years-old at the time.
Staff members of the Wake County Department of Social Services
(“Wake County DSS”) made an evaluation visit to the plaintiffs'
home and met young Michelae. Plaintiffs attended meetings and
training sessions, purchased additional insurance and fulfilled
all the requirements to become foster parents.
In the summer of 1993, staff members of the Wake County DSS
approached the couple about the placement of a particular child,a twelve-year-old boy, in their home. Over a period of weeks,
one or both of the plaintiffs met with Wake County DSS staff
members to discuss the child, his needs and whether the
plaintiffs' home would be a suitable placement for him. At the
time of these various meetings, Wake County DSS staff knew, but
failed to inform plaintiffs, that the child had been a victim of
sexual abuse and had been exposed to an environment in which his
sisters were also victims of sexual abuse. Nevertheless, the
child was placed with plaintiffs in August 1993.
In the fall of 1993, plaintiffs discovered that the child
had sexually assaulted their daughter. The couple filed suit in
1996, alleging negligence in the placement of the child in their
home. The complaint asserts that the defendants as professionals
knew or should have known that a child who has been a victim of
sexual abuse and who has lived in an environment of sexual
assault is likely to re-enact the abuse on younger, more
vulnerable children.
Summonses issued in October 1996 were returned as to all
defendants except Rosa Leech. Plaintiffs filed a voluntary
dismissal without prejudice of defendants North Carolina
Department of Human Resources; Mary Deyampert, individually and
in her capacity as director of the North Carolina Department of
Human Resources; Maria Spaulding, individually; Thomas Hogan,individually; James W. Kirkpatrick, Jr., individually; and
Horacio Sanchez, individually and in his capacity as a social
worker. Defendants before us are Wake County DSS; Wake County
Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse
Services; Wake County Human Services; Thomas W. Hogan in his
capacity as director of the Wake County DSS; James W.
Kirkpatrick, Jr., in his capacity as director of Wake County
Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse
Services; Maria Spaulding in her capacity as director of Wake
County Human Services; and Delice Coffey, Martha F. Waters,
Sandra Deloatch, Filico C. Bell, Tobias H. Smith and John C.
Harvey, all six of whom are named in their official and
individual capacities.
In May 1998, the trial court entered an order granting
defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs appeal and
assign error to the trial court's conclusion that the complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
[1]/A HREF>The complaint names, among others, Wake County DSS; Wake
County Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance
Abuse Services; and Wake County Human Services. These three
entities argue they may not be sued as individual entities.
Citing N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 108A (1997), 122C (1996) and 153A-77(1991), they contend there is no statutory authority for lawsuits
against the defendants Wake County DSS; Wake County Mental
Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse Services;
and Wake County Human Services. This amounts to an argument that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over these defendants.
Contrary to this argument, however, these defendants stipulated
in the record before us that they were properly before the trial
court and that the trial court had jurisdiction over them.
Further, in their motion to dismiss, these parties cited N.C.R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) and N.C.R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction), but they did not
cite N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), which sets out “lack of
jurisdiction over the person” as grounds for dismissal. “[A]
defendant may raise the defense of lack of jurisdiction over his
person by a pre-answer motion or by a responsive pleading. If
the defendant fails to proceed in this manner, the defense of
lack of jurisdiction is waived.” Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App.
666, 669-70, 353 S.E.2d 673, 676 (1987) (citation omitted). We
also note our Supreme Court has held that “an action against a
county agency which directly affects the rights of the county is
in fact an action against the county.” Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C.
97, 104, 489 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1997). Having failed to raise this
issue in their motion and having stipulated to this Court thatthey were properly before the trial court, these defendants may
not now argue they are not subject to suit.
[2]Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court
properly dismissed the complaint against defendants Wake County
DSS; Wake County Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and
Substance Abuse Services; and Wake County Human Services.
“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint
by presenting 'the question whether, as a
matter of law, the allegations of the
complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief can be
granted under some [recognized] legal
theory.'” A motion to dismiss pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) should not be granted “'unless
it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is
entitled to no relief under any state of
facts which could be proved in support of the
claim.'”
Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 604-05, 517 S.E.2d 121, 124
(1999) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Defendants did not file a response to plaintiffs'
assertions; rather, they argue they are protected by the public
duty doctrine.
Our Supreme Court adopted the public duty doctrine and the
two exceptions to it in Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410
S.E.2d 897 (1991), reh'g denied, 330 N.C. 854, 413 S.E.2d 550
(1992):
The general common law rule, known asthe public duty doctrine, is that a
municipality and its agents act for the
benefit of the public, and therefore, there
is no liability for the failure to furnish
police protection to specific individuals.
This rule recognizes the limited resources of
law enforcement and refuses to judicially
impose an overwhelming burden of liability
for failure to prevent every criminal act.
