1. Evidence--witness refusing to testify--prior testimony--
admission under hearsay exception
The trial court did not err in a prosecution for two counts
of first-degree murder, one count of armed robbery, and one count
of conspiracy to commit armed robbery by admitting the prior
testimony of defendant's brother under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule
804(b)(5) where the brother had testified at his own trial that
he had not committed these crimes but refused to testify at
defendant's trial. The trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law were supported by evidence that the brother
had personal knowledge of the underlying events, that his prior
testimony was material and (in light of his refusal to testify at
defendant's trial) more probative than any evidence the State
could procure through reasonable efforts, and that the brother's
testimony possessed equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.
2. Constitutional Law--confrontation clause--witness refusing
to testify--prior testimony
The introduction of prior trial testimony from defendant's
brother who refused to testify in the present trial did not
violate the confrontation clauses of either the state or federal
constitutions.
3. Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--plain error not
alleged--no authority cited
An argument by a murder, robbery, and conspiracy defendant
that the immunity offered to a State's witness was a bribe of a
public official was not considered where defendant failed to
preserve review of the issue through ordinary channels, waived
plain error review by failing to allege plain error in his
assignment of error, and cited no authority to support his
contention in his brief.
4. Constitutional Law--self-incrimination--prior testimony
voluntarily given
The trial court did not err in a prosecution for first-
degree murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed
robbery by allowing the State to introduce testimony defendant
had given during his brother's trial arising from the same
events. During that testimony, defendant exercised his Fifth
Amendment privilege and refused to answer many questions, but
specifically stated under oath that his brother did not shoot or
kill either of the victims. The privilege against self-incrimination furnishes no protection against the use of
testimony which was voluntarily given.
5. Criminal Law--circumstantial evidence--sufficient
The trial court did not err by not allowing defendant's
motion to dismiss charges of first-degree murder, armed robbery,
and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The contention that
circumstantial evidence must exclude to a moral certainty every
other reasonable hypothesis has been consistently rejected.
6. Search and Seizure--probable cause--evidence sufficient
The trial court did not err in a prosecution for first-
degree murder, armed robbery, and conspiracy to commit armed
robbery by denying defendant's motion to suppress items seized
from his home. The affidavit provided to the magistrate issuing
the warrant reveals that the affiant specifically listed details
told him by an unnamed “concerned citizen” and employee of the
company which was robbed; the details were specific; and the
these details were not public knowledge. The magistrate had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to
issue the warrant.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney
General Daniel P. O'Brien, for the State.
John T. Hall for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Robert Anthony McNeill (“defendant”) appeals the jury verdict
convicting him of two counts of murder in the first degree, one
count of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and one count of
conspiracy to commit armed robbery. We find no error.
The pertinent facts reflected in the record are these: In May
1993, while defendant was working as a grocery manager for Food
Lion grocers (“Food Lion”), he approached a co-worker, Craig Stover
(“Stover”) “about how easy it would be for them to rob the TowerFood Lion . . . .” In the process of devising a plan,
defendant
told Stover to get a gun. Defendant further suggested that in the
course of the robbery they kill a particular manager that defendant
disliked, but Stover did not want to kill anyone. On 16 May 1993,
defendant and Stover decided to implement their plan. Just after
the store closed to the public, while defendant and the store's
assistant manager conducted the day's-end accounting, Stover
arrived at a back door -- which was to be left unlocked by
defendant -- dressed in disguise. Stover then put a gun to
defendant's head, ordered defendant and the other manager to the
back of the store and locked them both in a tractor trailer that
was pulled up to the loading dock. Stover then took defendant's
keys and left the store with approximately $11,000.00, driving away
in defendant's new truck. Although defendant spoke to the
contrary, the record reflects that in the days and weeks following
the robbery, defendant's behavior did not comport with that of
someone who was terrified at having been robbed -- in fact,
defendant laughed and giggled about it. Furthermore, defendant was
known to be spending large sums of money just after the robbery.
