Appeal by defendants from order entered 15 October 1998 by
Judge Alexander Lyerly in Mitchell County District Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 25 January 2000.
Harrison & Poore, P.A., by Hal G. Harrison, for plaintiff-
appellee.
Randy A. Carpenter for defendant-appellants.
LEWIS, Judge.
This appeal arises from an order holding defendants in
contempt for violating a court order. The basis is defendants'obstruction of plaintiff's enjoyment of an easement he purportedly
has that runs across defendants' lands. Although the immediate
issue on appeal is
the contempt order, a resolution of this issue actually requires us
to delve nearly two decades into the past and consider the judgment
that awarded plaintiff's predecessors-in-title the easement in the
first place.
As the map below illustrates, plaintiff and defendants are
neighboring landowners in Mitchell County. N.C. State Road 1174
Figure
Graphic file number 0 named map2.gif with height 385 p and width 370 p Left aligned
(also known asRebels Creek Road) runs through defendants'
properties. This case involves an unimproved dirt road that turns
off of Rebels Creek Road and also runs through defendants'
properties. A
few hundred
feet from
Rebels Creek
Road, this
unimproved road
forks off into
two directions.
The left fork,
which we will
refer to as the
Center Road,
runs for a
short distance
along the
southwestern
boundary of
defendant Michael Welch's land and then enters plaintiff's property
at his southern boundary. It dead ends within a few hundred feet.
The right fork, herein referred to as the Mountain Road, continues
for several hundred feet along the western boundary of both
defendants' properties before entering plaintiff's property at his
northern boundary. The Mountain Road then exits plaintiff's land,apparently improves in quality, and continues on towards the town
of Bandana.
As part of a judgment entered in 1983 (“the 1983 judgment”),
plaintiff's predecessors-in-title were awarded a prescriptive
easement. That easement allowed plaintiff's predecessors-in-title
to use "a road" that traversed defendants' properties as a means of
perpetual ingress and egress. The 1983 judgment described this
road as follows:
3.
[It] extends from the Rebels Creek Public
Road along the western boundary of and
through the lands of the Defendants Welch
to the lands of the plaintiffs . . . .
4.
[It] has provided the sole means of
ingress and egress to plaintiffs' lands
and has been used in connection with
mining and timbering operations conducted
on plaintiffs' lands . . . .
In 1995, plaintiff purchased his property, along with the
easement, from those who were plaintiffs in the 1983 judgment.
Shortly thereafter, he and his family began using the Mountain
Road. Defendants responded by constructing a roadblock to prevent
plaintiff's use; they left the Center road unobstructed. Plaintiff
then instituted this action, asserting defendants' contempt of the
1983 judgment. At a contempt hearing before the same judge who
decided the 1983 case, defendants argued that the "road" described
in the 1983 judgment was the Center Road only. Plaintiff, on the
other hand, maintained that the judgment included both the Center
and Mountain roads. The trial court concluded that the 1983
judgment included both the Mountain and Center roads. The trialcourt then concluded that, by obstructing plaintiff's use of the
Mountain Road, defendants were in contempt. The trial court also
awarded plaintiff $2000 in attorney's fees. From this order,
defendants appeal.
[1]In their first argument, defendants contend the trial
court impermissibly transformed the contempt action that was before
it into a declaratory judgment action by considering whether the
easement awarded in the 1983 judgment included both the Mountain
and Center roads. We find this argument to be without merit. A
contempt proceeding requires willful violation of a prior court
order or judgment.
Hancock v. Hancock, 122 N.C. App. 518, 523, 471
S.E.2d 415, 418 (1996). As such, an interpretation of the prior
court order in this case was required. The trial court did not err
by considering what road or roads the easement in the 1983 judgment
included.
[2]Next, defendants argue that the trial court incorrectly
interpreted the 1983 judgment to apply to both the Mountain and
Center roads. Generally, the interpretation of judgments presents
a question of law that is fully reviewable on appeal.
Reavis v.
Reavis, 82 N.C. App. 77, 80, 345 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1986). In
interpreting judgments, we are to consider the pleadings, issues,
and other circumstances leading to the judgment.