“The amount of protection that may be
provided is limited by the resources of the
community and by a considered
legislative-executive decision as to how
those resources may be deployed. For the
courts to proclaim a new and general duty of
protection in the law of tort, even to those
who may be the particular seekers of
protection based on specific hazards, could
and would inevitably determine how the
limited police resources . . . should be
allocated and without predictable limits.”
While this policy is a necessary and
reasonable limit on liability, exceptions
exist to prevent inevitable inequities to
certain individuals. There are two generally
recognized exceptions to the public duty
doctrine: (1) where there is a special
relationship between the injured party and
the police, for example, a state's witness or
informant who has aided law enforcement
officers; and (2) “when a municipality,
through its police officers, creates a
special duty by promising protection to an
individual, the protection is not
forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on
the promise of protection is causally related
to the injury suffered.” Although we have
not heretofore adopted the doctrine with its
exceptions, we do so now.
Id. at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901-02 (citations omitted). Since
Braswell, our Courts have applied the public duty doctrine inother contexts. See Stone v. N.C. Dept. of Labor , 347 N.C. 473,
495 S.E.2d 711, reh'g denied, 348 N.C. 79, 502 S.E.2d 836, cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1016, 142 L. Ed. 2d 449 (1998) (workplace
inspections by state OSHA employees); Simmons v. City of Hickory,
126 N.C. App. 821, 487 S.E.2d 583 (1997) (home inspection by city
building inspectors); Prevette v. Forsyth County, 110 N.C. App.
754, 431 S.E.2d 216, disc. review denied, 334 N.C. 622, 435
S.E.2d 338 (1993) (release of dogs by animal control office and
shelter). Prior to Braswell and its progeny, this Court held
that a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-544 (1995), which
provides for the protection of abused or neglected juveniles, may
give rise to an action for negligence. Coleman v. Cooper, 89
N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2, disc. review denied, 322 N.C. 834,
371 S.E.2d 275 (1988). See also Coleman v. Cooper, 102 N.C. App.
650, 403 S.E.2d 577, disc. review denied, 329 N.C. 786, 408
S.E.2d 517 (1991). Based on the case law of this state, it is
clear that under some circumstances, negligence claims by abused
or neglected juveniles against agencies and employees charged
with their care may be actionable.
The provision of foster care is, without doubt, for the
public good and comes under the broad umbrella of the public duty
doctrine. But, by its nature, it also involves circumstances in
which the agencies, officials and employees involved in theadministration of foster care develop special relationships with
the children and families with whom they work and, pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-544 and the Coleman cases, have special
duties.
In Braswell, the issue was whether remarks allegedly made by
the sheriff to a woman created a special duty to protect the
woman from her husband. The facts in that case show that a woman
found evidence that her estranged husband, a deputy sheriff, had
plans to kill her. She shared the information with the sheriff
and expressed her fears that she would be killed. The sheriff,
according to testimony, assured her that “'he would see she got
back and forth to work safely . . . [and] that his men would be
keeping an eye on her.'” Braswell, 330 N.C. at 369, 410 S.E.2d
at 900. A few days later, the woman's husband shot her to death
while she was on a lunchtime errand. The administrator of her
estate sued the sheriff for negligent failure to protect. Citing
the public duty doctrine as set out above, our Supreme Court
found that the sheriff had no specific duty to protect the woman
from her husband. The Braswell Court agreed with defense
arguments that the sheriff's alleged statements “were general
words of comfort and assurance, commonly offered by law
enforcement officers in situations involving domestic problems,
and that such promises were merely gratuitous and hence notsufficient to constitute an actual promise of safety.” Braswell,
330 N.C. at 371-72, 410 S.E.2d at 902.
Even so, the Braswell Court acknowledged that the sheriff's
promise to the woman to protect her as she went to and from work
was arguably specific enough to create a special duty exception
to the public duty doctrine. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 372, 410
S.E.2d at 902. See also Isenhour, 350 N.C. at 606, 517 S.E.2d at
125. However, the Braswell Court did not pursue that point since
the victim in that case was undisputedly killed while on a midday
errand, not while traveling to or from work, “and hence was
outside the scope of protection arguably promised by [the
sheriff].” Braswell, 330 N.C. at 372, 410 S.E.2d at 902.
Our Supreme Court has recently applied the special
relationship exception to the public duty doctrine in Isenhour.
In that case, a child was struck by a car and killed as he
attempted to cross the street after having been signaled by a
school-crossing guard that it was safe to cross. The child's
family sued the city and the school-crossing guard alleging
wrongful death. Our Supreme Court held that the city “by
providing school crossing guards, has undertaken an affirmative,
but limited, duty to protect certain children, at certain times,
in certain places” and found the public duty doctrine
inapplicable under those circumstances. Isenhour, ___ N.C. at___, 517 S.E.2d at 126. The Isenhour Court also noted that “the
relationship between the crossing guard and the children is
direct and personal, and the dangers are immediate and
foreseeable.” Id. The Isenhour Court found the city and the
crossing guard subject to suit.
