1. Notice; Process and Service--notice of hearing--not mailed to last known address
The trial court erred by granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment where notice
of the summary judgment hearing was never provided. An earlier notice of a continued default
hearing was ineffective and could not be the basis for notice of the summary judgment hearing
because it was mailed to the street address at which the complaint had been served even though
the pro se defendant had responded with a single sentence which included a different address.
Where a defendant, especially one acting pro se, provides a mailing address in a document filed
in response to a complaint and serves a copy on opposing counsel, he or she should be able to
rely on receiving later service at the same address; by the some token, opposing counsel (or a pro
se party) may also rely on that address for service of all subsequent process and other
communications until a new address is furnished.
2. Pleadings--pro se answer--sufficient
A one sentence pro se response to a complaint, though minimal in the extreme, denied
the substance of the claim and sufficed as an answer.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 29 May 1998 by Judge
James M. Webb in Moore County Superior Court. Heard in the Court
of Appeals 13 May 1999.
Robbins May & Rich L.L.P., by P. Wayne Robbins, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Holshouser and Suggs, L.L.P., by Paul B. Trevarrow, for
defendant-appellant.
EDMUNDS, Judge.
Plaintiff's mother died on 26 February 1992. In her will,
plaintiff's mother bequeathed insurance benefits under herTeacher's Insurance and Annuity Association's College Retirement
Equity Fund account (TIAA-CREF) to defendant, who is plaintiff's
stepfather. Plaintiff, however, was the named beneficiary of the
insurance policy. In order to honor her mother's wishes,
plaintiff, in July 1992, voluntarily endorsed over to defendant
TIAA-CREF benefit checks totaling $303,988.36. Defendant used
the insurance proceeds to purchase land in Pinehurst, North
Carolina. At the time, plaintiff apparently did not consider the
tax consequences of her selflessness.
In 1993, plaintiff received a 1099 tax form from TIAA-CREF,
which informed her that she was responsible for $100,368.00 in
state and federal taxes arising from her receipt of the insurance
proceeds. In her affidavit, plaintiff alleged she notified
defendant, who agreed to reimburse plaintiff within a year if she
would pay the taxes. Plaintiff thereupon paid the amount due.
Plaintiff's affidavit further stated that in May 1993, defendant
made a $20,000.00 partial payment to her and promised that he
would soon pay the remaining amount. In her complaint, plaintiff
alleged that defendant failed to pay an additional unrelated
$5,000.00 debt, which is based on a subsequent loan from
plaintiff to defendant.
In October 1997, plaintiff filed this action seeking
recovery of $85,368.00, plus interest. The Moore CountySheriff's Department served defendant with the complaint on 30
October 1997 at 760 West Baltimore Avenue, Pinebluff, North
Carolina. On 26 November 1997, defendant, acting pro se, filed
with the court a single-sentence statement that, “The PLAINTIFF,
Amy Barnett assured me that I was under no obligation to
reimburse her for any sum as per her complaint.” Although signed
and dated by a witness and a notary, the statement contained no
indication whether plaintiff made it under oath. Defendant's
response was directed to plaintiff, in care of her legal counsel,
and provided defendant's mailing address, P.O. Box 4120,
Pinehurst, North Carolina 28374.
On 3 April 1998, plaintiff filed a “Motion For Entry Of
Default Or In The Alternative Motion For Judgment On The
Pleadings” (Motion for Default). According to the accompanying
certificate of service, the motion was mailed to 760 West
Baltimore Avenue, Pinebluff, North Carolina, where the original
complaint had been served. Notice that the hearing would take
place on 4 May 1998 was also sent to the Pinebluff address, and
the courtroom calendar for 4 May 1998 also shows defendant's
address as 760 West Baltimore Avenue, Pinebluff, North Carolina.
On 15 April 1998, plaintiff filed an affidavit supporting her
Motion for Default. According to the certificate of service for
the affidavit, plaintiff mailed the affidavit to defendant at “31Barton Hill Court, Pinehurst, N.C.” Defendant was not present
for the 4 May 1998 hearing, and the trial court continued the
matter in open court to 26 May 1998. On 5 May 1998, plaintiff
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff mailed a service
copy of this motion to defendant at the Pinehurst post officebox, which defendant set out in his response to the initial
complaint; however, no notice of hearing accompanied the motion
nor was such notice later served on defendant. The courtroom
calendar for 26 May 1998 shows defendant's address as 760 West
Baltimore Avenue, Pinebluff, North Carolina. On 29 May 1998, the
trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment at a
hearing that defendant did not attend. On 29 June 1998,
defendant, for the first time acting through counsel, filed or
attempted to file a verified answer to plaintiff's complaint, an
affidavit, a “Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Order Granting
Summary Judgment” and supporting brief, and notice of appeal from
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. On 15 July 1998,
the trial court denied defendant's motion to set aside the order
of summary judgment. Defendant appeals.
