CONNIE BATES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. DEBBIE JARRETT, MICHAEL
JARRETT, and MICHAEL BATES, Defendants-Appellees
1. Parties--standing--equitable distribution--transferred title to automobile
The defendants Jarrett had standing as real parties in interest to challenge the court's
jurisdiction over defendant Bates where plaintiff, a North Carolina resident, filed an equitable
distribution claim against Bates, a Virginia citizen, and claims against defendant Debbie Jarrett
for the insurance proceeds from a wrecked automobile sold by defendant Bates to Debbie Jarrett.
2. Divorce--equitable distribution--jurisdiction--minimum contacts
The trial court erred in an equitable distribution action by dismissing the claim against
defendant Bates for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiff and defendant Bates were married and
resided in North Carolina from 1985 until 1992 or 1993, when they moved to Virginia; plaintiff
and defendant Bates acquired an automobile in Virginia which was titled in defendant Bates'
name; plaintiff moved to North Carolina after the separation in 1997 and brought the
automobile with her with defendant Bates' consent; Bates subsequently appeared at a domestic
violence hearing in North Carolina without being served; a court order gave plaintiff possession
of their automobile for 90 days; Bates conveyed title to the automobile to defendants Jarrett one
week later; the automobile remained continuously in North Carolina until it was wrecked; and
the insurance proceeds were paid to defendants Jarrett and deposited in their account here. The
actions of Bates involving an automobile constitute sufficient minimum contacts with North
Carolina that he should have reasonably anticipated being haled into court here over the issues of
possession and ownership of the vehicle.
Bruce Allen for plaintiff-appellant.
Robin Weaver Hurmence for defendants-appellees Debbie and
Michael Jarrett.
WALKER, Judge.
The plaintiff, a resident of Cumberland County, North
Carolina, filed an equitable distribution claim against defendant
Michael Bates, a citizen of Virginia, and claims against defendant
Debbie Jarrett, a citizen of this State. Included was a claim to
set aside the conveyance of a 1992 Subaru Loyale by defendant Bates
to defendant Debbie Jarrett and to recover the insurance proceeds
received by Jarrett after the Subaru was wrecked. After defendant
Debbie Jarrett filed a motion to dismiss, an answer, and
counterclaims, plaintiff filed a motion to add defendant Michael
Jarrett as a necessary party. Plaintiff's motion was granted.
Defendants Jarrett then filed a motion to dismiss, an answer, and
counterclaims.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion of defendants
Jarrett to dismiss the equitable distribution claim against
defendant Bates for lack of jurisdiction. At the hearing, the
trial court reviewed the pleadings and considered plaintiff's
affidavit with attachments, as well as the arguments of counsel.
After finding there was no personal jurisdiction over defendantBates, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for
equitable distribution against defendant Bates as well as the
remaining claims against defendants Jarrett.
[1]The plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred in
allowing defendants Jarrett to challenge the court's subject matter
jurisdiction over defendant Bates. The record indicates that the
Subaru was wrecked shortly after title was transferred by defendant
Bates to defendant Michael Jarrett. The insurance proceeds were
paid to defendants Jarrett and deposited in their account in this
State. Since plaintiff has asserted claims against defendants
Jarrett, we conclude they have standing as real parties in interest
to challenge our courts' jurisdiction over defendant Bates.
[2]Plaintiff next assigns as error the dismissal of her claim
for equitable distribution against defendant Bates for lack of
jurisdiction. Exercise of jurisdiction in an equitable
distribution action must meet the minimum contacts standard of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed.
