1. Juveniles--transfer of case--reasons for transfer
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the defendant-juvenile's first-
degree sexual offense case to superior court under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-608 and 7A-610(a) (both
statutes now replaced by N.C.G.S. § 7B-100 et seq.), based on the findings that the juvenile's
history indicates prior aggressive tendencies and the public needs to be protected from this type of
crime and the sex offenders that commit them, because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7A-610(c) does not
require the trial court to make findings of fact, but only to set forth its reasons for transfer; and
(2) the trial court's reasons are supported by the evidence.
2. Juveniles--transfer of case--factors considered--new statute inapplicable
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in transferring the defendant-juvenile's first-
degree sexual offense case to superior court under N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-608 and 7A-610(a) (both
statutes now replaced by N.C.G.S. § 7B-100 et seq.), based on failing to consider “the age or the
maturity of the juvenile” or his “condition and needs for treatment” under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2203(b),
because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7B-2203(b) is not applicable to this case since it applies to hearings
related to acts committed on or after 1 July 1999; (2) defendant cites no statute or case which
required the judge to consider these factors at the time of his hearing; and (3) even if
consideration of these factors was required, the record reflects that evidence on each factor was
presented to the trial court.
3. Juveniles--transfer of case--chronological age
The ordinary meaning of the words in N.C.G.S. § 7A-608 reveals that the legislature
intended for juveniles who have achieved the chronological age of thirteen years to be subject to
the transfer of their case to superior court, and the determination is not based on the juvenile's
developmental age.
4. Constitutional Law--cruel and unusual punishment--possible conviction--purely
speculative
Although the juvenile court transferred defendant-juvenile's case to superior court and
defendant argues that his possible conviction of first-degree sexual offense in superior court
would constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the courts have no jurisdiction to determine
purely speculative matters since the issue of punishment will arise, if at all, only if defendant
receives an adverse verdict at trial and is then sentenced for the crime.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney
General Elizabeth L. Oxley, for the State.
Barnes, Braswell & Haithcock, P.A., by Glenn A. Barfield, for
juvenile-appellant.
JOHN, Judge.
Jonathan T. Wright (Wright), juvenile, appeals the trial
court's “Order Transferring Juvenile Case to Superior Court.” We
affirm.
Pertinent facts and procedural history include the following:
A Juvenile Petition was filed 6 May 1998 in Wayne County District
Court alleging that
between the dates of March 1, 1998 and April
12, 1998 [Wright] unlawfully, willfully and
feloniously did engage in a Sex Offense with
[M.], a [male] child under the age of 13
years, in violation of [N.C.G.S. § 14-27.4
(1999)].
At the time alleged, Wright was thirteen years old and M. was
eight. Wright was taken into secure custody 12 May 1998, and a
probable cause hearing was conducted 4 August 1998.
At the hearing, M. testified he “suck[ed] on” Wright's penis
for “[a]bout a minute” because Wright “said he was going to beat me
up.” M. stated he believed this had happened four times
previously, but “[t]he only time I remember was the last time,”
immediately prior to Easter 1998. H. and J., two juvenile males
who resided in the neighborhood and who knew both Wright and M.,
indicated they had witnessed the Easter incident and corroborated
M.'s testimony. In addition, J. testified Wright had stated he was
also “going [to] try to get [J.'s] sister to do it.” M.'s mother
and a Wayne County Sheriff's Department detective were additionalwitnesses for the State. Wright presented no evidence.
The trial court found probable cause on the charge of first
degree sex offense and, upon motion by the State, conducted a
second hearing on the issue of whether to transfer Wright's case to
superior court for trial pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-608 and 7A-610
(1995) (repealed 1 July 1999).
(See footnote 1)
The statutes provided in pertinent
part:
The court after notice, hearing, and a finding
of probable cause may transfer jurisdiction
over a juvenile to superior court if the
juvenile was 13 years of age or older at the
time the juvenile allegedly committed an
offense that would be a felony if committed by
an adult.
G.S. § 7A-608.
If probable cause is found . . . , the
prosecutor or the juvenile may move that the
case be transferred to the superior court for
trial as in the case of adults. The judge may
proceed to determine whether the needs of thejuvenile or the best interest of the State
will be served by transfer of the case to
superior court for trial as in the case of
adults.
G.S. § 7A-610(a).
At this latter phase of the proceedings, several witnesses
testified on Wright's behalf. These included members of his
church, a neighbor, his school guidance counselor, an employee of
the detention center, and Dr. Kurt Luedtke (Dr. Luedtke), a court-
appointed expert witness in forensic psychology.
