1. Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--reliance on companion case--no
additional argument
The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the
issue of punitive damages in a case where plaintiff was a victim of an armed robbery while
staying at defendants' motel, because: (1) plaintiff incorporated arguments regarding these claims
from a companion case, and the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's grant of summary
judgment as to punitive damages in the companion case; and (2) plaintiffs failed to make any
additional argument as to punitive damages in this case.
2. Negligence--armed robbery of motel patron--reasonable foreseeability--summary
judgment improper
The trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the issue of negligence in favor of
the first set of defendants in a case where plaintiff was a victim of an armed robbery while
staying at defendants' motel, because the evidence before the trial court raised triable issues as to
whether defendants should have reasonably foreseen that the conditions on its motel premises
were such that its guests might be exposed to injury by the criminal acts of third persons.
3. Appeal and Error--preservation of issues--rulings on motions in limine
Although plaintiff contends the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings on eighteen
motions in limine, five of which were held open pending a proffer of evidence at trial, the
evidentiary issues raised in plaintiff's brief are not properly before the Court of Appeals and will
not be addressed because: (1) this case was dismissed at the summary judgment stage and there
was never an opportunity by either party to introduce evidence at trial; and (2) the trial court
ruled on the motions in limine after the entry of the trial court's order for summary judgment.
Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Jack L. Cozort and
Stephen D. Coggins, for the plaintiff-appellants.
Young, Moore & Henderson, P.A., by John A. Michaels and
Kathryn H. Hill, for the defendant-appellees.
LEWIS, Judge.
At approximately 2 a.m. on 17 August 1994, plaintiff Betty
Evans was a victim of an armed robbery while staying at the Family
Inn motel in Rowland, North Carolina ("Family Inn"). More than one
gunmen entered plaintiff's room, where she was staying with Willie
Izzard, and ordered her to cover her head with the sheets. The
assailants left with plaintiff's purse, her Bible, cash that she
had placed in the Bible, her grandchildren's pictures, change, a
watch, a camera and the keys to her rental car; however, they never
took anything from the car. Plaintiff was not physically injured
as a result of the robbery. After the incident, plaintiff reported
the robbery, but had no specific conversation with the desk clerk
about the events of the robbery. The Family Inn offered plaintiff
and Mr. Izzard another room for the night, which they accepted, and
left the next day.
On 16 March 1998, plaintiff brought suit against numerous
defendants variously associated with the Family Inn, asserting
claims of (1) negligence, (2) negligent infliction of emotional
distress, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress and (4)
unfair trade practices, requesting compensatory, punitive and
treble damages.
On 18 March 1999, defendants (1) Family Inns of America
Franchising, Inc., (2) Rowland Associates, Ltd., (3) Kenneth
Seaton, and (4) Gerald Williamson ("first set of defendants"),
moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted
summary judgment on all claims in favor of this first set ofdefendants. In addition, defendants (5) Family Inns of America,
Inc., (6) Innco Management Corporation, (7) Bill Thomas and (8)
Wayne Davis ("second set of defendants") moved for partial summary
judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's claims except for the sole
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Although the
parties do not address it on appeal, in its order allowing partial
summary judgment, the trial court mistakenly stated that the second
set of defendants did not seek dismissal of plaintiff's claims of
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Ultimately, the trial court granted partial summary judgment on the
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, punitive
damages, and unfair trade practices in favor of the second set of
defendants. This leaves pending plaintiff's claims for negligence
and negligent infliction of emotional distress only against the
second set of defendants. Plaintiff appeals from the summary
judgment order and from the trial court's order ruling on certain
of both parties' motions in limine.
As previously noted, the trial court granted summary judgment
as to the claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and unfair trade practices as to all defendants. We begin by
addressing plaintiff's contention that the evidence creates a
triable issue as to these claims. In making this contention,
plaintiff incorporates the arguments regarding these claims from a
companion case also filed this day, Connelly v. Family Inns, Inc.,
COA No. 99-1241 (N.C. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2000). However in
Connelly, we concluded plaintiffs ultimately abandoned theirargument as to these claims on appeal. Accordingly, we will not
address them here and leave undisturbed summary judgment as to the
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and unfair
trade practices.