95, 102 (1945). Carroll v. Carroll, 88 N.C. App. 453, 455, 363
S.E.2d 872, 874 (1988). The resolution of whether the trial court
acquired in personam jurisdiction over defendant involves a two-
fold determination. Godwin v. Walls, 118 N.C. App. 341, 345, 455
S.E.2d 473, 478 (1995). First, our statute must permit the
exercise of jurisdiction, and second, such exercise must comport
with due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. Id. The question on appeal is whether the second prong of this
test was met. The requirements of due process are well settled:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'
International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316, 90 L. Ed. at 102. To
effectuate minimum contacts, a defendant must have acted to
purposefully avail itself of the privileges of conducting
activities within this State, thus invoking the benefits and
protection of our laws. International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319,
90 L. Ed. at 103. The Supreme Court later clarified the standard:
“Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490, 501 (1980). As the United
States Supreme Court has explained:
[T]he 'purposeful availment' requirement
ensures that a defendant will not be haled
into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated'
contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of
another party or a third person.'
Jurisdiction is proper, however, where the
contacts proximately result from actions by
the defendant himself that create a
'substantial connection' with the forum State.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 85 L. Ed. 2d
528, 542 (1985).
The trial court found that there were insufficient minimum
contacts between defendant Bates and this State whereby our courtscould exercise personal jurisdiction over him in this matter. The
determination of whether jurisdiction is statutorily and
constitutionally permissible due to contact with the forum is a
question of fact for the trial court. Chadbourn, Inc. v. Katz, 285
N.C. 700, 208 S.E.2d 676 (1974). Whether minimum contacts are
present is determined not by using a mechanical formula or rule of
thumb but by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances. Better Business Forms, Inc. v. Davis, 120 N.C. App.
498, 462 S.E.2d 832 (1995). The standard of review of an order
determining personal jurisdiction is whether the findings of fact
by the trial court are supported by competent evidence in the
record; if so, this Court must affirm the order of the trial court.
Id.
In its order of dismissal, the trial court's findings included
the following:
1. The Court has carefully examined the filed
documents in Case No. 97 CvD 5938 and also 97
CvM 785; In Case No. 97 CvD 5938, the
Defendant was personally served within the
State of North Carolina in reference to the
TRO and for that action he was personally
served in the State of North Carolina which
then had personal service over him the TRO.
Our review of the record reveals the following: Plaintiff and
defendant Bates married in 1985 and resided in North Carolina from
1985 until 1992 or 1993, when they moved to Virginia. While living
in Virginia, plaintiff and defendant Bates acquired the Subaru
which was titled in defendant Bates' name and registered in
Virginia. After separating from defendant Bates, plaintiff moved
to Cumberland County, North Carolina, in March 1997. At that time,
defendant Bates consented to plaintiff bringing the Subaru to North
Carolina and according to plaintiff's affidavit, he was to pay the
car payments on the Subaru in lieu of paying plaintiff child
support for their two children.
On 20 August 1997, plaintiff sought a domestic violence
protective order in the District Court of Cumberland County.
Although he had not been served with any process, defendant Bates
appeared at the hearing. A domestic violence protective order was
entered and defendant Bates was served with the order on 20 August1997. The order gave plaintiff possession of the Subaru and was
effective for 90 days. On that same day, defendants Jarrett
instituted a small claims action in Cumberland County against
plaintiff and defendant Bates to recover the Subaru. This action
was later dismissed.
On 26 August 1997, defendant Bates transferred title to the
Subaru to defendant Michael Jarrett. The title was registered with
the Department of Motor Vehicles on 27 August 1997. On 28 August
1997, defendants Jarrett, with the assistance of a Hope Mills
police officer, took possession of the Subaru.
From March 1997 until it was wrecked on 23 September 1997, the
Subaru remained continuously in North Carolina. After the Subaru
was wrecked, the insurance proceeds were paid to defendants Jarrett
and deposited in their account in North Carolina.
Among the authorities cited by the parties are the following
cases which we address: Carroll v. Carroll, 88 N.C. App. 453, 363
S.E.2d 872 (1988); Shamley v. Shamley, 117 N.C. App. 175, 455
S.E.2d 435 (1994); and Tompkins v. Tompkins, 98 N.C. App. 299, 390
S.E.2d 766 (1990). In Carroll, the plaintiff and defendant were
married in 1975 and lived together in the State of Washington.
