Workers' Compensation--compromise settlement agreement--health insurer not included--
real party in interest--settlement void
A compromise settlement agreement in a workers' compensation case was void where a
health insurer which had filed a claim for reimbursement did not consent to the settlement. In a
case of first impression, the Court of Appeals held that the Industrial Commission had subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim because a health insurer may intervene as a real party in interest
when it alleges that it has paid medical expenses due to an employee's compensable injury and is
entitled to reimbursement and liability is disputed by the employer. A compromise settlement
agreement can only be approved when all parties consent; of course, nothing prohibits an
employee and employer from including the health insurer in the clincher.
Taft, Taft and Haigler, P.A., by Alden B. Cole, for plaintiff-
appellee.
Young Moore and Henderson, P.A., by Joe E. Austin, Jr. and
Dawn M. Dillon, for defendant-appellees Crystal Ford-Mercury,
Inc. and Pennsylvania National Insurance Company.
J. Randolph Ward and Maupin Taylor & Ellis, P.A., by M. Keith
Kapp and Kevin W. Benedict, for appellant Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of North Carolina.
HUNTER, Judge.
Appellant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North Carolina (“BCBS”)
appeals orders of the North Carolina Industrial Commission
(“Industrial Commission”) wherein it approved a compromise
settlement agreement between April Hansen (“plaintiff”) her
employer, Crystal Ford-Mercury, Inc. (“employer”), and its workers'compensation carrier, Pennsylvania National Insurance Company
(“carrier”), without addressing whether or not plaintiff's injurywas compensable under the North Carolina Workers' Compensation A
ct
(“Act”). BCBS had filed a claim in the matter, contending that it
was entitled to reimbursement for medical costs it paid due to
plaintiff's alleged compensable injury. The Full Industrial
Commission (“Full Commission”) did not rule on BCBS's claim,
inferring that it did not have jurisdiction to do so. We reverse
on the basis that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction over
BCBS's claim, and therefore the subject compromise settlement is
void because all interested parties did not consent to it.
The record indicates that plaintiff filed a workers'
compensation claim alleging a workplace injury on 24 July 1996,
when plaintiff allegedly came down a ladder and twisted her right
knee as she stepped on the floor. On 7 August 1996, carrier denied
plaintiff's claim for “fail[ing] to cooperate” with their requests
for medical records. On 26 August 1996, carrier sent plaintiff a
letter denying that her injury was compensable due to carrier's
review of plaintiff's medical records and the revelation that
plaintiff had suffered prior problems with the injured knee.
Carrier recommended that plaintiff submit her claim to BCBS,
plaintiff's health insurer through her employer's group healthinsurance plan. BCBS subsequently paid $12,229.78 for treatment of
plaintiff's injured knee from 26 July 1996 to 30 October 1996.
BCBS's coverage of plaintiff apparently ended with her departure
from employment with employer in the fall of 1996. BCBS learnedof plaintiff's workers' compensation claim as to t
he injury in
September 1997. On 29 September 1997, BCBS entered a Form 33
“Request that Claim be Assigned for Hearing” in plaintiff's case,
requesting that it be reimbursed for its costs because employer and
carrier (collectively “defendants”) were liable for plaintiff's
alleged compensable injury. On 24 November 1997, on Industrial
Commission Form 33R, “Response to Request that Claim be Assigned
for Hearing,” defendants stated that “compensability has been
denied,” and made the following notations under “Defendant Agrees
to the Following,” in pertinent part:
Subject to Act Admitted
;
Employment Relationship Admitted &n
bsp;
Insurance Coverage Admitted &nb
sp;
Date of Injury 7/24/96 alleged &nbs
p;
Injury by accident Denied
;
Arising out of and in the course of employment
Denied &nbs
p;
Industrial Commission Deputy Commissioner Mary Moore Hoag entered
an order on 10 December 1997 allowing BCBS to serve requests for
admissions to defendants, and ordering defendants to serve
responses on or before 15 December 1997. Those requests asked for
carrier's admission that the medical services for plaintiff in
question were necessary due to the condition of plaintiff's right
knee on and/or after 24 July 1996, the date of the accident.