On 18 September 1993, defendant's brother, Elmer Ray McNeill
(“Ray”) went to South Carolina to pick up a friend (“Thornhill”) whom
he had asked to obtain a gun. Thornhill bought a Ruger Blackhawk
.357 magnum from Zane Bryant (“Bryant”) and gave it to Ray. On thenight of 19 September 1993, Ray met with defendant and gave
defendant the gun. Later that night, Food Lion at Six Forks was
robbed and two managers were murdered, execution style. The store
showed no sign of forced entry and there were no signs of a
struggle with the victims. However both defendant's and Ray's
fingerprints were found at the crime scene next to those of one of
the victims. Additionally, bullet fragments recovered from thevictims' bodies matched both the gun type and the ammunition loaded
in the gun which Bryant sold to Thornhill for Ray. Furthermore,
there were four small metal parts found at the crime scene next to
the body of one of the victims. Those four parts were found to be
the ejector rod, ejector housing, spring, and ejector rod screw
from a Ruger Blackhawk revolver. At trial, Bryant testified that
the gun he sold Thornhill had an “ejector screw [that] would never
tighten up properly.”
At Ray's trial, defendant testified that Ray was innocent and
that he did not commit any of the crimes for which he was being
tried. After defendant testified, Ray “voluntarily called himself
to the witness stand to testify . . . and denied that he committed
the crimes for which he was charged . . . .” However, at
defendant's trial, when called to the stand, Ray refused to
testify. The trial court therefore allowed the State to admit
statements made by Ray, under oath at his own trial, into evidence
at defendant's trial.
[1]In the record we see defendant preserved twenty-six
assignments of error; however, he argues only seven. Thus we deem
those not argued to be abandoned. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).
Defendant first assigns error to the trial court's admitting Ray's
prior testimony and statements into evidence in violation of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5). Defendant argues that the
statements were inadmissible because the trial court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law were not supported by the evidence to
show that there were “equivalent circumstantial guarantees oftrustworthiness . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5)
(1999). We disagree.
We begin by agreeing with the State that although defendant
argues there are “four different statement clusters that fall under
this challenge,” the record reveals that the trial court admitted
only one of these “clusters” pursuant to this rule, specifically
Ray's prior testimony. Therefore, we address only defendant's
contention that Ray's prior trial testimony was statutorily
inadmissible under hearsay exception Rule 804(b)(5).
Under North Carolina law, hearsay is defined as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1999). Although
hearsay is generally not admissible, there are any number of
exceptions to the hearsay rule. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule
802-804. Accordingly, one such exception is listed for when a
declarant is unavailable, the pertinent sub-section allows a trial
court to admit hearsay statements when a declarant “[p]ersists in
refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement
despite an order of the court to do so . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
8C-1, Rule 804(a)(2) (1999) (emphasis added).
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that Ray's prior
testimony, offered in defendant's trial “to prove the truth of the
matter asserted,” is hearsay. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 801(c).
However, the record before this Court reflects that after Raytestified under oath at his own trial, he refused to testify at
defendant's trial. Yet, defendant argues that the trial court's
inquiry to determine Ray's unavailability was inadequate.
Defendant further argues “[t]he trial court determined that the
Fifth Amendment privilege invoked by . . . Ray was appropriate
. . . .” However, we find the record to reflect the very opposite.
The record reveals the trial court found that, having
testified at his own trial, Ray:
5. . . . [K]nowingly waived any
privilege against self-incrimination which may
have existed prior to the time of his
testimony. That privilege having been waived,
either side may call him as a witness in [the
present defendant's trial court] proceedings.
[Ray] has no right to refuse to testify or to
refuse to answer questions under oath
concerning these matters.
. . .
