Appeal and Error--writ of habeas corpus--effect of Fourth Circuit decision--tax on seized
narcotics
Defendant's appeal from the denial of his writ of habeas corpus petition seeking relief
from an alleged double jeopardy violation as a result of a tax assessment on drugs and the
subsequent conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver those drugs is dismissed
because no appeal lies from an order made in a habeas corpus proceeding instituted under Chapter
17 of the North Carolina General Statutes since the remedy, if any, is by petition for writ of
certiorari, and the Court of Appeals declines to address these issues pursuant to a writ of
certiorari since: (1) the constitutionality of the assessment and collection of the drug tax has been
previously upheld by North Carolina appellate courts; and (2) federal appellate decisions are not
binding upon either the appellate or trial courts of this State with the exception of decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney
General Christopher E. Allen, for the State.
Steven A. Grossman for defendant-appellant.
SMITH, Judge.
On 3 January 1995, the North Carolina Department of Revenue
notified defendant of a controlled substance tax assessment of
$3,210.67 for thirty-eight dosage units of cocaine. The Department
of Revenue on 7 January 1995 garnished $1,874.50 which was in
defendant's possession at the time of his arrest. Defendant was
subsequently convicted on 16 August 1995 of possession with intent
to sell and deliver cocaine, resisting a public officer, and
determined to be an habitual felon. The trial court sentenced him
to a term of 96 to 125 months' imprisonment, and defendantappealed. This Court found no error on appeal. State v. Wambach,
122 N.C. App. 580, 475 S.E.2d 259 (1996) (unpublished), cert.
denied, 345 N.C. 645, 483 S.E.2d 717 (1997).
On 12 November 1998, defendant filed a pro se petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Defendant alleged that he had been
subjected to double jeopardy as a result of an improperly imposed
second punishment. After hearing the matter on 1 April 1999, the
trial court determined that defendant had not been placed in
jeopardy twice for the same offense and denied defendant's
petition. From the trial court's order, defendant appeals.
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error
by denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. He argues the
trial court erred by not following precedent from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which found North
Carolina's drug tax (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-113.105 et seq. (1999))
to be a criminal penalty. See Lynn v. West, 134 F.3d 582 (4th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 813, 142 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1998).
Defendant asks that his convictions, which were subsequent to his
partial payment of the drug tax, be vacated.
As an initial matter, this Court notes that petitioner has no
appeal of right from the trial court's order.
In this jurisdiction the rule is firmly
established that no appeal lies from an order
made in a habeas corpus proceeding institutedunder N.C. Gen. Stats., ch. 17 by a prisoner
to inquire into the legality of his restraint.
The remedy, if any, is by petition for
certiorari addressed to the sound discretion
of the appropriate appellate court.
State v. Niccum, 293 N.C. 276, 278, 238 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1977).
Accordingly, defendant's appeal is dismissed.
Defendant's counsel requests that in the event this Court
deems appeal inappropriate, to consider the issues herein by way ofcertiorari pursuant to Rule 21 of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure, due to their constitutional nature. However,
the constitutionality of the assessment and collection of the drug
tax has been previously upheld in State v. Ballenger, 123 N.C. App.
179, 472 S.E.2d 572 (1996), aff'd per curiam, 345 N.C. 626, 481
S.E.2d 84, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 817, 139 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1997), and
State v. Creason, 123 N.C. App. 495, 473 S.E.2d 771 (1996), aff'd
per curiam, 346 N.C. 165, 484 S.E.2d 525 (1997). As for the
applicability of the Lynn decision, with the exception of
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, federal appellate
decisions are not binding upon either the appellate or trial courts
of this State. State v. Adams, 132 N.C. App. 819, 820, 513 S.E.2d
588, 589, disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 836, ___ S.E.2d ___, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 145 L. Ed.2d 414 (1999). We therefore
decline to address these issues pursuant to a writ of certiorari.
Dismissed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge WALKER concur.
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