1. Appeal and Error--cross-assignments of error--appellate rules
Issues were not considered where defendant attempted to raise
cross-assignments of error without following the requirements of
N.C. R. App. P. 10(d) and 28(c).
2. Attorneys--disbarred attorney--practicing law--subject to
contempt
Defendant was subject to the contempt power of the
Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the N.C. State Bar even though
he had already been disbarred.
3. Attorneys--State Bar--contempt power
The Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the N.C. State Bar had
the authority to exercise contempt power against an attorney who
was practicing law in violation of a disbarment order.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 3 September 1999 by
Judge Abraham Penn Jones in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 11 October 2000.
The North Carolina State Bar, by Carolin Bakewell and A. Root
Edmonson, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michaux & Michaux, P.A., by Eric C. Michaux, for defendant-
appellee.
EDMUNDS, Judge.
Plaintiff The North Carolina State Bar appeals an order
dismissing its contempt action, declaring the judgment of contempt
issued by the Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina
State Bar (DHC) on 20 January 1995 null and void, and releasing
defendant from imprisonment. We reverse.
Although this Court has previously set out relevant factspertaining to this case, see Frazier v. Murray, 135
N.C. App. 43,
519 S.E.2d 525 (1999), appeal dismissed, 351 N.C. 354, 542 S.E.2d
209 (2000), we shall recount them here to ensure a complete
understanding of the history of this and related proceedings.
Defendant has a history of behavior that has resulted in discipline
by plaintiff, including the following: defendant's law license was
suspended for one year, shortly following his admission to practice
law, after he improperly retained funds belonging to a client, see
State Bar v. Frazier, 269 N.C. 625, 153 S.E.2d 367 (1967);
defendant was censured in 1978 for failing to perfect an appeal for
a client and for retaining a fee after he failed to perform
services for a client; defendant's law license was suspended for
one year in 1981 for failing to notify his client of a hearing,
advising his client not to attend a hearing, failing to attend a
hearing on his client's behalf, filing a voluntary dismissal of his
client's claim without adequate preparation, failing to perfect an
appeal for his client, and having his client sign a release, which
attempted to exonerate him from liability, see N.C. State Bar v.
Frazier, 62 N.C. App. 172, 302 S.E.2d 648 (1983); defendant was
suspended from the practice of law for two years in 1988 for
neglecting a legal matter in which he represented Willis Jarman
(Jarman) and for pressuring Jarman to withdraw a grievance against
him; and defendant was disbarred from the practice of law on 6
November 1989 for attempting to persuade Jarman to recant prior
truthful testimony, which Jarman had given in a 1988 disciplinary
case against defendant.
Although defendant filed notice of appeal from the 6 November1989 disbarment order, defendant's failure to perfect
the appeal
resulted in its dismissal. Since that time, defendant has not been
reinstated to the practice of law in the State of North Carolina.
Although defendant has filed numerous pleadings and petitions
challenging the order of disbarment, none has ever been upheld by
DHC or by any court.
In 1991, upon discovering that defendant was practicing law in
violation of the 6 November 1989 disbarment order, plaintiff
initiated a criminal contempt proceeding in Craven County Superior
Court. A hearing was held in April 1991, and defendant was found
guilty of indirect criminal contempt. He was sentenced to thirty
days in jail and served his sentence in 1991.
In 1994, plaintiff again received notice that defendant was
practicing law in violation of the 6 November 1989 disbarment
order. After plaintiff's attempts to persuade the Craven County
District Attorney to prosecute plaintiff for unauthorized practice
of law proved unsuccessful, plaintiff requested Superior Court
Judge D. Marsh McClelland to hold defendant in criminal contempt.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and on 18 February 1994, Judge
McLelland granted defendant's motion. In his order of dismissal,
the judge noted that there was no basis in law for enforcing a
disbarment order by contempt proceeding and that there were no
grounds for punishing defendant for contempt because he neither
violated nor attempted to violate the parol order of the presiding
judge ordering defendant not to represent clients in criminal cases
set for trial at the February 1994 session. Plaintiff did not
appeal this ruling. In August 1994, plaintiff received new allegations that
defendant was continuing to practice law, even placing an
advertisement for legal services in the local newspaper.
Accordingly, plaintiff instituted a show cause proceeding before
the DHC. Defendant filed a series of motions in September,
November and December of 1994 alleging indigency, seeking
appointment of counsel, attempting to discharge appointed counsel,
seeking a continuance, and attempting to remove the contempt
proceeding to federal court. A hearing was held on 19 December
1994, at which defendant failed to appear. Plaintiff entered a
judgment of contempt on 20 January 1995 finding defendant guilty of
sixteen counts of contempt, sentencing him to thirty days in jail
for each count, and imposing a fine of $200 for each count.
Additionally, defendant was ordered to pay the costs of the
proceedings.
On 23 January 1995, plaintiff obtained an order for arrest
from the Wake County Superior Court. Pursuant to this order,
defendant was arrested and taken to the Craven County jail, where
he was held until 30 January 1995, at which time he was transported
to the Wake County jail. Subsequently, he was transferred to the
North Carolina Department of Corrections.
