Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata--negligence action--prior declaratory judgment on
insurance coverage--negligence claim not precluded
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment for defendants based upon collateral
estoppel in a negligence action arising from a shooting at defendants' house where a trial court
had previously concluded in a declaratory judgment action that a homeowner's policy did not
provide coverage because plaintiff's injury was expected or intended.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 29 June 1998 by
Judge Julius A. Rousseau, Jr. in Wilkes County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 May 1999.
Vannoy, Colvard, Triplett, McLean & Vannoy, P.L.L.C., by J.
Gary Vannoy, Jay Vannoy, and James E. Creamer, for
plaintiff-appellant.
Cunningham & Gray, P.A., by George G. Cunningham; and Max F.
Ferree, for defendants-appellees.
WALKER, Judge.
On 21 January 1995, defendant Timothy Burchette and his
wife, defendant Barbara Burchette, had been arguing throughout
the day. Defendant Timothy Burchette went twice to the home of
plaintiff in order to purchase cocaine. When he returned home at
approximately 11:00 p.m. after the second trip to plaintiff's
house, he noticed that defendant Barbara Burchette had beendrinking. Plaintiff then arrived at defendants' house, and while
all three were in the kitchen, defendant Barbara Burchette picked
up a pistol from the counter, pointed it toward the floor and
fired it. The bullet struck plaintiff in the leg and he was
seriously injured.
Defendants were insured by North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) under a homeowner's policy. Farm
Bureau brought a declaratory judgment action in 95 CVS 1228 to
determine if the policy provided coverage for this injury. An
exclusionary provision in the policy prevented coverage to
persons for bodily injury or property damage which was expected
or intended by the insured. In depositions, both defendants
testified that the shooting was accidental. In his affidavit,
plaintiff asserted he did not believe the shooting was
intentional. Judgment was entered after the jury determined that
the policy did not provide coverage for the injury.
On 3 August 1995, defendant Barbara Burchette pleaded no
contest in 95 CRS 2160 to the charge of misdemeanor assault with
a deadly weapon with regard to the shooting on 21 January 1995.
On 16 January 1998, plaintiff filed this action against the
defendants. The complaint alleged: (1) that the defendants had
been arguing, and that while intoxicated, defendant Barbara
Burchette initially pointed the pistol at the ground but thenstarted moving the [pistol] around and pointing it in a negligent
manner; and (2) that the pistol went off and plaintiff was shot
in the leg. Further, defendant Burchette's negligent handling
of a loaded gun while intoxicated contributed to the accidental
shooting which resulted in serious injury to the Plaintiff. On
26 May 1998, defendants moved for summary judgment. Following a
hearing, the trial court entered summary judgment for defendants
finding there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
that the defendants are entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thompson
v. Three Guy Furniture Co., 122 N.C. App. 340, 344, 469 S.E.2d
583, 585 (1996)(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56 (c)).
The burden of proving the lack of a triable issue of fact is on
the party moving for summary judgment. Collingwood v. G.E. Real
Estate Equities, 324 N.C. 63, 66, 376 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1989).
The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Davis v. Town of Southern Pines, 116 N.C. App.663, 666, 449 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1994), disc. review denied, 339N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 648 (1995).
In contending there is a genuine issue of fact, plaintiff
points to deposition testimony of both plaintiff and defendants
which indicate that the shooting was accidental. During the
deposition taken for the declaratory judgment action, defendant
Barbara Burchette testified as follows:
And as I walked over, I noticed the gun
laying there and I just picked the gun up and
then I pointed it. . .I just turned around
and . . .I pointed it at the floor--and the
next thing I knew it went off. . . . When I
realized that he [plaintiff] had been shot. .
.I got hysterical.
Defendant Timothy Burchette also testified that his wife did not
point the gun at anyone and that somehow or another it [the
pistol] just went off. In his affidavit, plaintiff also
testified that he did not believe he was shot intentionally.
However, defendants contend plaintiff is collaterally
estopped from bringing this negligence action as the trial court
already decided in the declaratory judgment action that defendant
Barbara Burchette's actions were expected or intended and the
plaintiff only has a claim for assault and battery which is now
barred by the one-year statute of limitations. Collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion is to be applied when the following requirements are met:
(1) The issues to be concluded must be the
same as those involved in the prior action;
(2) in the prior action, the issues must have
been raised and actually litigated; (3) the
issues must have been material and relevant
to the disposition of the prior action; and
(4) the determination made of those issues in
the prior action must have been necessary and
essential to the resulting judgment.
Johnson v. Smith, 97 N.C. App. 450, 452-53, 388 S.E.2d 582, 583-
84, disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 596, 393 S.E.2d 878
(1990)(quoting King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 358, 200 S.E.2d
799, 806 (1973)). The issue in this case and the issue in the
declaratory judgment action are distinguishable. The issue in
the declaratory judgment action concerned the interpretation of
an insurance policy with regard to coverage and focused on
whether the actions of defendant Barbara Burchette were expected
or intended. In determining whether the injury was expected or
intended, the trial court looked to the resulting injury, not
merely the volitional act, which must be intended for the
exclusion to apply. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stox, 330
N.C. 697, 703-04, 412 S.E.2d 318, 322 (1992). Thus, a
determination that the act was expected or intended does not
preclude a claim that the injury resulted from an act of
negligence on the part of defendant Barbara Burchette.
This Court has previously stated, [t]here are situations
where the evidence presented raises questions of both assault and
battery and negligence. Vernon v. Barrow, 95 N.C. App. 642,
643, 383 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1989)(quoting Lail v. Woods, 36 N.C.
App. 590, 592, 244 S.E.2d 500, 502, disc. review denied, 295 N.C.
550, 248 S.E.2d 727 (1978)). In Lail, 36 N.C. App. at 591-92,
244 S.E.2d at 501-02, it was determined that only an action for
assault and battery was proper since the evidence showed that the
injury resulted from the defendant's intentional act of throwing
a rock at the plaintiff. In Vernon, 95 N.C. App. at 642, 383
S.E.2d at 441-42, the plaintiff was injured when the defendant
pointed a gun toward the floor and one of the bullets ricocheted
and hit the plaintiff in the leg. This Court determined that the
defendant's conduct in firing the gun gave rise to actions for
assault and battery as well as for negligence. Id. at 643, 383
S.E.2d at 443. Thus, the trial court's determination in the
declaratory judgment action that defendant Barbara Burchette's
actions were expected or intended is not controlling in this
action and plaintiff is not estopped from asserting a negligence
claim. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for
defendants.
Reversed.
Judges MCGEE and EDMUNDS concur.
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