Defendants never answered the requests, and carrier defended on the
grounds that plaintiff's injury was not an “injury by accident” as
contemplated by the Act.
A “compromise settlement agreement” or “clincher” per
Industrial Commission Rule 502, and a proposed order, weresubmitted to the Industrial Commission on 18 December 1997. They
provided that without admitting liability, but upon payment of
$15,000.00 and certain medical expenses to plaintiff, the
Industrial Commission would discharge defendants from further
liability under the Act. On 30 March 1998, the deputy commissioner
denied defendants' and plaintiff's 18 December 1997 joint motion to
strike the discovery orders and approve a compromise settlement
agreement releasing defendants from all liability without
reimbursing BCBS, stating: “I can not [sic], in good conscience,
approve a Compromise Settlement Agreement in this action which does
not provide for reimbursement to [BCBS].” Defendants and plaintiff
appealed to the Full Commission.
The Full Commission entered an order on 22 January 1999
approving the compromise settlement agreement and releasing
defendants from liability for plaintiff's injuries. The Full
Commission vacated all prior discovery orders, and approved the
compromise settlement agreement, stating in pertinent part:
Because it appears to the Commission that
the liability of defendants for the unpaid
medical expenses is legitimately in dispute,
an injustice would result if defendants must
undertake to pay these expenses prior to
approval of this agreement as the case would
not then reach a settlement. Therefore, the
Commission exercises its discretion pursuant
to Industrial Commission Rules 502(2)(b) and
801 to waive the obligation, if any, of
defendants to pay all unpaid medical expenses
as a part of this agreement.
Industrial Commission Rule 502, which the Full Commission cites for
authority, states in pertinent part: (2) No c
ompromise agreement will be
approved unless it contains the following
language or its equivalent:
(a) Where liability is admitted, that
the employer or carrier/administrator
undertakes to pay all medical expenses to the
date of the agreement.
(b) Where liability is denied, that the
employer or carrier/administrator undertakes
to pay all unpaid medical expenses to the date
of the agreement. However, where application
of this Rule shall work an injustice, it may
be waived in the discretion of the Industrial
Commission.
Workers' Comp. R. of N.C. Indus. Comm'n 502(2), (a), (b), 2000 Ann.
R. 723 (Lexis) (emphasis added). Likewise, Rule 801 provides that
the Industrial Commission Rules may be waived in the “interest of
justice.” Workers' Comp. R. of N.C. Indus. Comm'n 801, 2000 Ann.
R. 733 (Lexis). The 22 January 1999 order was amended by order of
3 February 1999 to correct a clerical error. BCBS made a motion
for reconsideration, asking that the order be amended by
discharging defendants' liability only as to plaintiff's claims,
not those of BCBS. This motion was denied by order of 16 February
1999. BCBS appeals.
First, BCBS contends that the Full Commission erred by
failing to hear and determine its claim for reimbursement because
the Industrial Commission is the only body with jurisdiction to
hear and determine issues regarding the compensability of allegedly
work-related injuries.
First, we note that our review of claims under the Act is
limited. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that “'the
findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive on appeal,. . . when supported by competent evidence[] . . . even though the
record may support a contrary finding of fact.'” Inscoe v.
Industries, Inc., 292 N.C. 210, 215, 232 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1977)
(quoting Rice v. Chair Co., 238 N.C. 121, 124, 76 S.E.2d 311, 313
(1953)). When the Court of Appeals reviews a decision of the full
Commission, its inquiry is limited to: (1) whether there is
competent evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact;
and, (2) whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of
law and decision of the Commission. Hansel v. Sherman Textiles,
304 N.C. 44, 49, 283 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1981). Conclusions of law by
the Industrial Commission are reviewable de novo by this Court.
Grantham v. R. G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 491 S.E.2d 678
(1997), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 671, 500 S.E.2d 86 (1998).
While we normally review findings of fact and conclusions of
law by the Full Commission based on the foregoing precedent, the
order which has been appealed in the present case is a “clincher,”
or compromise settlement agreement, and as such, contained neither.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-17 and 97-82, “[t]he Commission
recognizes, . . . two forms of voluntary settlements, namely, the
compensation agreement in uncontested cases, and the compromise or
'clincher' agreement in contested or disputed cases.” Vernon v.