White v. Graham,
72 N.C. App. 436, 441, 325 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1985). Aside from the
1983 judgment itself, the record on appeal here, however, contains
no information relative to the prior judgment. We are thus left to
piece together the issues and circumstances leading up to thatjudgment.
Based upon our review of the record before us, we conclude
that the 1983 judgment was ambiguous as a matter of law.
Specifically, we conclude that the judgment was reasonably
susceptible to three differing interpretations. First, the
judgment can reasonably be construed to include both the Mountain
and Center roads. After all, both roads do in fact "extend[] from
the Rebels Creek Public Road along the western boundary of and
through the lands of the Defendants Welch to the lands of the
plaintiffs." Second, the judgment can be interpreted to only
include the Mountain Road, since the Mountain Road extends along
much more of the western boundary than does the Center Road.
Furthermore, the judgment throughout only refers to "a road,"
refuting the notion that more than one road was intended to be
included. Third, the judgment is reasonably susceptible to the
interpretation that only the Center Road was included. The Center
Road provides the "sole means of ingress and egress" to the
majority of plaintiff's property. The Mountain Road, on the other
hand, is not a sole means of ingress and egress; plaintiff can
access the northeastern tip of his property by traveling south from
Bandana, in which case he would never have to cross into
defendants' properties. Adding to all of this uncertainty is the
fact that plaintiff's and defendants' lands had not even been
surveyed at the time of the 1983 action. Thus, any description of
the easement was inherently imprecise. Accordingly, we conclude
that the 1983 judgment was ambiguous. Our next step, then, is toresolve this ambiguity.
Unfortunately, the law with respect to ambiguous judgments is
not very well-developed in our State. What little law there is can
be summarized as follows: Where a judgment is ambiguous, and thus
susceptible to two or more interpretations, our courts should adopt
the interpretation that is in harmony with the law applicable to
the case.
See Alexander v. Brown, 236 N.C. 212, 215, 72 S.E.2d
522, 524 (1952). This principle is not helpful here because more
than one of the above interpretations is in harmony with the law
concerning prescriptive easements.
Prescriptive easements require the showing of four elements:
(1) an adverse or hostile use; (2) the use has been open and
notorious; (3) the use has been continuous and uninterrupted for at
least twenty years; and (4) substantial identity of the way claimed
to be an easement.
Potts v. Burnette, 301 N.C. 663, 666, 273
S.E.2d 285, 287-88 (1981). At the contempt hearing, plaintiff's
evidence tended to show that the pre-1983 use of both roads
satisfied all four of these elements. Defendants' evidence, on the
other hand, tended to show that only the pre-1983 use of the Center
Road satisfied the requisite elements. Accordingly, we are left
with an ambiguous judgment, reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation, all of which are in relative harmony with the
applicable law. We have found no guidance in our state with
respect to this rare situation, and so we turn to the common law
and to other states for assistance.
Although no unanimity seems to exist, several courts, in thecontext of ambiguous judgments, have given deference to
the trial
court's interpretation of the prior judgment. Exactly how much
deference varies.
See, e.g.,
County of Suffolk v. Stone & Webster
Eng'g Corp., 106 F.3d 1112, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating a trial
court's interpretation is subject to an abuse of discretion
standard);
Holmberg v. Holmberg, 578 N.W.2d 817, 825 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998) (stating the trial judge's interpretation is given
"great weight"),
aff'd, 588 N.W.2d 720 (Minn. 1999);
Schultz v.
Schultz, 535 N.W.2d 116, 120 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that
some deference is given to the trial court's interpretation).
But
see Kerndt v. Ronan, 458 N.W.2d 466, 470-71 (Neb. 1990) (stating
that a trial judge's interpretation is irrelevant). Deference to
a trial judge's interpretation is even more appropriate where, as
here, that trial judge is the same one who presided over the
original judgment now being interpreted. This is so because "the
[trial judge's] resolution of the ambiguity is made based upon the
judge's experience of trial or prior experience with the record."
Schultz, 535 N.W.2d at 120. Here, the trial judge interpreted the
1983 judgment to include both roads. We will defer to his
experience with this case and the parties and therefore affirm his
interpretation.
