Search and Seizure--driving while impaired--investigatory stop--reasonable suspicion
The trial court did not err in a driving while impaired case by concluding that a police
officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop of defendant's vehicle because:
(1) the officer testified that he observed specific indicators of intoxication he was specifically
trained to look for, including that defendant had a blank look on his face and stared straight ahead
without making eye contact with the officer, defendant was driving at least ten miles per hour
below the speed limit, and defendant's driver-side window was completely down in twenty-eight
degree weather; and (2) just because most investigatory stops in the context of driving while
impaired have involved weaving within a lane or weaving between lanes, it does not mean that
only those cases will meet the reasonable suspicion standard.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Isaac T. Avery, III, for the State.
Pete Bradley for defendant-appellant.
LEWIS, Judge.
On 27 December 1997, Officer Glenn Wyatt of the Lexington
Police Department was patrolling Route 8 (Cotton Grove Road) when
he came upon defendant's vehicle stopped at an intersection.
Officer Wyatt noticed that defendant's driver-side window was
rolled down all the way, even though the outside temperature was
twenty-eight degrees. Officer Wyatt also observed defendant had "a
blank look on his face" and never turned his head to make eye
contact with the officer. After the light changed, Officer Wyatt
proceeded to follow defendant for approximately a half mile. The
speed limit on this stretch of road was forty miles per hour, butdefendant's speed never reached more than thirty miles per hour.
As defendant reached the city limits sign (at which point Officer
Wyatt testified he would no longer have jurisdiction), Officer
Wyatt pulled him over on suspicion of driving while impaired.
Defendant submitted to an intoxilyzer test and blew a .13, which is
above the then legal limit of .08. He also had no valid driver's
license at the time. Officer Wyatt then arrested defendant for
driving while impaired and for driving without a license.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained as
a result of the investigatory stop, including the results of the
intoxilyzer test. After hearing Officer Wyatt testify as to the
grounds for his stopping defendant, the trial court denied
defendant's motion. Defendant then pled guilty to driving while
impaired in return for the State dropping the charge of driving
without a licence, but reserved his right to appeal.
The only issue on appeal is whether Officer Wyatt had
sufficient grounds to justify pulling over defendant. Before a
police officer may stop a vehicle and detain its occupants without
a warrant, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 20
L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968). This reasonable suspicion must be more
than just a "hunch"; it must be based upon specific, articulable
facts that, when taken together with the reasonable inferences from
those facts, reasonably justify the seizure. Id. at 21, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 906. Moreover, the reasonableness standard must be judgedobjectively and "viewed as a whole 'through the eyes of a
reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his
experience and training.'" State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706,
252 S.E.2d 776, 779 (1979) (quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62
L. Ed.
2d 143 (1979).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Wyatt articulated three
reasons for suspecting defendant may be driving while impaired.
First, defendant had a blank look on his face and stared straight
ahead. Second, defendant was driving at least ten miles per hour
below the speed limit. Third, defendant's driver-side window was
completely down in twenty-eight degree weather. Officer Wyatt
explained he had been taught that one of the reasons drivers may
roll down their windows in cold weather is "to refresh theirself
[sic] because they have too much alcohol in their system." We
conclude these reasons are sufficient to satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard.
Officer Wyatt had been specifically trained to look for
certain indicators of intoxication, including some of the ones
here. He had ten years of experience in this area and had even
made several arrests using the exact same indicators that were
present here. As stated previously, an officer's training and
experience must be considered in analyzing the "reasonable
suspicion" standard. Thompson, 296 N.C. at 703, 252 S.E.2d at 779.
Additionally, we note that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration ("NHTSA"), in its recent publication "The Visual
Detection of DWI Motorists," states that driving ten miles per hour
or more under the speed limit, plus staring straight ahead with
fixed eyes, indicates a fifty percent chance of being legally
intoxicated. Http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/dwi/dwihtml/index.htm. This statistic lends objective credibility to
Officer Wyatt's suspicions, demonstrating that his suspicions were
in fact reasonable -- something more than just a "hunch."
Defendant points out, and we acknowledge, that the three
indicators cited by Officer Wyatt, in and of themselves, are wholly
innocent actions that can be explained by reasons unrelated to
intoxication. However, our courts have repeatedly emphasized that
the indicators should not be viewed in isolation, but as a
totality. State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70
(1994). Furthermore, whether a particular indicator is innocent in
nature is immaterial; the relevant inquiry is “'the degree of
suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.'"
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12
(1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 527, 552 n.13 (1983)). The three indicators here, though
noncriminal in nature, elicited enough reasonable suspicion when
combined to warrant the investigatory stop.
Defendant also suggests that weaving, or some other form of
aberrant driving, is required in order to satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard. To that effect, defendant correctly points out
that most North Carolina cases upholding investigatory stops in the
context of driving while impaired have involved weaving within a
lane or weaving between lanes. See, e.g., State v. Aubin, 100 N.C.
App. 628, 397 S.E.2d 653 (1990) (weaving within lane plus driving
only forty-five miles per hour on the interstate), disc. review
denied, 328 N.C. 334, 402 S.E.2d 443, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842,116 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1991); State v. Jones, 96 N.C. App. 3
89, 386
S.E.2d 217 (1989) (weaving within lane plus driving twenty miles
per hour below the speed limit), disc. review denied, 326 N.C. 366,
389 S.E.2d 809 (1990); State v. Adkerson, 90 N.C. App. 333, 368
S.E.2d 434 (1988) (weaving within lane and off road). But just
because most of our cases have involved weaving does not mean that
only those cases involving weaving will meet the reasonable
suspicion standard. Our Supreme Court recently concluded that a
legal turn immediately prior to a DWI checkpoint, in and of itself,
could be sufficient grounds to justify an investigatory stop.
State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 632-33, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000).
A driver's intoxicated appearance, as observed by an officer
driving by, has also been held to be sufficient. State v. White,
311 N.C. 238, 244, 316 S.E.2d 42, 46 (1984). Thus, contrary to
defendant's assertion, weaving is not a threshold requirement in
order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.
In sum, we conclude that Officer Wyatt did have reasonable
grounds to stop defendant. Defendant's slow driving, his blank
look and staring straight ahead, and his window being down in
below-freezing weather, when viewed together, constituted
reasonable and articulable grounds to justify Officer Wyatt's
stopping the car.
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and WALKER concur.
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