Steven L. Mabe Builders, 336 N.C. 425, 430, 444 S.E.2d 191, 193
(1994) (emphasis added). The Full Commission did not consider
BCBS's claim for reimbursement due to a compensable injury, but
stated:
[T]his Order does not purport to approve,
resolve or address any issue or matter overwhich the Industrial Commission has no
jurisdiction, whether or not such issue or
matter is raised in the compromise settlement
agreement executed by the parties in this
action.
The Full Commission made no findings of fact or conclusions of law
to support the inference that it did not have jurisdiction over
BCBS's claim, and this was error. As we have noted, our review is
usually limited to whether their findings are supported by
competent evidence. However, jurisdictional facts found by the
Industrial “. . . 'Commission, though supported by competent
evidence, are not binding on this Court.'” Williams v. ARL, Inc.,
133 N.C. App. 625, 628, 516 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1999) (emphasis added)
(quoting Cook v. Norvell-Mackorell Real Estate Co., 99 N.C. App.
307, 309, 392 S.E.2d 758, 759 (1990)). Because this Court may make
independent findings with respect to jurisdictional facts, we shall
address the issue of whether or not the Industrial Commission has
jurisdiction over BCBS's claim.
“The Industrial Commission is not a court of general
jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction except that conferred upon it
by statute.” Bryant v. Dougherty, 267 N.C. 545, 548, 148 S.E.2d
548, 551 (1966) (citation omitted). Under our General Statutes:
All questions arising under [the Act] if
not settled by agreements of the parties
interested therein, with the approval of the
Commission, shall be determined by the
Commission, except as otherwise herein
provided.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-91 (1999). Therefore, if a question arising
under the Act is not settled by agreement of all parties, the
Commission shall make a determination on this issue. The questionon which BCBS's claim is based, i.e., whether or not plaintiff's
injury is compensable, is a question arising under the Act.
Therefore, if BCBS were found to be a party to plaintiff's claim,
the “clincher” in question would obviously be void, since BCBS did
not consent and all interested parties must consent to a compromise
agreement.
(3) No compromise agreement will be
considered unless the following additional
requirements are met:
. . .
(b) Parties and all attorneys of record
must have signed the agreement.
Workers' Comp. R. of N.C. Indus. Comm'n 502(3), (b), 2000 Ann. R.
723 (Lexis). Consequently, we must determine if BCBS, as
plaintiff's health insurer, is a party to plaintiff's workers'
compensation case due to the fact that it filed a claim for
reimbursement in the case.
Whether a health insurer may intervene in a workers'
compensation claim for reimbursement appears to be an issue of
first impression in this state. As to the parties in any suit:
Only a “real party in interest” has the
legal right to maintain a cause of action.
Crowell v. Chapman, 306 N.C. 540, 293 S.E.2d
767 (1982). In order to qualify as a real
party in interest, a party must have some
interest in the subject matter of the
litigation and not merely an interest in the
action. Parnell v. Insurance Co., 263 N.C.
445, 449, 139 S.E.2d 723, 726 (1965). In
other words, “[a] real party in interest is a
party who is benefitted or injured by the
judgment in the case.” Id. at 448, 139 S.E.2d
at 726 (quoting Rental Co. v. Justice, 211
N.C. 54, 55, 188 S.E. 609, 610 (1936)). . . .
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Scott, 124 N.C. App. 224, 226,
476 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1996), cert. denied, 346 N.C. 185, 486 S.E.2d
220 (1997). The general consensus of workers' compensation
statutes is that:
a health or accident insurer may intervene in
workers' compensation proceedings to recover
benefits paid when the recipient of the
insurance proceeds is the party seeking
compensation benefits. Among the reasons
given by the courts . . . are that the insurer
has a direct interest in the outcome of the
litigation in that it may gain or lose
depending on the outcome, and that to deny the
right to intervene would cause the insured to
be unjustly enriched. The courts also point
out that it is more efficient and inexpensive
to determine all relevant issues in one
proceeding rather than compelling the insurer
to pursue an independent action against the
insured for reimbursement.
