2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata--claims precluded--issues precluded
Although this appeal involves a different defendant-unnamed uninsured motorist insurer,
plaintiff is precluded by res judicata from re-litigating the identical issue of the applicable
limitations period for service upon an insurance company providing coverage for an uninsured
motorist. Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 14 September 1998 by
Judge B. Craig Ellis in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 16 August 1999.
Currie, Becton & Stewart, by Elwood Becton and Pipkin,
Knott, Clark & Berger, L.L.P., by Michael W. Clark and
Ashmead P. Pipkin, for plaintiff-appellant.
Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Stephanie Hutchins
Autry, for unnamed defendant-appellee North Carolina Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc.
Yates, McLamb & Weyher, L.L.P., by Rodney E. Pettey, for
defendant-appellee Lee Todd Barbee.
JOHN, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's order allowing
unnamed defendant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Company's (Farm Bureau) motion to dismiss. We affirm the trial
court.
Pertinent factual and procedural information includes the
following: On 15 July 1994, defendant Lee Todd Barbee
(defendant) was involved in an automobile collision with a
vehicle in which Carlo Reese (decedent), the son of plaintiff
Portia Reese, was a passenger. Decedent subsequently died from
injuries allegedly sustained in the collision.
On 26 July 1996, plaintiff commenced the instant wrongful
death action, seeking recovery from unnamed defendants NationwideMutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) and North Carolina Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) under the uninsured
motorist provisions of respective insurance policies which
plaintiff claimed provided coverage for decedent. Only Farm
Bureau is involved in the present appeal.
An original summons and subsequent alias and pluries
summonses were obtained until successful service upon defendant
occurred on 10 October 1996. Summons was not issued to Farm
Bureau until 25 April 1997 and was served 28 April 1997. In its
answer, Farm Bureau raised, inter alia, the defense that
plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations.
Summons upon Nationwide was not issued until 24 April 1997,
and its subsequent motion to dismiss on grounds plaintiff's
claims were barred by the applicable limitations period was
allowed by the trial court. On plaintiff's appeal, this Court
affirmed the ruling, holding the action against Nationwide had
not been commenced within two years of decedent's death on 28
July 1994 as required by N.C.G.S. § 1-53(4) (1996). Reese v.
Barbee, 129 N.C. App. 823, 501 S.E.2d 698 (1998), aff'd, 350 N.C.
60, 510 S.E.2d 374 (1999).
Farm Bureau filed a similar motion to dismiss plaintiff's
claim on 17 June 1998. The motion was allowed and plaintiff
appeals. Plaintiff maintains this Court is not bound by the previous
opinion in Reese, noting that our Supreme Court, being evenly
divided, stated the decision was without precedential value.
Reese v. Barbee, 350 N.C. 60, 510 S.E.2d 374 (1999). Farm Bureau
responds that the earlier decision nonetheless constituted the
law of the instant case and, further, that the doctrine of res
judicata compels affirmance of the trial court's order. We
conclude Farm Bureau has the better of the argument.
Where an appellate court decides questions
and remands a case for further proceedings,
its decisions on those questions become law
of the case, both in the subsequent
proceedings in the trial court and upon a
later appeal, where the same facts and the
same questions of law are involved.
Sloan v. Miller Building, Corp., 128 N.C. App. 37, 41, 493 S.E.2d
460, 463 (1997).
[1]Although the present appeal involves a different unnamed
defendant, both the current and previous appeals arose out of a
single action, involve the same facts, and have raised the
identical issue of law. Moreover, both Nationwide and Farm
Bureau became parties pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(3)(a)
(1993). Accordingly, the earlier appellate ruling on the issue
raised herein is binding under the doctrine of law of the case.
See also In the Matter of Appeal from Civil Penalty, 324 N.C.
373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 36 (1989) (subsequent panel of Court ofAppeals bound by decision of earlier panel on same issue, even if
in a different case, unless precedent has been overturned by a
higher court).
[2]In addition, the doctrine of res judicata prevents a
plaintiff, who has once litigated an issue and had it finally
determined adversely, from re-litigating the identical issue
against a second defendant. Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249
N.C. 167, 170, 105 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1958). In the case sub
judice, the issue of the applicable limitations period for
service upon an insurance company providing coverage for an
uninsured motorist has earlier been litigated by plaintiff and
determined adversely to her. The circumstance that the present
appeal involves a different uninsured motorist insurer is of no
consequence. See id.
Affirmed. Judges HUNTER and SMITH concur.
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