[1]As previously mentioned, the trial court granted summary
judgment as to punitive damages in favor of all defendants in this
case. Plaintiff contends this was error. In making this
contention, plaintiff again incorporates the argument from the
companion case of Connelly. In Connelly, we upheld the trial
court's grant of summary judgment as to punitive damages in favor
of all defendants. In the absence of any additional argument as to
punitive damages in this case, we again conclude the trial court
did not err in granting summary judgment as to punitive damages.
Next, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in dismissing
the claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional
distress against the first set of defendants only, as those claims
still remain pending before the trial court against the second set
of defendants. In Connelly, we held plaintiffs failed to preserve
their claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Absent
any argument in this case expounding on this contention, we will
not address it here. We have left undisturbed the trial court's
grant of summary judgment as to the claim of negligent infliction
of emotional distress in favor of the first set of defendants.
[2]As to the claim of negligence, in Connelly, we determined
that the risk of crime at the Family Inn was foreseeable, and thus,
created a duty in the Family Inn to safeguard its guests againstthe criminal attacks of third parties. That analysis, which rested
on the existence of prior criminal activity in the intersection
surrounding the Family Inn, also applies here. Although not
necessary to our conclusion, we take into consideration the armed
robbery occurring in Connelly as bearing on the issue of
foreseeability in this case. We thus conclude that the evidence
before the trial court raised triable issues as to whether
defendants should have reasonably foreseen that the conditions on
its motel premises were such that its guests might be exposed to
injury by the criminal acts of third persons. Accordingly, we
reverse summary judgment only as to plaintiff's claim for
negligence in favor of the first set of defendants.
[3]Next, we address plaintiff's contention that the trial
court erred in its ruling on eighteen motions in limine, five of
which were held open pending a proffer of evidence at trial. A
motion in limine seeks "pretrial determination of the admissibility
of evidence proposed to be introduced at trial," and is recognized
in both civil and criminal trials. State v. Tate, 44 N.C. App.
567, 569, 261 S.E.2d 506, 508, rev'd on other grounds, 300 N.C.
180, 265 S.E.2d 223 (1980). Rulings on these motions are merely
preliminary and thus, subject to change during the course of trial,
depending on the actual evidence offered at trial. Heatherly v.
Industrial Health Council, 130 N.C. App. 616, 620, 504 S.E.2d 102,
105 (1998). Thus, an objection to an order granting or denying the
motion "is insufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the
admissibility of evidence." State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 521,453 S.E.2d 824, 845 (1995).
“A party objecting to an order granting or denying a motion in
limine, in order to preserve the evidentiary issue for appeal, is
required to object to the evidence at the time it is offered at the
trial (where the motion was denied) or attempt to introduce the
evidence at the trial (where the motion was granted).” Southern
Furn. Hdwe., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 136 N.C. App. 695,
701, 526 S.E.2d 197, 200 (2000). On appeal, then, the issue is not
whether the granting or denying of the motion in limine was error
since that issue is not appealable, but instead whether the
evidentiary rulings of the trial court made during the trial are
error. Id.
This case was dismissed at the summary judgment stage, and
there was never an opportunity by either party to introduce
evidence at trial. Accordingly, the evidentiary issues raised in
plaintiff's brief are not properly before this Court and will not
be addressed. Nonetheless, we note plaintiff's contention that the
trial court's rulings on these motions in limine "manifest multiple
legal misapprehensions" in the court's ruling on summary judgment
in this case. To the contrary, the trial court ruled on the
motions in limine in this case on 22 July 1999 -- after the entry
of the trial court's order for summary judgment on 21 May 1999.
Plaintiff nonetheless contends this Court should provide specific
guidance to the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence
at trial. To that end, we note that our analysis as to the
question of foreseeability in Connelly should be instructive as tothe admissibility of evidence on that issue.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment
on all claims save the claim of negligence. We reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment only as to the claim of
negligence in favor of the first set of defendants -- (1) Family
Inns of America Franchising, Inc., (2) Rowland Associates, Ltd.,
(3) Kenneth Seaton, and (4) Gerald Williamson. That leaves pending
on remand the claim of negligence as to all defendants, and the
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress as to the
second set of defendants.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Judges WALKER and HUNTER concur.
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