Francis M. Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Right of Health or Accident
Insurer to Intervene in Workers' Compensation Proceeding to Recover
Benefits Previously Paid to Claimant or Beneficiary, 38 A.L.R.4th
355, 356 (1985). Also:
An agency charged with administration of
a workers' compensation act generally has
jurisdiction to pass upon questions relating
to a workers' compensation insurance policy
when such rulings are necessary or ancillary
to the determination of an injured workers'
rights under the act. But where such
determinations are not material to
determination of a worker's right to benefits,
the view has been expressed that a court of
law, rather than an administrative tribunal
charged with resolving workers' compensation
claims, is the proper forum for a dispute over
insurance coverage between an employer and an
insurer, or between two or more insurers.
Under some workers' compensation statutes,
however, the commission has been granted
exclusive original jurisdiction of all
questions relating to compensation insurance,including reimbursements among insurance
carriers.
82 Am. Jur. 2d Workers' Compensation § 486 (1992) (footnotes
omitted). Thus, the intervention of a health insurer in a workers'
compensation claim, when it has a direct interest in the case,
encourages judicial economy, prevents unjust enrichment, and avoids
duplicative litigation.
While the North Carolina Supreme Court has not considered the
issue of intervention by a health insurer in a workers'
compensation case, it has held that the jurisdiction of the
Industrial Commission, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-91,
is not limited . . . solely to questions
arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or in the determination of rights
asserted by or on behalf of an injured
employee. Clark v. Ice Cream Co., 261 N.C.
234, 134 S.E.2d 354, did not so hold. On the
contrary the North Carolina Supreme Court has
held in Worley v. Pipes, 229 N.C. 465, 50
S.E.2d 504, and in Matros v. Owen, 229 N.C.
472, 50 S.E.2d 509, that the sole remedy of a
physician to recover for services rendered to
an injured employee in cases where the
employee and his employer are subject to the
Workmen's Compensation Act is by application
to the Industrial Commission in accordance
with the Act, with right of appeal to the
courts for review, and that this remedy is
exclusive. These decisions are equally
applicable to charges for hospital services
rendered to employees in Workmen's
Compensation cases.
Wake County Hospital v. Industrial Comm., 8 N.C. App. 259, 261, 174
S.E.2d 292, 293 (1970), overruled on other grounds by Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. Industrial Comm., 336 N.C. 200,
211, 443 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1994). In accord with this reasoning,
our Supreme Court has held that the Industrial Commission hasjurisdiction to consider a Veterans Administration claim for
medical treatment furnished to an indigent veteran for injuries
resulting from an industrial accident, and to order the claim paid
as part of the employer's liability under the Act. Marshall v.
Poultry Ranch, 268 N.C. 223, 150 S.E.2d 423 (1966). Also, in a
more recent case, this Court considered whether the Industrial
Commission had subject matter jurisdiction over intervening claims
by a health care provider for payment of medical services provided
to an injured employee, when the expenses had not been paid by
plaintiff's Medicaid insurance, and the Industrial Commission had
previously ordered that the employer pay reasonable and necessary
expenses for the employee's compensable injury. In holding that
the Industrial Commission did have jurisdiction, this Court pointed
out:
The General Assembly intended that the
Commission have continuing jurisdiction of all
proceedings begun before it. “[I]t is clothed
with such implied power as is necessary to
perform the duties required of it by the law
which it administers.” Hogan v. Cone Mills
Corp., 315 N.C. 127, 137, 337 S.E.2d 477, 483
(1985). Furthermore, this Court has
recognized that “the Commission's continuing
jurisdiction over its judgments includes the
power to supervise and enforce them.” Hieb v.
Howell's Child Care Center, 123 N.C. App. 61,
68, 472 S.E.2d 208, 212, disc. review denied,
345 N.C. 179, 479 S.E.2d 204 (1996). The
Workers' Compensation Act bestows on the
Commission the authority to approve medical
fees.
. . .
[I]n this case, plaintiff is seeking
enforcement of the Commission's earlier order
awarding him reasonable and necessary medical
expenses after a dispute arose over whatexpenses defendants must pay. G.S. 97-90
enables the Commission to approve medical
expenses. The fact that the Commission was
also required to interpret state and federal
statutes is irrelevant. Accordingly, because
the Commission was acting within its statutory
mandate, we hold that it had subject matter
jurisdiction to hear and decide these issues.