According to Dr. Luedtke, he performed an “independent
forensic examination” of Wright on 21 May 1998. Dr. Luedtke
concluded “there [wa]s evidence of psychiatric disturbance and
evidence that a prodomal psychotic state could be developing,” but
he did not believe Wright fit the North Carolina Department of
Correction profile indicative of a “child rapist or non-violent
sexual molester” or of one who commits “aggravated sex crimes [or]
sex perversion [crimes].”
Dr. Luedtke's written report noted that Wright, prior to being
placed in custody, was
along with other individuals that he had
recruited, . . . planning to take over his
school . . . . He had a weapon under his bed
that his parents had discovered, namely a
shotgun, and he had developed an elaborate
plan for not only taking over the school by
force, but also to possibly bomb it.
. . . .
. . . In his elaborate plan for wanting to
“take over the school,” he indicates that he
did not necessarily want to hurt anybody, but
just to scare them all. He also indicates
that he did not care if he did kill anyone ifthey did not “go along” and indicated that he
would begin to kill hostages if the police did
not go along with his plan.
Dr. Luedtke testified he viewed Wright's plan as “more fantasy
than reality” and as a “delusion.” In Dr. Luedtke's opinion,
Wright would not pose a risk to the community if accorded proper
treatment, and Dr. Luedtke recommended Wright be “placed in a
residential treatment environment” rather than incarcerated.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court ordered transfer
of the first degree sex offense charge to superior court for trial,
finding that:
the needs of the juvenile or the best interest
of the State, or both, will be served by
transfer of the case to superior court. The
reasons for transfer are: . . .
1. the seriousness of the offense, and the
fact the [j]uvenile used intimidation and
force.
2. under current juvenile law, a juvenile
court would have no jurisdiction past 4 years.
If the juvenile is found guilty in an adult
court, that court can order treatment and have
jurisdiction over him for many more years.
3. the juvenile's history indicates prior
violent aggressive tendencies. He had a plan
for wanting to take over a school and
indicated to Dr. Luedtke that he would kill
anyone that did not go along with him.
4. the public needs to be protected from
this type of crime and the sex offenders that
commit them.
5. the State presented 3 eye-witnesses to
the crime (the victim and 2 more).
Wright timely appealed.
[1]Among numerous assignments of error directed at thetransfer order, Wright first contends the trial court's thir
d and
fourth “reasons for transfer” were not supported by the evidence
adduced at the hearing.
“Any order of transfer [must] specify the reasons for
transfer.” G.S. § 7A-610(c). However,
[t]he judge is not required to make findings
of fact to support his conclusion that the
needs of the juvenile or that the best
interest of the State would be served by
transferring the case to the [s]uperior
[c]ourt division. It is only required that if
he elects to order the transfer, he must state
his reasons therefor.
In re Bunn, 34 N.C. App. 614, 616, 239 S.E.2d 483, 484 (1977). So
long as the trial court has complied with G.S. § 7A-610(c), “the
decision to transfer a juvenile's case to superior court lies
solely within the sound discretion of the hearing judge,” State v.
Green, 348 N.C. 588, 601, 502 S.E.2d 819, 827 (1998), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 142 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1999), and “that discretion is not
subject to review in the absence of a showing of gross abuse,”
Bunn, 34 N.C. App. at 616, 239 S.E.2d at 484.
As noted above, the trial court sub judice set forth its
“reasons for transfer” in ordering transfer to the superior court.
Further, the court's reasons “are supported by evidence on the
record from the transfer hearing[; accordingly, there is]
sufficient support for the juvenile court judge's discretionary
transfer decision . . . .” Green, 348 N.C. at 602, 502 S.E.2d at
827. In short, Wright's first assignment of error is unfounded.
[2]Wright next asserts the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider “the age or the maturity of the juvenile” orhis “condition and needs for treatment.” In advanci
ng this
argument, Wright cites the following provision of the new juvenile
code:
In the transfer hearing, the court shall
determine whether the protection of the public
and the needs of the juvenile will be served
by the transfer of the case to superior court
and shall consider the following factors:
(1) The age of the juvenile;
(2) The maturity of the juvenile;
(3) The intellectual functioning of the
juvenile; [and]
. . . .
(6) Facilities or programs available to the
court . . . and the likelihood that the
juvenile would benefit from treatment or
rehabilitative efforts . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2203(b) (1999).
However, the foregoing code section is applicable only to
hearings related to acts committed on or after 1 July 1999, see
1998 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 202, § 37, and thus is not implicated
herein. Moreover, Wright “cites no statute or case which
require[d, at the time of his hearing,] a district court judge to
consider” a juvenile's age, maturity, condition, or needs for
treatment “before making a transfer decision.” State v. Green, 124
N.C. App. 269, 276, 477 S.E.2d 182, 185 (1996), aff'd, 348 N.C.