[3]Having resolved the ambiguity in the 1983 judgment, we
must next determine whether, by blockading plaintiff's access to
the Mountain Road, defendants were in contempt of this judgment.
As previously stated, in order to be held in contempt, a party must
have willfully violated a court order.
Hancock, 122 N.C. App. at523, 471 S.E.2d at 418. The trial court here found that defendants
did willfully violate the 1983 judgment. This finding is
conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence.
Clark v.
Clark, 294 N.C. 554, 571, 243 S.E.2d 129, 139 (1978). Here,
however, there was simply no evidence of willfulness on the part of
defendants.
With respect to contempt, willfulness connotes knowledge of,
and stubborn resistance to, a court order.
Mauney v. Mauney, 268
N.C. 254, 257, 150 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1966). If the prior order is
ambiguous such that a defendant could not understand his respective
rights and obligations under that order, he cannot be said to have
"knowledge" of that order for purposes of contempt proceedings.
Cf. In re Board of Commissioners, 4 N.C. App. 626, 629-30, 167
S.E.2d 488, 491 (1969) ("The generality of the Order leaves much to
be desired, and it is questionable whether the Order is capable of
full understanding. . . . In view of the apparent vagueness of the
order . . . and the lack of notice to show cause before entry of
the Order appealed from, we reverse the adjudication of contempt .
. . ."). Due to the ambiguity of the 1983 judgment here, we
reverse the trial court's adjudication of contempt.
[4] Finally, we address the trial court's award of attorney's
fees. Generally speaking, "[a] North Carolina court has no
authority to award damages to a private party in a contempt
proceeding. Contempt is a wrong against the state, and moneys
collected for contempt go to the state alone."
Glesner v.
Dembrosky, 73 N.C. App. 594, 599, 327 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1985)(citations omitted). But our courts can award attorney's fees in
contempt matters when specifically authorized by statute.
Records
v. Tape Corp., 18 N.C. App. 183, 187, 196 S.E.2d 598, 602,
cert.
denied, 283 N.C. 666, 197 S.E.2d 880 (1973). Thus, in
Smith v.
Smith, 121 N.C. App. 334, 465 S.E.2d 52 (1996), we allowed
attorney's fees in a contempt action to enforce a child support
order because our child support statutes specifically authorized
such an award.
Id. at 339-40, 465 S.E.2d at 55-56. With respect
to contempt actions involving easements, however, there is no
specific statutory authorization for the award of attorney's fees.
We therefore reverse that part of the trial court's order awarding
plaintiff $2000 in attorney's fees.
In conclusion, we feel obligated to comment on the scope of
the easement here. "In the case of easements arising by
prescription, the character and pattern of the user during the
whole period during which the easement came into being determines
its extent." 1 James A. Webster, Jr.,
Webster's Real Estate Law in
North Carolina § 15-22 (5th ed. 1999). This is so because a
prescriptive easement is a form of estoppel; "[it] is an invasion
of the rights of the owner of the servient tenement, and he is only
estopped from claiming damages as to such injuries as he has
quietly submitted to for twenty years."
Powell v. Lash, 64 N.C.
456, 459 (1870). Accordingly, "[i]f any
new injury is occasioned
by the easement, the owner of the servient tenement, may, at any
time within twenty years, sustain an action for this
additional
invasion of his rights.
Id. (emphasis added). Here, theprescriptive easement was based upon two uses by plaintiff's
predecessors-in-title: (1) mining and timbering operations; and (2)
ingress and egress to their property. These uses thus define the
scope of the easement that plaintiff now owns. At the contempt
proceeding, plaintiff testified that he is currently using the
roads for two uses: (1) ingress and egress; and (2) recreational
four-wheeling. Pure recreational use was never contemplated in the
1983 judgment and thus would appear to exceed the scope of the
easement awarded therein. Any use consistent with ingress and
egress to plaintiff's property, however, would be within the scope
of that easement. The able trial judge has resolved the use of the
easement granted in 1983. The parties now understand what
easements exist and the limitations on them.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Judges GREENE and EDMUNDS concur.
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