We must determine whether one or both exceptions to the
public duty doctrine apply to the facts before us.
In this case, plaintiffs allege that they “specifically
asked whether it was safe” to have the foster child in question
placed in their home with their toddler daughter. They assert
they “were told that it would be safe[.]” Citing Braswell, 330
N.C. at 371-72, 410 S.E.2d at 902, defendants argue that such
assurances were gratuitous comments that would commonly be made
in the context of describing a foster child to his prospective
foster family and not “sufficient to create an actual promise of
safety to the family.” We do not agree that the facts before us
are so simply analogous to those of Braswell.
In the case at bar, the complaint states that
representatives of Wake County DSS visited the plaintiffs' home
to decide if it was suitable for the placement of a foster child.
The complaint states that representatives of Wake County DSS;
Wake County Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and
Substance Abuse Services; and Wake County Human Services met withone or both plaintiffs at least three times to discuss placement
of the designated foster child in their home. The complaint
refers to a “team meeting” attended by the plaintiffs and nine
representatives of defendants Wake County DSS; Wake County Mental
Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse Services;
and Wake County Human Services to discuss the placement of the
foster child. Treating plaintiffs' assertions as true, as we
must, Isenhour, 350 N.C. at 604, 517 S.E.2d at 124, we conclude
that these were purposeful meetings, not casual conversations.
The meetings addressed the serious matter of whether placement of
the foster child in plaintiffs' home was appropriate and were not
a setting in which one might disregard the assurances as
gratuitous comments. These facts distinguish the case before us
from Braswell.
In light of Isenhour, the facts before us arguably suggest a
special relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
The parties had considerable direct contact and discussion.
Defendants visited in plaintiffs' home. The facts also arguably
suggest a special duty in that, as discussed above, plaintiffs
allege they specifically asked and specifically were given
assurances that the foster child would not be a threat to their
small daughter.
In the context of direct contact and purposeful meetings,were defendants' assurances gratuitous reassurance or did they
create a special duty? Was there a special relationship between
defendants and the prospective foster parents? These questions
make dismissal at the pleading stage inappropriate.
[3]We now turn to the individuals named as defendants in
only their official capacities. Those before us are Thomas W.
Hogan in his capacity as director of Wake County DSS; James W.
Kirkpatrick, Jr., in his capacity as director of Wake County
Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse
Services; and Maria Spaulding in her capacity as director of Wake
County Human Services.
“[O]fficial-capacity suits “'generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an
officer is an agent.'” Thus, where the governmental entity may
be held liable for damages resulting from its official policy, a
suit naming public officers in their official capacity is
redundant.” Moore v. City of Creedmoor, 345 N.C. 356, 367, 481
S.E.2d 14, 21 (1997) (citations omitted). “[O]fficial-capacity
suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the
governmental entity.” Mullis v. Sechrest, 347 N.C. 548, 554, 495
S.E.2d 721, 725 (1998) (citation omitted). “A claim against
[defendants DSS director, DSS supervisor and social worker] in
their official capacities is a claim against DSS[.]” Meyer v.Walls, 347 N.C. at 111, 489 S.E.2d at 888. The claims against
defendants Hogan, Kirkpatrick and Spaulding in their official
capacities are effectively claims against Wake County DSS; Wake
County Mental Health, Developmental Disabilities and Substance
Abuse Services; and Wake County Human Services. For the reasons
explained above, the trial court's dismissal was inappropriate.
Finally, we turn to the defendants before us who were sued
in their official and individual capacities. They are Delice
Coffey, Martha F. Waters, Sandra Deloatch, Filico C. Bell, Tobias
H. Smith and John C. Harvey. Our analysis with regard to these
six defendants in their official capacities is identical to the
analysis set out above, and the complaint against them in their
official capacities was improperly dismissed.
[4]In addressing the complaint against defendants Coffey,
Waters, Deloatch, Bell, Smith and Harvey in their individual
capacities, we must address the question of whether they are
properly designated as public officials or public employees.
Public officials cannot be held individually
liable for damages caused by mere negligence
in the performance of their governmental or
discretionary duties; public employees can.
“It is settled law in this jurisdiction
that a public official, engaged in the
performance of governmental duties involving
the exercise of judgment and discretion, may
not be held personally liable for mere
negligence in respect thereto. The rule insuch cases is that an official may not be
held liable unless it be alleged and proved
that his act, or failure to act, was corrupt
or malicious, or that he acted outside of and
beyond the scope of his duties. . . .”