7. The Court having so ruled that the
privilege no longer exists, and the State
having in fact called Ray McNeill as a
witness, and [Ray] having been ordered by the
court to testify and having willfully refused
to testify and refused to take the oath and
refused to answer any questions, the Court
finds and concludes that such refusal was
without any right in law and that such willful
refusal renders the witness Ray McNeill
unavailable as a matter of fact and as a
matter of law. . . .
(Emphasis added.) Defendant offers no proof for his insistence
that the trial court only found Ray unavailable due to his
assertion of the privilege. Neither does defendant offer this
Court any authority upon which we should overturn the trial court's
ruling due to an abuse of discretion with regard to its findingthat Ray was unavailable. Thus, we hold the record supports the
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law that Ray was,
in fact, unavailable as required under Rule 804(a)(2).
However, having held that Ray was unavailable to testify at
defendant's trial, we must still consider other factors to
determine if Ray's prior trial testimony offered by the State was
properly allowed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) reads:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. -- The follow
ing
[offered testimony is] not excluded by the
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable
as a witness:
. . .
(5) Other Exceptions. -- A statement
not
specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence
which the [State] can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a
statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the [State]
gives written notice stating [its]
intention to offer the statement and
the particulars of it . . . to the
[defendant] sufficiently in advance
of offering the statement to provide
the [defendant] with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet the
statement.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 804(b)(5) (emphasis added). (The
State does not contend as to whether the offered testimony isspecifically covered by another hearsay exception. Thus, that
issue is not before us.)
In State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 337 S.E.2d 833 (1985), our
Supreme Court outlined six specific questions and their explanation
pursuant to Rule 803(24) (now codified as Rule 804(b)(5)) which a
trial court must answer in its determination of whether to admit
hearsay testimony. They are:
[1] Has proper notice been given?
[Where the] testimony is sought to be
admitted as substantive evidence under Rule
803(24), the proponent must first provide
written notice to the adverse party . . . .
. . .
[2]nbsp; Is the hearsay not specifically
covered elsewhere?
If the trial judge determines that the
statement is covered by one of the other
specific exceptions, that exception, not . . .
[this one] governs . . . and the inquiry must
end. . . .
[3]nbsp; Is the statement trustworthy?
This threshold determination has been called
“the most significant requirement” of
admissibility under [this exception]. . . .
Among the[] factors [to be considered] are (1)
assurance of personal knowledge of the
declarant of the underlying event . . . ; (2)
the declarant's motivation to speak the truth
or otherwise . . . ; (3) whether the declarant
ever recanted the testimony . . . ; and (4)
the practical availability of the declarant at
trial for meaningful cross-examination. . . .
None of these factors, alone or in
combination, may conclusively establish or
discount the statement's “circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness.” The trial
judge should focus upon the factors that bearon the declarant at the time of making the
out-of-court statement and should keep in mind
that the peculiar factual context within which
the statement was made will determine its
trustworthiness.
. . .
[4]nbsp; Is the statement material?
[The statement must be] “. . . offered as
evidence of a material fact.” [N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 8C-1, Rules 401 and 402.] . . .
[5]nbsp; Is the statement more probative on
the issue than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts?
The requirement [of necessity] imposes the
obligation of a dual inquiry: were the
proponent's efforts to procure more probative
evidence diligent, and is the statement more
probative on the point than other evidence
that the proponent could reasonably procure?
. . .
. . .
[6]nbsp; Will the interests of justice be
best served by admission?
[As] set out in N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 102,
[the general purpose of the Evidence Code is]
. . . to secure fairness in administration,
elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development
of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.”
Id. at 92-96, 337 S.E.2d at 844-47 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted). However, in his brief to this Court, defendant takes
issue only with questions 3 through 6 (emphasized above), thus
those are the only issues we will address. The record reveals that the trial court, in determining
whether Ray's proffered testimony possessed equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, found Ray:
9. . . . [H]as actual knowledge of the
events about which he testified, and that this
evidence is more probative than any other
evidence which the State can produce through
reasonable efforts. [Furthermore,] [t]he
Court also finds and concludes that the
general purposes of the Rules of Evidence and
the interest of justice [are] best . . .
served by the admission of this testimony into
evidence.
