Municipal Corporations--governmental immunity--public duty doctrine--limited
The trial court erred by granting a dismissal under N.C.G.S. § Rule 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6)
for the City of Louisburg where plaintiff alleged that he was injured by a dynamite blast while
constructing a sewer line. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that the protection
afforded by the public duty doctrine does not extend to local governmental agencies other than
law enforcement agencies engaged in their general duty to protect the public.
Roberti, Wittenberg, Holtkamp & Lauffer, P.A., by R. David
Wicker, Jr., and Samuel B. Taylor, for plaintiff-appellant.
Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Jeffrey A.
Doyle, for defendant-appellee.
MARTIN, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing his complaint
against defendant City of Louisburg for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. We reverse.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he was employed by
defendant Billings & Garrett, Inc., a construction company which
had contracted with defendant City of Louisburg for the
construction of a sewer line. Plaintiff alleges that excavation
for the sewer line necessitated the use of dynamite, an ultra-
hazardous activity. He alleges he was injured when he was required
to operate a jackhammer in a trench where three sets of dynamite
charges had previously been detonated. As he began drilling holes
with the jackhammer in preparation for a fourth set of dynamitecharges, some undetonated dynamite and dynamite residue exploded,
inflicting serious and permanent injuries upon plaintiff, including
the loss of an eye. He alleges Billings & Garrett, Inc., was
acting as agent for the City of Louisburg in constructing the sewer
line and that both defendants are strictly liable for the injuries
which he sustained as a result of defendants' use of dynamite.
Plaintiff also alleges defendant City of Louisburg waived
governmental immunity by the purchase of liability insurance.
Because plaintiff appeals from a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we
treat all of the foregoing factual allegations as true. The
standard of review of an order dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, G.S. § 1A-1,
Rule 12(b)(6), is to determine 'whether, as a matter of law, the
allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal
theory.' Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 134
N.C. App. 217, 517 S.E.2d 406, 413 (1999) (citations omitted). 'A
complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if no law
exists to support the claim made, if sufficient facts to make out
a good claim are absent, or if facts are disclosed which will
necessarily defeat the claim.' Id. (citations omitted).
Blasting is recognized as an ultra-hazardous activity in North
Carolina and parties whose blasting causes injury are held strictly
liable for damages, regardless of negligence. Woodson v. Rowland,329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991); Insurance Co. v. Bl
ythe
Brothers Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963); see Charles E.Daye and Mark W. Morris, North Carolina Law of Torts, § 20.
40, at
421 (2nd ed. 1999). Sovereign immunity is waived to the extent to
which a municipality has purchased liability insurance. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 160A-485, Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App. 44, 457 S.E.2d
902, disc. review denied, 341 N.C. 647, 462 S.E.2d 508 (1995). The
parties agree that the sole question for our determination is
whether plaintiff's claim is barred by application of the public
duty doctrine.
The public duty doctrine provides that governmental entities,
when exercising their statutory powers, act for the benefit of the
general public and therefore have no duty to protect specific
individuals. Stone v. N.C. Dept. of Labor, 347 N.C. 473, 495
S.E.2d 711, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016, 142 L.Ed.2d 449 (1998).
The rationale behind the public duty doctrine is to prevent 'an
overwhelming burden of liability' on governmental agencies with
'limited resources.' Id. at 481, 495 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting
Braswell v. Braswell, 330 N.C. 363, 410 S.E.2d 897 (1991)). The
doctrine was first applied in North Carolina by this Court in
Coleman v. Cooper, 89 N.C. App. 188, 366 S.E.2d 2, disc. review
denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 375 (1988) and was adopted by our
Supreme Court less than a decade ago in Braswell. As originally
applied and adopted, the doctrine operated to shield a governmental
entity from liability for the failure of the government and its law
enforcement agents to furnish police protection to specific
individuals. Braswell at 370-71, 410 S.E.2d at 901.
The doctrine has since been extended by this Court to shieldmunicipalities and their agents from liability for negl
igence in
providing fire protection services, Davis v. Messer, 119 N.C. App.
44, 457 S.E.2d 902 (1995), animal control services, Prevette v.
Forsyth County, 110 N.C. App. 754, 431 S.E.2d 216, disc. review
denied, 334 N.C. 622, 435 S.E.2d 338 (1993), municipal building
inspection services, Lynn v. Overlook Development, 98 N.C. App. 75,
389 S.E.2d 609 (1990), reversed in part on other grounds, 328 N.C.
689, 403 S.E.2d 469 (1991), Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.C. App. 515,
459 S.E.2d 71, disc. review denied, 342 N.C. 194, 463 S.E.2d 242
(1995), and by our Supreme Court to shield state agencies required
by statute to perform safety inspections for the protection of the
general public. Hunt v. N.C. Dept. of Labor, 348 N.C. 192, 499
S.E.2d 747 (1998); Stone v. N.C. Dept. of Labor, supra. More
recently, however, in Lovelace v. City of Shelby, ___ N.C. ___, ___
S.E.2d ___ (7 April 2000) and Thompson v. Waters, ___ N.C. ___,
___ S.E.2d ___ (7 April 2000), the North Carolina Supreme Court has
held the protection afforded by the public duty doctrine does not
extend to local governmental agencies other than law enforcement
agencies engaged in their general duty to protect the public.
Therefore, the public duty doctrine does not apply to shield the
City of Louisburg from liability for the claim alleged in
plaintiff's complaint. The order of the trial court dismissing the
complaint against the City of Louisburg is reversed and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Reversed.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
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