[1]Defendant contends that the trial court's grant of
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was erroneous because
defendant's absence from the hearing resulted from plaintiff's
failure to provide notice. Adequacy of notice is a question of
law. See Benton v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 500 N.W.2d 158
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993), and the cases cited therein. Motions for
summary judgment are governed by Rule 56 of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 states, “The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56 (1990). Although Rule 56 makes
no direct reference to notice of hearing, this Court has held
that such notice also must be given at least ten (10) days prior
to the hearing. See Calhoun v. Wayne Dennis Heating & Air Cond.,
129 N.C. App. 794, 800, 501 S.E.2d 346, 350 (1998), disc. review
dismissed ex mero motu, 350 N.C. 92, --- S.E.2d --- (1999).
Here, plaintiff properly served her Motion for Summary
Judgment by mailing a copy to the address provided by defendant
in his only filing with the court up to that time. She failed,
however, to serve defendant with the required notice of the
hearing on the motion. Defendant contends this failure was
prejudicial, depriving him of property without notice, contrary
to the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and
the Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution.
Plaintiff disagrees, reasoning that because she mailed notice of
the hearing on her earlier Motion for Default to the Pinebluff
address where defendant originally had been served by the
sheriff, defendant received notice of and should have attended
the hearing of 4 May 1998. Had he done so, he would have
received actual notice that the trial court continued the hearing
on plaintiff's Motion for Default until 29 May, when the Motion
for Summary Judgment was heard. We find plaintiff's reasoning
unpersuasive. Plaintiff's certificate of service shows that on 3 April
1998, plaintiff mailed notice of the 4 May 1998 hearing on her
Motion for Default to defendant's Pinebluff street address, where
defendant had been served originally on 30 October 1997.
However, on 26 November 1997, defendant filed his pro se
statement purporting to respond to plaintiff's complaint.
Defendant's statement included a post office box address, which
plaintiff used on 5 May 1998 to serve her Motion for Summary
Judgment. Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that as of 3 April
1998, approximately four months after defendant filed his
statement, defendant's Pinebluff street address was his “last
known address.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 5(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1998). We disagree. Where a defendant, especially one
acting pro se, provides a mailing address in a document filed in
response to a complaint and serves a copy of that filing on
opposing counsel, he or she should be able to rely on receiving
later service at that address; by the same token, opposing
counsel (or a pro se party) may also rely on that address for
service of all subsequent process and other communications until
a new address is furnished. See id. Here, plaintiff sent
material meant for defendant to three different addresses after
defendant filed his statement responding to plaintiff's
complaint. Because plaintiff mailed notice of the 4 May 1998hearing on her Motion for Default to an address other than that
provided on defendant's filed response, the notice was
ineffective and cannot be the basis for notice of the 29 May 1998
hearing on her Motion for Summary Judgment. See Town of Cary v.
Stallings, 97 N.C. App. 484, 488, 389 S.E.2d 143, 145 (1990).
[2]Plaintiff further contends that defendant was not
entitled to any notice when plaintiff filed her Motion For
Summary Judgment. She argues that defendant was in default
because the response he filed after being served with plaintiff's
complaint was not an “Answer” as contemplated by the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. While it is true that “[a]
party who is in default for failure to appear is ordinarily not
entitled to notice of additional pleadings in the case,” First
Union Nat'l Bank v. Rolfe, 83 N.C. App. 625, 628, 351 S.E.2d 117,
119 (1986), this Court has held that
the general policy of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is to disregard technicalities of
form and determine the rights of litigants on
the merits. . . .
[A] letter, or in fact any document, that is
filed with the court and substantively
responds to a complaint may constitute an
answer, notwithstanding its failure to comply
with all of the technical requirements of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Brown v. American Messenger Services, Inc., 129 N.C. App. 207,
211-12, 498 S.E.2d 384, 387, disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 692,511 S.E.2d 644 (1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In
response to plaintiff's complaint, defendant timely filed a
statement, which denied the substance of her claim. We hold that
his statement, though minimal in the extreme, suffices as an
answer. Defendant was not in default and therefore was entitled
to adequate notice of the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment. Because plaintiff did not give the required
notice of the hearing for this motion, we vacate the order of the
trial court and remand this case for further proceedings. Upon
remand, it lies within the sound discretion of the trial court
whether to allow any amendment to defendant's 26 November 1997
filing. See News & Observer Publishing Co. v. Poole, 330 N.C.
465, 485, 412 S.E.2d 7, 19 (1992).
In light of this holding, we need not address defendant's
other assignments of error.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges WALKER and MCGEE concur.
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