10. . . . [Ray's] testimony was given
under oath in a court of law and subjected to
direct and cross examination. The testimony
is materially consistent with [his] prior
statements . . . . This testimony of Ray is
also consistent with [that] of [defendant] at
Ray's trial. . . .
11. The Court finds . . . that these two
men had a close relationship as brothers and
that Ray would not likely have incriminated
his brother in his testimony unless the
testimony was, in fact, true. . . .
12. . . . [Defendant's] testimony at
Ray's trial shows that he was specifically
asked about his own conduct on the evening of
the murders and . . . [defendant] refused to
answer and gave as a basis for such refusal
that the answer would tend to incriminate him.
...[T]he Court specifically finds that this
defendant asserted his Fifth Amendment
privilege in Ray's trial in good faith and
that the answers to the questions posed to the
defendant at that time which he refused to
answer would have tended to incriminate
him. . . . [W]here one has voluntarily chosen
to testify as a witness for a co-defendant and
has used this Fifth Amendment claim in that
co-defendant's trial as a “sword” for the co-
defendant's defense, to create an impression
in the minds of the co-defendant's jury that
the co-defendant on trial is innocent and that
the witness claiming the Fifth Amendment
privilege is in fact the perpetrator, then theCourt can consider the totality of this
conduct as a circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness of the testimony of the co-
defendant on trial, which testimony the
witness claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege
has sought to support, re-enforce, and
bolster.
It is undisputed by defendant that Ray purchased the gun at
issue. The State presented evidence at trial that the only parties
privy to the robbery and murders were the victims (both dead),
defendant, and Ray -- although their brother, Michael McNeill,
testified of things each brother had told him, the stories
conflicted. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's findings of
fact and conclusions of law were supported by the evidence that Ray
had personal knowledge of the underlying events, that his prior
testimony was material and (in light of his refusal to testify at
defendant's trial) more probative than any evidence the State could
procure through reasonable efforts, and that Ray's testimony
possessed equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
Further, the record reflects that Ray never deviated from
claiming that he was innocent. From the time he was arrested and
spoke to the police, to the time of his trial, Ray consistently
stated he did not commit the robbery or murders. In fact, we agree
with the trial court that defendant's voluntarily testifying at
Ray's trial -- during which defendant stated “'Ray knows who beat
him up and took the gun that night. He has sat there thirty months
keeping his mouth shut for some reason; stupidity maybe, loyalty
another[,]'” -- “support[ed], re-enforce[d], and bolster[ed]” Ray's
testimony that he was innocent. We again hold that the evidencesupports the trial court's conclusion that Ray was motivated to
speak the truth and that he had never recanted his claim of
innocence. Defendant's only showing that Ray may not have been
telling the truth was based on the fact that Ray's testimony
conflicted with that of their brother, Michael. We find
defendant's argument one of credibility going against Michael's
testimony, and not Ray's prior trial testimony which was “given
under oath in a court of law and subjected to direct and cross
examination.” Thus, we find no error in the trial court's
admitting Ray's prior trial testimony because it, in fact, served
the interests of justice.
[2] Defendant's second assignment of error is that the trial
court's allowance of Ray's prior trial testimony violated
defendant's state and federal constitutional rights to
confrontation and cross-examination. We find defendant's argument
meritless.
In his brief to this Court, defendant admits:
“The Confrontation Clauses in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Article I Section 23 of the North Carolina
Constitution prohibit the State from
introducing hearsay evidence in a criminal
trial UNLESS the State: (1) demonstrates the
necessity for using such testimony, and (2)
establishes 'the inherent trustworthiness of
the original declaration.'”
