IN THE MATTER OF: HANNAH F. ELLIS, Juvenile, and ADDISON S.
ELLIS, Juvenile
Child Abuse and Neglect--death of older sibling--removal of other children not required
The trial court did not err in failing to find by clear and convincing evidence that the two
juveniles are abused or neglected children based on the conflicting evidence concerning the
death of their older sibling since N.C.G.S. § 7A-517 does not require the removal of all other
children from the home, the trial court has discretion in determining the weight to be given such
evidence because it is in a superior position to observe and determine the credibility of the
witnesses, and the environment in which the two juveniles live has been closely monitored by
DSS.
Appeal by petitioner Department of Social Services from
judgment entered 5 October 1998 by Judge Larry J. Wilson in
Lincoln County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17
August 1999.
Maria Chantae Ellis (Chantae) was born to Robert Ellis and
his wife, Shirley M. Ellis, on 20 May 1991. During 1996, Chantae
resided primarily in the home of her grandmother, Debra Maners,
and was cared for by both her grandmother and her mother, Shirley
Ellis. Chantae died on 2 April 1996 at Lincoln Medical Center,
and her body was transferred to Wake Forest University School of
Medicine for an autopsy. On 29 April 1996, the Lincoln County
Department of Social Services (DSS) received a report stating
that Chantae died as a result of being given Verapamil, an adult
blood pressure medication. DSS then filed a juvenile petition on
1 May 1996 in which it alleged that Hannah S. Ellis (Hannah), a
younger sibling of Chantae, was an abused and neglected juvenile.
Pursuant to a non-secure custody order, Hannah was placed in a
foster home. However, at a hearing on 6 May 1996, the trial
court determined that there was no evidence showing that Hannah
would be in danger if she were allowed to live with Shirley Ellis
pending a hearing on the merits of the juvenile petition, and the
court allowed Hannah to return to her mother's home. The
adjudicatory hearing was continued from time to time, and thetrial court allowed a motion to add Debra Maners, the grandmother
of the child, as a caregiver of Hannah. On 7 January 1997, the
parties entered into a consent order whereby Hannah would
continue to reside with her mother, with DSS to monitor the
placement in the mother's home. On 23 June 1997, the terms of
the consent order were continued in effect.
A female child, Addison Shea Ellis (Addison), was born to
Shirley and Robert Ellis on 22 December 1997. Two months later,
on 20 February 1998, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that
Hannah and Addison were abused and neglected children because
their parents had not properly cared for them and because of
concerns about the suspicious nature of the death of their older
sibling, Chantae. On 25 February 1998 DSS filed an amended
juvenile petition containing an additional allegation that the
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Chapel Hill had ruled
that the death of Chantae was a homicide. Both Hannah and
Addison were placed in the custody of DSS pursuant to a non-
secure custody order.
At a hearing to determine the necessity of the non-secure
custody order, the trial court determined that there was no need
for the order and returned the children to the home of their
parents. An adjudicatory hearing was held during the week of 6
July 1998. At the close of the evidence, the trial court foundthat the children were neither abused nor neglected, and
dismissed the juvenile petitions. Petitioner appealed.
The Jonas Law Firm, P.L.L.C., by Rebecca J. Pomeroy and W.
Todd Pomeroy, for Lincoln County Department of Social
Services, petitioner appellant.
Lewis & Shuford, P.A., by Robert C. Lewis, for Robert and
Shirley Ellis, respondent appellees.
HORTON, Judge.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to
find by clear and convincing evidence that the juveniles were
neglected or abused. The heart of petitioner's argument is that
the juveniles' sibling, Chantae, died on 2 April 1996 as an
alleged result of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSP) perpetrated
by either her mother, respondent Shirley M. Ellis, or her
grandmother, respondent Debra Maners. MSP is defined as a
psychiatric disorder in which the parent causes or fabricates a
child's illness. In re Jessica Z., 135 Misc. 2d 520, 521, 515
N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (Fam. Ct. 1987). Because of the psychiatric
disorder, the parent or caretaker treats the child for illnesses
the child does not have by fabricating symptoms and giving the
child inappropriate medicine, or by engaging in actions which
cause the child to become ill. Petitioner alleged that the
surviving juveniles, Hannah and Addison, were at risk due totheir continued medical problems, the failure of their parents to
secure proper medical assistance for them, and the mother's
continued misstatements to DSS.