Carroll, 88 N.C. App. 453, 363 S.E.2d 872. They separated in 1985
and plaintiff moved to North Carolina. Id. Although defendant had
not lived in North Carolina during any part of the marriage,
certain property of the parties was located in this State. Id.
This Court stated:
The fact that there exists some personal
property in North Carolina in which thedefendant may have an interest because of the
equitable distribution statutes is not alone
sufficient to establish jurisdiction over the
defendant or his property. If there [were]
evidence the defendant brought the property
into North Carolina or consented to the
placement of property in North Carolina, this
would be some evidence of contacts with the
forum State. . . .
Id. at 456, 363 S.E.2d at 874. This Court held that because the
facts did not indicate who brought the property into North Carolina
or whether defendant even consented to the property being in North
Carolina, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant
and could not properly determine the equitable distribution claim.
Id.
In Shamley, the plaintiff and defendant were married in New
York in 1965 and resided in New Jersey for 20 years until 1991.
Shamley, 117 N.C. App. 175, 455 S.E.2d 435. In 1991, plaintiff
moved from New Jersey to this State, bringing certain personal
property with him. Id. Plaintiff purchased real property here,
which he titled in both parties' names without defendant's
participation or knowledge. Id. This Court upheld the finding of
the trial court that it lacked jurisdiction over defendant,
stating:
Plaintiff's purchase of land in North Carolina
and construction of a house thereon was done
without defendant's participation.
Defendant's only voluntary contacts with North
Carolina were during a brief visit in which
she looked at houses with defendant and
another visit in which she purchased an
automobile.
Id. at 182, 455 S.E.2d at 439. In Tompkins, the plaintiff argued that defendant had
sufficient contacts with this State in that he abandoned her within
the State and the marital relationship was still in existence at
the time the action was brought. Tompkins, 98 N.C. App. 299, 390
S.E.2d 766. The defendant, by affidavit in support of his motion
to dismiss, stated:
[H]e had left North Carolina more than three
and a half years prior to the commencement of
the action, had resided in South Carolina
since that time, owned no property in North
Carolina, conducted no business in this State,
and had not invoked the protection of North
Carolina law for any purpose or reason since
leaving this State.
Id. at 300, 390 S.E.2d at 767. This Court found that the pleadings
did not indicate “where the parties were married, that they shared
a marital domicile in this State, that defendant has conducted
activities here, owns property here, or otherwise has invoked the
protection of North Carolina laws.” Id. at 304, 390 S.E.2d at 769.
This Court held:
Plaintiff's allegations of defendant's marital
misconduct, absent any allegations going to a
nexus between such misconduct and this State,
are simply insufficient to permit the
reasonable inference that personal
jurisdiction over defendant could properly be
acquired in this case.
Id.
However, we distinguish our case from the decisions in
Carroll, Shamley, and Tompkins. Plaintiff and defendant Bates were
married in 1985 and resided in this State from 1985 until 1992 or
1993. After the parties separated, defendant Bates consented to
plaintiff bringing the Subaru to this State. Subsequently,defendant Bates had additional contact with the State. He appeared
at the domestic violence hearing without being served with process.
After being served with the domestic violence protective order,
defendant Bates, in disregard of the order, which gave plaintiff
possession of the Subaru for 90 days, conveyed title to the Subaru
to defendant Michael Jarrett on 26 August 1997, approximately one
week after the order was entered.
From March 1997 until it was wrecked on 23 September 1997, the
Subaru remained continuously in this State. After the Subaru was
wrecked, the insurance proceeds were paid to defendants Jarrett and
deposited in their account here.
As a result, we conclude that the actions of defendant Bates
involving the Subaru constitute sufficient minimum contacts with
this State such that he should have reasonably anticipated being
“haled into Court” here over the issues of possession and ownership
of this vehicle. Thus, we reverse the decision of the trial court
and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge MCGEE concur.
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