(Emphasis added) (quoting State v. Waddell, 130 N.C. App. 488, 494,
504 S.E.2d 84, 88 (1998).) Having already addressed the
trustworthiness of Ray's statement and the fact that the testimony
was more probative than any other evidence which the State couldproduce through reasonable efforts, we hold that the trial court's
admittance of the testimony did not violate the Confrontation
Clauses of either our state or federal constitutions, and thus, did
not violate any of defendant's constitutional rights. See State v.
Jackson, 348 N.C. 644, 503 S.E.2d 101 (1998).
[3] Defendant's third assignment of error is that the trial
court committed plain error, in violation of defendant's
constitutional rights, by allowing Craig Stover to testify while
also granting him immunity. It is defendant's position that the
immunity offered Mr. Stover was a bribe of a public official by the
district attorney.
Defendant admits that he failed to preserve, through ordinary
channels, the right to argue this issue. Nonetheless:
In criminal cases, a question which was not
preserved by objection noted at trial and
which is not deemed preserved by rule or law
without any such action, nevertheless may be
made the basis of an assignment of error where
the judicial action questioned is specifically
and distinctly contended to amount to plain
error.
N.C.R. App. P. 10(c)(4). However, even a plain error argument must
be made an assignment of error in the record, which defendant also
failed to do. “[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a
consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record
on appeal . . . .” N.C.R. App. P. 10(a). Therefore, defendant has
“also waived plain error review by failing to allege in his
assignment of error that the trial court committed plain error.”
State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 274-75, 506 S.E.2d 702, 710 (1998). Furthermore, although defendant makes several arguments in his
brief concerning this issue, he cites no authority to support the
contention that admittance of testimony of a witness who is offered
immunity violates a defendant's constitutional rights. Thus, we
refuse to address defendant's argument. N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5).
[4] Defendant's fourth assignment of error is that the trial
court erred by allowing the State to introduce his own testimony
made during's Ray's trial. It is defendant's contention that by
the trial court's admitting the prior testimony (during which
defendant “exercise[d] his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to
answer many questions about his own activities on the date of these
homocides . . . [but] specifically stated under oath . . . that Ray
did not shoot or kill either of the victims in this case[,]”) the
State was allowed to unconstitutionally compel him to testify or to
“call[] attention to [defendant's] failure to take the stand and
testify at [his own] trial.” We disagree.
Defendant is correct in that it has long been held by our
Supreme Court that the privilege against self-incrimination is one
against being compelled to testify. It furnishes no protection
against the use of testimony which was voluntarily given. State v.
Farrell, 223 N.C. 804, 807, 28 S.E.2d 560, 563 (1944) (citations
omitted) (“[t]he constitutional inhibition against compulsory self-
incrimination . . . is directed against compulsion, and not against
voluntary admissions, confessions, or testimony freely given on the
trial. Such statements, confessions, and testimony voluntarily
given on a former trial are received against the accused as hisadmissions”). The record before us clearly reflects that the trial
court found,
[a]gainst the advice of his lawyers who were
present and with whom he had consulted, and
after being advised by the Court that he did
not have to testify and that he could refuse
to answer any question that would tend to
incriminate him, [defendant] freely and
voluntarily chose to take the witness stand
and testify on behalf of Ray.
(Emphasis added.) At no time before, nor does defendant now object
to the trial court's findings that he voluntarily testified at the
trial of his brother, Ray. Case law is clear, that where a
defendant fails to object to the trial court's findings, “the
findings of fact are deemed to be supported by the evidence and are
conclusive upon appeal.” State v. Davis, 46 N.C. App. 778, 780,
266 S.E.2d 20, 22 (1980). Therefore, we hold that defendant's
prior testimony from Ray's trial was freely and voluntarily given
and defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply to that “voluntarily given” testimony.
Defendant's argument is overruled.