Under our Juvenile Code, a neglected juvenile is defined as
[a] juvenile who does not receive proper care,
supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker . . . or who is not
provided necessary medical care . . . or who lives in
an environment injurious to the juvenile's
welfare . . . . In determining whether a juvenile is a
neglected juvenile, it is relevant whether that
juvenile lives in a home where another juvenile has
died as a result of abuse or neglect or lives in a home
where another juvenile has been subjected
to . . . abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly
lives in the home.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-517(21) (1995). An abused juvenile is
defined as
[a]ny juvenile less than 18 years of age whose parent,
guardian, custodian, or caretaker:
a. Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the
juvenile a serious physical injury by other than
accidental means . . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-517(1) (Cum. Supp. 1997). Whether a child
is neglected or abused is a conclusion of law. See In Re Helms,
127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675-76 (1997). The trial
court must make sufficient findings of fact to support its
conclusions. See In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111, 316 S.E.2d
246, 253 (1984) . Furthermore, the evidence presented must be
clear and convincing in order to sustain such a finding. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-635 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
Where the trial court sits without a jury, the facts found
by the trial court are binding on appeal so long as they are
supported by competent evidence. Helms, 127 N.C. App. at 511, 491
S.E.2d at 676. In this case the trial court made the following
findings of fact:
A. That there exist[s] clear and convincing evidence
that [Maria Chantae] Ellis died of Verapamil
toxicity. There is not clear and convincing
evidence at whose hands she died.
B. That the family has expressed its lack of belief
in the medical professionals, some of which are
not from this community but are well regarded and
well qualified. The court has no problem in
accepting the conclusion of these professionals as
to the death of Chantae Ellis. The court joins
with the medical professionals in sharing a
concern for the younger children, Hannah and
Addison. Although, not necessarily for all thesame reasons.
C. That judging from the impact on this family, it
doesn't appear to this court that these two
children are going to ever be able to remove
themselves from the shadow of Chantae's death at
least as far as the family's concerned.
D. That the law is clear regarding the fact that the
existence of abuse of a sibling is the basis for a
finding of neglect of other siblings. However,
the crucial difference in this case is that all of
the cases and references to the abuse of another
sibling deal with the abuse of a sibling in the
home where the other sibling is living. To the
extent that anyone would find abuse of Chantae
Mari[a], it is clear from the evidence that the
abuse occurred in the home of Mr. and Mrs. Maners.
There may be a dispute as to what extent Mrs.
Ellis was involved in the care of Mari[a] Chantae
Ellis. Uncontroverted though is that the child
lived with Mr. and Mrs. Maners. The other
children live with Mr. and Mrs. Ellis.
E. That based on the statements of the professionals
and care givers for Hannah and Addison while they
have had some illnesses and understandably for the
last two years they have been monitored or
watched, nevertheless, they appear to be much
healthier children than [Maria Chantae].
F. That the court has concerns about the minor
children and yet has to weigh those concerns about
the children against the paramount rights of their
parents to raise their children under their care
and custody against evidence that they are failing
to care for and protect their children. The court
does not find clear and convincing evidence to
warrant neglect against Hannah and Addison Ellis
and fails to find neglect as to Hannah and
Addison Ellis.
Neither party took exception to any of these findings. The trial
court concluded as a matter of law that based on the findings offact there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of
neglect or abuse as regards Hannah Ellis or Addison Ellis and
dismissed the juvenile petition. Petitioner contends that the
trial court's conclusion was erroneous. After careful
consideration, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
While the situation in which one sibling is killed or
seriously injured is extremely troubling both to the trial courts
and this Court, we have held that
[the statute] does not require the removal of all other
children from the home once a child has either died or
been subjected to sexual or severe physical abuse.
Rather, the statute affords the trial judge some
discretion in determining the weight to be given such
evidence.
In re Nicholson & Ford, 114 N.C. App. 91, 94, 440 S.E.2d 852, 854
(1994). In Nicholson, we upheld the lower court's decision to
find neglect as to one sibling while dismissing the DSS petition
as to the other sibling. The trial court in Nicholson considered
both the death of a prior child and the risk of like harm to the
remaining children in light of their respective ages. Id. at 93,
440 S.E.2d at 853. In this case, the order entered by the trial
court shows that the able trial judge carefully weighed all of
the evidence in the case, and determined that it was insufficient
to prove neglect by the applicable clear and convincing standard.
We are particularly mindful of the fact that the environmentin which Hannah and Addison live has been closely monitored by
DSS from May of 1996 until July of 1998. Thus, the trial court
had ample evidence regarding the efforts made by both the parents
and DSS to provide a safe and caring environment in which to
raise Hannah and Addison. While we understand the petitioner's
concern that the satisfactory care provided Hannah and Addison by
their parents may have resulted in part from the continued
supervision by petitioner, there is no competent evidence that
the care provided the children will become inadequate once the
petitioner is no longer involved with this family.
Although the petitioner introduced evidence tending to show
that either Chantae's mother or grandmother administered the drug
which caused the child's death, other competent evidence supports
a contrary finding. The evidence was in sharp conflict, and the
trial court found that there "is not clear and convincing
evidence at whose hands [Chantae] died." The trial court's
findings reflect that it struggled to assess the evidence and
determine the risk of future harm to these children, but found
inadequate evidence to support a conclusion of abuse or neglect.
We recognize that the trial court is in a superior position to
observe the parties and witnesses, determine their credibility,
and determine the weight to give the credible evidence. All
parties were ably represented in this matter. We have carefullystudied the arguments and contentions of counsel and carefully
reviewed the voluminous transcript in this matter. Having done
so, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial court erred
in failing to find by clear and convincing evidence that Hannah
and Addison are abused or neglected children.
Affirmed.
Judges GREENE and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.
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