588, 502 S.E.2d 819 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 142 L. Ed.
2d 783 (1999); see also N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (“[a]ssignments of
error . . . in support of which no . . . authority [is] cited, will
be taken as abandoned”). In any event, assuming arguendo consideration of such factors
was required, the record reflects that evidence on each was
presented to the trial court. See Green, 348 N.C. at 600, 502
S.E.2d at 826 (juvenile court deciding transfer “does so with full
knowledge of the dispositional alternatives in the juvenile and
adult systems. . . . [The court's] decision is also guided by the
needs and limitations of the juvenile, as well as the strengths and
weaknesses of the juvenile's family.”)
For example, Wright acknowledges the trial court without doubt
was aware of Wright's age. Further, all Wright's witnesses during
the transfer hearing addressed his level of maturity, and Dr.
Luedtke testified as to Wright's “condition and needs for
treatment.” The court also specifically commented that if Wright
were “found guilty in an adult court, that court can order
treatment,” indicating the court's consideration of any need for
treatment.
To conclude, we reiterate that transfer of a juvenile case to
superior court is solely within the discretion of the trial court,
Bunn, 34 N.C. App. at 616, 239 S.E.2d at 484, so long as the court
has complied with G.S. § 7A-610(c). Such ruling “will not be
reversed unless the decision was arbitrary,” Albrecht v. Dorsett,
131 N.C. App. 502, 508, 508 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1998), or "lacked any
basis in reason." Judkins v. Judkins, 113 N.C.App. 734, 740, 441
S.E.2d 139, 142, disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 781, 447 S.E.2d 424
(1994). We cannot say the trial court's transfer decision in the
instant case was either arbitrary, Albrecht, 131 N.C. App. at 508,508 S.E.2d at 323, or without any basis in reason, Judkins,
113
N.C.App. at 740, 441 S.E.2d at 142, and we therefore reject
Wright's second assignment of error.
[3]Next, Wright insists the transfer statutes
should be construed to prohibit transfer of
this juvenile to [s]uperior [c]ourt, because
his real age for the purposes of the statute
is below the statutory threshold
of thirteen, see G.S. § 7A-608. Wright does not claim a
chronological age of less than thirteen at the time of the alleged
offense, but rather maintains the evidence presented at the hearing
showed without contradiction that [he] was
developmentally, socially, psychologically,
and emotionally a child far younger than
thirteen . . . .
However, Wright cites no “authorities upon which the appellant
relies,” N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5), for the novel proposition that
the transfer statute should be interpreted to require determination
of a juvenile's developmental, as opposed to chronological, age.
Wright's final assignment of error is therefore deemed abandoned.
Id. (“[a]ssignments of error . . . in support of which no . . .
authority [is] cited, will be taken as abandoned”).
Notwithstanding, we note that it is well established that
[i]n interpreting a statute, it is presumed
the General Assembly intended the words it
used to have the meaning they have in ordinary
speech. When the plain meaning of a statute
is unambiguous, a court should go no further
in interpreting the statute.
Nelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 335 N.C. 133, 136, 436
S.E.2d 122, 124 (1993) (citation omitted).
Therefore, it must be presumed that, in allowing transfer tosuperior court of cases of juveniles who are “13 y
ears of age or
older,” G.S. § 7A-608, the General Assembly intended the “ordinary”
meaning of the words employed, i.e., that the cases of juveniles
who have achieved the chronological age of thirteen years are
subject to transfer. The statute contains no ambiguity nor any
indication the General Assembly intended “13 years of age or older”
to be construed as developmental or emotional age rather than
chronological. Accordingly, we “go no further in interpreting the
statute.” Nelson, 335 N.C. at 136, 436 S.E.2d at 124.
[4]Finally, Wright argues that, if convicted of first degree
sex offense in superior court, even the minimum punishment to which
he might be subjected, see G.S. § 14-27.4(b) and N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1340.17 (1999), would constitute cruel and unusual punishment. We
do not address this assertion in that
[t]he courts have no jurisdiction to determine
matters purely speculative, enter anticipatory
judgments, . . . deal with theoretical
problems, give advisory opinions, . . .
provide for contingencies which may hereafter
arise, or give abstract opinions.
Little v. Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 243, 113 S.E.2d 689, 700 (1960).
Wright has been neither tried nor convicted of any crime, much
less sentenced. The issue of punishment thus is not “ripe for
review because it will arise, if at all, only if [Wright] receives
[an adverse] verdict” at trial and is then sentenced for the crime
of first degree sex offense. Simmons v. C.W. Myers Trading Post,
307 N.C. 122, 123, 296 S.E.2d 294, 295 (1982).
Affirmed. Judges LEWIS and MCGEE concur.
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