Pearson v. C. P. Buckner Steel Erection Co., 126 N.C. App. 745,
747-48, 486 S.E.2d 723, 725-26 (1997), affirmed in part and
reversed in part, 348 N.C. 239, 498 S.E.2d 818 (1998) (citations
omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed this Court's ruling, stating:
We believe that the Commission's “supervisory
power over its judgments,” [Hogan v. Cone
Mills Corp., 315 N.C. 127,] 140, 337 S.E.2d
[447,] 485 [(1985),] includes the authority to
enter orders to enforce those judgments. The
authority to set and approve medical fees is
granted to the Commission by statute. Having
found that defendants are liable for
plaintiff's reasonable and necessary medical
expenses, the Commission retains jurisdiction
over the case to determine which expenses must
be paid and in what amount.
Pearson, 348 N.C. at 242, 498 S.E.2d at 820 (citation omitted).
While the Full Commission did not order defendants to pay
plaintiff's unpaid medical expenses in the present case, as it had
in Pearson, the holding in Pearson indicates that the Industrial
Commission has jurisdiction over all claims in a proceeding begun
before it, including intervening claims for payment for services by
a medical provider.
Similarly, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Harris, 578 F.2d 52 (3rd Cir. 1978), held that a health
insurer “providing coverage for non-occupational injuries and
illnesses may intervene in proceedings under the Longshoremen's andHarbor Workers' [Compensation] Act . . . and recover amounts paid
out for injuries or illnesses that are found to be work-related.”
Id. at 53 (citation omitted). The Court reasoned:
[The insurer's] claim for reimbursement
is derived from the same nucleus of operative
facts as [claimant's] claim for compensation.
A finding that a claimant's injuries are work-
related is, in operative effect, a finding
that payments should not have been made under
a policy covering non-occupational injuries.
Deciding reimbursement claims at the same time
as compensation claims avoids essentially
duplicative litigation thus reducing the
expenditure of time and money by the parties
and the courts. Facilitating reimbursement of
improperly paid benefits also encourages
insurance companies . . . to make swift
payment of legitimate claims. Thus on the
basis of these policy considerations and the
close factual relationship between
reimbursement and compensation claims, we hold
that claims for reimbursement are questions in
respect of compensation claims and may
therefore be decided in the same proceedings
in which the compensation claims are decided.
Id. at 54. This holding is instructive as “[t]he North Carolina
Workmen's Compensation Act seems to have been taken in the main
from the Longshoremen's Act.” Kellams v. Metal Products, 248 N.C.
199, 202, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958). As with the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act, that statute “does not explicitly
provide procedures for intervention” by general health insurers.
Aetna, 578 F.2d at 55.
As to litigation between two insurers involving a workers'
compensation claim, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. Tucker, 3 Va. App. 116, 348 S.E.2d 416
(1986), held that the Virginia Industrial Commission did not havejurisdiction over such matter, unless the litigation affected the
employee's right to recover:
Generally, the Commission's jurisdiction is
limited to those issues which are directly or
necessarily related to the right of an
employee to compensation for a work-related
injury. . . .
. . .
Questions between the insurer and the
employer or another insurer do not “arise
under” the Act except insofar as they affect
the rights of an injured employee. When the
rights of the claimant are not at stake, the
Act clearly leaves the litigants to their
common law remedies, with the pleading
requirements, broader discovery and the more
stringent rules of evidence not applicable
under the Act. . . .
Hartford, 3 Va. App. at 120-21, 348 S.E.2d at 418-19 (emphasis
added) (citations omitted). Under this reasoning, BCBS's claim
falls under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission because
resolution of its claim requires a determination of compensability,
which affects plaintiff's right to recover under the Act. We note
that this affect could be either beneficial or detrimental to
plaintiff's ability to recover benefits. However, based on the
foregoing authority, our review indicates that such affect is in
accord with the purpose of the Act as it affects a compromise
settlement agreement.