In May 1995, defendant filed a habeas corpus proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. After a hearing in November 1995, the federal district
court on 25 November 1995 ordered that defendant be released from
jail pending a final ruling in the case. The next day, the federal
district court issued a final order holding that plaintiff hadfailed to provide defendant with proper notice of both his right to
appeal from the DHC judgment of contempt and his right to seek a de
novo jury trial in Wake County Superior Court. Specifically, the
court found:
The circumstances and procedures
surrounding Mr. Frazier's criminal contempt
conviction establish that he was not
sufficiently appraised of his right to contest
the conviction and obtain a trial by jury on
the issue of his criminal contempt. He was
entitled to be notified of this right by the
court so that he could either elect to pursue
the right to trial by jury, or knowingly and
willfully abandon that right. Because of this
error, the court will issue a writ of habeas
corpus on the terms and conditions set out in
this order. Accordingly, this court orders
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
releasing Mr. Frazier from the conviction and
sentence heretofore imposed by the
Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North
Carolina State Bar, unless within 30 days from
the entry of this order, the DHC affords Mr.
Frazier notice of his right to appeal to the
Superior Court of Wake County upon the times
and terms provided for in the General Statutes
of North Carolina.
In the event that the petitioner fails to
exercise his right to appeal or waives or
abandons that right, then the sentence
previously imposed may be executed to its full
term, and this writ shall be dissolved.
In the event that the petitioner
exercises his rights to further proceedings
within the Superior Court of Wake County and
the courts of North Carolina, then the
judgment and order of that court shall
control, and this writ shall no longer operate
to interfere with the determination of that
court. This court will retain only such
jurisdiction as may be necessary to conclude
this proceeding consistent with the order
entered herein.
Frazier v. French, No. 5:95-HC-463-BO, slip op. at 13-14 (E.D.N.C.
Nov. 25, 1996). In accordance with this order, plaintiff filed on 5 December
1996 a notice respecting defendant's right to appeal to Wake County
Superior Court. Defendant filed notice of appeal to that court on
13 December 1996 and then filed motions to dismiss in May 1997 and
September 1998. These motions were granted on 3 September 1999.
Plaintiff appeals.
[1]Defendant gave notice of cross-appeal on 15 September
1999, but later abandoned this cross-appeal in his appellate brief.
Defendant nevertheless purports to present alternative valid
grounds for the trial court's decision, claiming that the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel require the court's
decision to be affirmed. However, a party may cross-assign any
action or omission of the trial court which was properly preserved
for appellate review and which deprived the appellee of an
alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment, order or
other determination from which appeal has been taken. N.C. R.
App. P. 10(d). It appears that defendant is attempting to raise
issues which may be properly developed through cross-assignments of
error, but without following the requirements of N.C. R. App. P.
10(d) and 28(c). Accordingly, we shall not consider the issues
raised by defendant in Part I of his brief.
Although plaintiff sets out a number of assignments of error,
the central issues on appeal are: (1) whether defendant is subject
to the contempt power of plaintiff even though he was disbarred;
and (2) whether plaintiff can lawfully exercise contempt power.
Both issues have already been decided in the affirmative by this
Court in Frazier, 135 N.C. App. 43, 519 S.E.2d 525. This panel isbound by those holdings. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 136 N.
C. App.
386, 390, 524 S.E.2d 363, 365, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 370,
543 S.E.2d 147 (2000) (stating that [a]bsent modification by our
Supreme Court, a panel of this Court is bound by the prior decision
of another panel addressing the same issue).
[2]As to the first issue, whether defendant is subject to the
contempt power of plaintiff even though he was disbarred, this
Court stated:
The Disciplinary Hearing Commission clearly
had authority to discipline and disbar
plaintiff. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28.1(b)
authorizes the Disciplinary Hearing Commission
to hold hearings in discipline, incapacity
and disability matters, to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law after such
hearings, and to enter orders necessary to
carry out the duties delegated to it by the
council.
Id. at 49, 519 S.E.2d at 529 (internal citations omitted).
[3]As to whether plaintiff can exercise contempt power, the
Court found:
Moreover, the General Assembly intended to
vest the Disciplinary Hearing Commission with
the statutory authority to enforce its order
of disbarment by criminal contempt powers
comparable to those of the general courts of
justice. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28.1(b)
provides that [t]he disciplinary hearing
commission of the North Carolina State Bar, or
any committee thereof, acting through its
chairman, shall have the power to hold
persons, firms or corporations in contempt as
provided in Chapter 5A. Chapter 5A outlines
the criminal contempt powers of the general
courts of justice. Since the Disciplinary
Hearing Commission was acting within its
statutory authority in exercising its contempt
powers, any claim for negligence in the
performance of its duties would come within
the public duty doctrine.
Id. (citation omitted). Because these issues have been resolvedagainst defendant, it is not necessary to discuss plaintiff's
remaining assignments of error. The case is reversed and remanded
to the trial court for disposition consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges GREENE and MARTIN concur.
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