[5] Defendant's fifth assignment of error is that the trial
court erred by not allowing his motion to dismiss for lack of
evidence. Defendant's only support for his contention that the
evidence was insufficient is that “[i]n the present case, only the
improperly admitted hearsay statements of [] Ray [] provide any
direct evidence that the defendant was present or otherwise
participated in the crimes.” We disagree. We reject defendant's assertion that “circumstantial evidence
must exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable
hypothesis[,]” and thus the evidence is insufficient to justify his
conviction. State v. Madden, 212 N.C. 56, 58, 192 S.E. 859, 860
(1937). From as far back as 1956, our Supreme Court has
consistently rejected that line of reasoning, holding that even in
cases where the evidence is completely circumstantial:
“If there be any evidence tending to prove the
fact in issue or which reasonably conduces to
its conclusion as a fairly logical and
legitimate deduction, and not merely such as
raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to
it, the case should be submitted to the jury.”
[State v. Simmons, 240 N.C. 780, 785, 83
S.E.2d 904, 908 (1954) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 199 N.C. 429, 431, 154 S.E. 730, 731
(1930).] . . . [Therefore,] there must be
substantial evidence of all material elements
of the offense to withstand the motion to
dismiss. It is immaterial whether the
substantial evidence is circumstantial or
direct, or both. To hold that the court must
grant a motion to dismiss unless, in the
opinion of the court, the evidence excludes
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence would
in effect constitute the presiding judge the
trier of the facts. . . .
State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 383-84, 93 S.E.2d 431, 433-34
(1956) (emphasis added).
A review of the record reveals much more evidence admitted at
trial (including Michael's testimony and Stover's testimony) than
that to which defendant takes issue. Since defendant does not
argue that any element was missing from the State's prima facie
case, and having already held that Ray's statements were
trustworthy and properly admitted; we hold that, in the light mostfavorable to the State, there was substantial evidence (be it
circumstantial or direct) of every element of the crimes charged
and that defendant committed the crimes. State v. Bruce, 315 N.C.
273, 337 S.E.2d 510 (1985). Thus we are unpersuaded by defendant's
argument.
[6] Defendant next assigns error to the trial court's denial
of his motion to suppress items seized from his home and truck. It
seems defendant's substantive argument is that the applications for
the search warrants of his vehicles and home failed to provide
sufficient probable case for issuance of the warrants.
Specifically, defendant argues that the affidavits were
insufficient because “there [wa]s no information to indicate the
reliability of the informant.” Thus, the warrants were issued in
violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. We are unpersuaded.
Since the State did not introduce any evidence seized from any
of defendant's vehicles, we need only address defendant's
contention with respect to items seized from his home, specifically
the bag of washed clothes found wet in defendant's garage rafters.
In State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 641, 319 S.E.2d 254, 257-
58 (1984), our Supreme Court plainly adopted the totality of the
circumstances test enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, for determining
whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant.
(See Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 548 (1983),
overruling and abandoning the two-pronged test of Aguilar v. Texas,378 U.S. 108, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964); and Spinelli v. U.S., 393
U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1969)).
The question under the totality test is
whether the issuing magistrate, given the
totality of the circumstances as set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the
veracity and basis for knowledge of persons
supplying hearsay information, had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable
cause existed. Arrington, 311 N.C. at 638,
319 S.E.2d at 257-58.
Our review of the affidavit provided to the issuing magistrate
reveals that the affiant, among other things, specifically listed
for both robberies and the murders, details told him about the
crimes by an unnamed “concerned citizen” and a Food Lion employee.
The details listed were specific, “includ[ing] the number of people
present during the robbery, the weapon used, where the alleged
victims were left, where the get away vehicle was left and the
items actually taken from the Food Lion Store.” Furthermore, the
affiant stated, “[t]hese details were not public knowledge and
could only have been known by those persons actually involved or
law enforcement officers.” Thus, we hold that the magistrate had
a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed to issue
the warrants.
Finally, defendant argues vaguely that the trial court
committed prejudicial error against him by its entering judgments
and by committing other errors throughout the trial. Because
defendant's arguments have already been addressed in his other
assignments of error, we need not address them here.
We find the trial court committed No error.
Judges LEWIS and WALKER concur.
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