A compromise settlement agreement, when liability is
questionable, is not always preferable for the employee or
employer:
[I]t is often argued that to permit
compromises will enable claimants to get at
least something in the many controversialcases where there is serious doubt whether
fundamental conditions of liability can be
established. But again it must be stressed
that the objective of the legislation is not
to see how much money can be transferred to
workers as a class; it is to ensure that those
with truly compensable claims get full
compensation. If there is doubt about the
conpensability of the claim, the solution is
not to send the claimant away half-
compensated, but to let the Compensation Board
decide the issue. That is the Board's job.
8 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law
§ 82.42 (1999) (footnotes omitted). While a compromise settlement
agreement may be in accordance with the purpose of the Act, which
is “not only to provide a swift and certain remedy to an injured
worker, but also to ensure a limited and determinate liability for
employers,” Radzisz v. Harley Davidson of Metrolina, 346 N.C. 84,
89, 484 S.E.2d 566, 569 (1997) (citing Barnhardt v. Yellow Cab Co.,
266 N.C. 419, 427, 146 S.E.2d 479, 484 (1966)), we recognize that
when liability itself is in dispute, there are
only two correct decisions possible under the
Act: full liability or nonliability; a
partial payment must, therefore, be either an
overpayment or an underpayment . . .
[nevertheless] the compromise devise . . . may
forestall tedious and expensive litigation.
8 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law
§ 82.43 (1999) (footnote omitted). Therefore, while a
determination of compensability under the Act may have caused more
litigation, this determination nevertheless would have ensured that
plaintiff did not receive an overpayment or underpayment in the
present case. Such a result protects and encourages the rights of
both an employee and employer under the Act, and the rights of an
employee's health insurer. Defendants contend that this Court held “that a health
insurance carrier may bring a subrogation claim against a workers'
compensation insurance carrier in superior court after the
Industrial Commission has determined that the . . . carrier is
liable for the claim” in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. American
Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 89 N.C. App. 299, 365 S.E.2d 677 (1988).
To the contrary, our review of that case indicates that in
Nationwide, the insurer of the employer's truck sought
reimbursement from the workers' compensation carrier in superior
court for monies allegedly paid on behalf of an employee after the
Industrial Commission had determined that the injury was
compensable under the Act. This Court never considered the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction. It ruled that the truck insurer
was not an intermeddling volunteer and was thus entitled to recover
monies from the workers' compensation carrier, and that for statute
of limitations purposes, the insurer's subrogation action accrued
on the date the Industrial Commission determined that the workers'
compensation carrier should pay the employee for his injuries. Id.
We note that should BCBS seek a remedy in superior court, as
defendants urge, such claim would be meritless because BCBS is only
entitled to reimbursement if plaintiff's injury was compensable
under the Act, and the Industrial Commission, who chose not to
rule, has exclusive jurisdiction on that issue. Therefore, if we
were to uphold the Full Commission's order in the present case, an
employer or carrier could avoid costs by denying a claim while the
employee is receiving medical treatment, and subsequently enteringinto a clincher agreement which does not reimburse the employee's
health insurer. In such case, if the injury were in fact
compensable under the Act, the employer would be unjustly enriched
to the detriment of the health insurer.
While a determination of compensability prior to the entry of
a clincher may result in the plaintiff receiving nothing if the
injury were not found to be compensable, such result would prevent
an overpayment to the employee and would be fair to the employer.
Also, the health insurer would have no right to reimbursement.
Thus, all parties would be treated fairly under the Act. Of
course, nothing prohibits an employee and employer from working out
a settlement with the health insurer and including it in the
clincher.
Based on the foregoing precedent, we hold that a health
insurer may intervene as a real party in interest in a workers'
compensation proceeding when it alleges that it has paid medical
expenses due to an employee's compensable injury and is entitled to
reimbursement, and liability is disputed by the employer. Thus,
the Industrial Commission had subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim of BCBS, which was a real party in interest when the
compromise settlement agreement was approved by the Industrial
Commission. Because a compromise settlement agreement can only be
approved when all parties consent, and BCBS did not consent in the
present case, we hold that the compromise settlement agreement in
question is void. We therefore reverse and remand this case to the
Full Commission, which shall conduct further proceedings consistentwith this opinion. Due to our holding, we need not reach BCBS's
additional assignments of error.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges WYNN and MARTIN concur.
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