Meyer, 347 N.C. at 112, 489 S.E.2d at 888 (citations omitted).
Our Supreme Court in Meyer set out the test for determining
whether an individual is a public official or a public employee.
“A public officer is someone whose
position is created by the constitution or
statutes of the sovereign. 'An essential
difference between a public office and mere
employment is the fact that the duties of the
incumbent of an office shall involve the
exercise of some portion of sovereign power.'
Officers exercise a certain amount of
discretion, while employees perform
ministerial duties. Discretionary acts are
those requiring personal deliberation,
decision and judgment; duties are
ministerial when they are 'absolute, certain,
and imperative, involving merely the
execution of a specific duty arising from
fixed and designated facts.'”
Meyer, 347 N.C. at 113, 489 S.E.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-14 recognizes the position of “county
director of social services” and gives the director the duty and
responsibility, inter alia, “[t]o accept children for placement
in foster homes and to supervise placements for so long as such
children require foster home care[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-
14(a)(12) (Cum. Supp. 1998). Unquestionably, pursuant to the
statute, a county director of social services is a public officeras defined in Meyer. The statute also gives the director the
authority to “delegate to one or more members of his staff the
authority to act as his representative.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-
14(b) (Cum. Supp. 1998). This statutory language contemplates
that staff members of departments of social services may be
responsible for duties identified in the statute. It creates a
structure under which department of social services staff members
may function as public officers.
Foster children and the families who provide homes for them
present a wide range of circumstances. Staff members who work
with foster children and families certainly cannot rely on
“'fixed and designated facts.'” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 113, 489
S.E.2d at 889 (citations omitted). In the case before us, for
example, the complaint states that defendants Bell and Smith
visited plaintiffs' home to determine if it was suitable for the
placement of a foster child. The complaint also states that one
or more defendants met with one or both adult plaintiffs at least
three times to discuss placement of the designated foster child
in the plaintiffs' home. Common sense tells us that the home
inspection and the meetings required the participating defendants
to assess the individual characteristics and circumstances of the
foster child and the prospective foster family. The process must
have involved defendants' “personal deliberation, decision andjudgment.” Meyer, 347 N.C. at 113, 489 S.E.2d at 889. It surely
involved more than “'the execution of a specific duty arising
from fixed and designated facts.'” Id. Taking into account the
language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-14(b) and Meyer, we conclude
that defendants Coffey, Waters, Deloatch, Bell, Smith and Harvey
were acting as public officials since they were acting for and
representing the director of social services. Thus, we hold that
defendants Coffey, Waters, Deloatch, Bell, Smith and Harvey may
not be held individually liable.
As noted above, “[p]ublic officials cannot be held
individually liable for damages caused by mere negligence in the
performance of their governmental or discretionary duties[.]”
Meyer, 347 N.C. at 112, 489 S.E.2d at 888. “[A]n official may
not be held liable unless it be alleged and proved that his act,
or failure to act, was corrupt or malicious, or that he acted
outside of and beyond the scope of his duties.” Id. Plaintiffs'
complaint contains no allegations of corrupt or malicious acts or
omissions by defendants and no allegations of acts outside or
beyond the scope of defendants' duties.
We are aware that plaintiffs' complaint characterizes
defendants Coffey, Waters, Deloatch, Bell, Smith and Harvey as
social workers. We are further aware that this Court, in
Coleman, 102 N.C. App. 650, 403 S.E.2d 577, treated a socialworker as a public employee. Coleman, however, was decided
before our Supreme Court embraced the test set out in Meyer and
before N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-14 was amended to provide that a
county social services director may “delegate to one or more
members of his staff the authority to act as his representative.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 108A-14(b). Based on Meyer and N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 108A-14(b), we conclude we are not bound by Coleman on this
issue.
The trial court's dismissal is reversed as to defendants
Wake County DSS; Wake County Mental Health, Developmental
Disabilities and Substance Abuse Services; Wake County Human
Services; Thomas W. Hogan in his official capacity as director of
the Wake County DSS; James W. Kirkpatrick, Jr., in his official
capacity as director of Wake County Mental Health, Developmental
Disabilities and Substance Abuse Services; Maria Spaulding in her
official capacity as director of Wake County Human Services;
Delice Coffey in her official capacity as a Wake County social
worker; Martha F. Waters in her official capacity as a Wake
County social worker; Sandra Deloatch in her official capacity as
a Wake County social worker; Filico C. Bell in his official
capacity as a Wake County social worker; Tobias H. Smith in his
official capacity as a Wake County social worker; and John C.
Harvey in his official capacity as a Wake County social worker. The trial court's dismissal as to defendants Coffey, Waters,
Deloatch, Bell, Smith and Harvey in their individual capacities
is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Judges WYNN and WALKER concur.
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