Appeal by defendant from judgments dated 23 October 1998 by
Judge Forrest A. Ferrell in Cherokee County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 17 October 2000.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Teresa L. Harris, for the State.
McKinney & Tallant, P.A., by Zeyland G. McKinney, Jr., for
defendant-appellant.
GREENE, Judge.
David Eugene McGill, Jr. (Defendant) appeals from convictions
of four counts of first-degree sexual offense upon a minor child
(G.H.) and of two counts of indecent liberties with G.H.
Pre-trial
On 18 May 1998, Defendant filed motions requesting the right
to inspect records of G.H. from the Cherokee County (CCDSS) andGaston County (GCDSS) Departments of Social Services for
exculpatory information. Defendant believed these records would
show that the State's [p]rosecuting [w]itness, [G.H.], filed
formal complaints against . . . Defendant in said Count[ies], and
Defendant believes such records will show exculpatory material
contained therein. On 21 May 1998, the trial court, after
conducting an
in camera inspection of the file of CCDSS, identified
four pages of materials from the file as possibly exculpatory and
ordered them to be given to Defendant and ordered a copy of the
entire file be sealed and deposited for further
in camera review,
should it be necessary. The four pages given to Defendant
contained allegations of abuse and neglect made in December 1996
against Lynn Hampton (Hampton), G.H.'s mother, and Defendant,
Hampton's boyfriend. At the time these allegations were made,
Hampton stated G.H. was bad to set fires. Also contained in the
four pages given to Defendant was an interview with the elementary
school principal of G.H. and his younger brother R.H., in which the
principal stated he feels like [G.H. and R.H.] are prone to
exagerate [sic] and make things bigger than they are.
On 19 October 1998, prior to jury selection, the trial court
stated it had reviewed the records of GCDSS and found nothing
exculpatory in them. It's all inculpatory. The trial court then
sealed the records of GCDSS for further
in camera inspection ifnecessary.
State's evidence
G.H. testified that in 1997 and the early part of 1998, when
he was nine years old, G.H., R.H., and Hampton lived with Defendant
in Murphy, North Carolina. In November 1997, Defendant awakened
G.H. at approximately 12:00 a.m. and made G.H. come in the living
room and sit on his lap. Defendant made G.H. sit there and watch
a pornographic movie as he touched [G.H.'s] privates . . . andmade [G.H.] take [Defendant's] pants off. G.H. was in
the living
room with Defendant for approximately one hour.
In January 1998, Defendant awakened G.H. from his sleep at
around 2:30 a.m. and made G.H. watch the same video he had seen in
November. Shortly after the video ended, Defendant made G.H. take
off Defendant's pants and then Defendant went into the bathroom.
Defendant made G.H. enter Defendant's bedroom and Defendant removed
G.H.'s clothes. G.H. testified Defendant made him suck
[Defendant's] peter and made G.H. kiss him. G.H. stated this
whole thing lasted [a]bout five hours, while Defendant stuck
his tongue in[to G.H.'s] butt, bit G.H.'s penis, and put
[Defendant's] penis into G.H.'s butt. On cross-examination, G.H.
stated he wanted to live with his grandmother, even during the time
period he was living with Defendant.
R.H. testified that in November 1997, G.H. was crying and G.H.
told him Defendant made him watch a pornographic movie and made
G.H. pull Defendant's pants off. R.H. recalled that during the
second time, which he believed occurred in November 1997, G.H.
went into Defendant's bedroom and Defendant closed the door. The
next morning, G.H. told R.H. Defendant molested him in the
behind. On cross-examination, R.H. testified he wanted to live
with his grandmother because Defendant would be mean to [him] and
Defendant would tell him to do his homework and chores. If R.H. or
G.H. did not do their homework or chores, they would get a
whipping. R.H. denied ever watching pornographic videos at his
grandmother's house. Hampton testified that a week after the November 1997
incident, G.H. told her Defendant got [G.H.] up in the middle of
the night and had [G.H.] come and watch [television] with
[Defendant] . . . and [Defendant] had [G.H.] take [Defendant's]
pants off. G.H. told Hampton Defendant pulled [G.H.] down
toward[] [Defendant's] penis. In January 1998, when she arrived
home from work during the early morning hours, Hampton found
Defendant who was naked under the covers and G.H. in the bed
together.
On cross-examination, Hampton testified when she and
Defendant, along with R.H. and G.H., lived in Gastonia, before
their move to Murphy in 1996, she and Defendant were investigated
concerning allegations about sexual contact with G.H. and R.H.
Hampton recalled making a statement about G.H. watching dirty
movies at [his grandmother's] house and looking through a peephole
and watching his uncle and another man engaging in sexual acts.
After finding G.H. in the bed with Defendant in January 1998,
Hampton never saw any blood or feces in G.H.'s underwear and did
not inspect the sheets in Defendant's bedroom. In addition,
Hampton did not notice any discomfort in G.H. subsequent to the
incident in January of 1998.
Chanda Enand (Enand), a physician's assistant at Carolina
Medical Center in Charlotte, North Carolina, examined G.H. on 30
April 1998 after the reported sexual abuse. Enand testified G.H.'s
physical exam was normal, however, the overall assessment,
including [an] interview and physical exam [was] consistent withprobable sexual abuse. Enand revealed [s]ixty or seventy
percent
of the children who are sexually abused have normal exams.
Defendant's evidence
Defendant testified he did not sexually assault G.H. nor did
he make G.H. watch a pornographic video. In addition, Debra Sears
(Sears), the Child Protective Services Supervisor for CCDSS,
testified Hampton and Defendant had previously been investigated
concerning allegations of sexual abuse and nothing was found.
Closing arguments
In closing arguments, Defendant argued testimony G.H. and R.H.
watched pornographic videos and G.H. and R.H. saw their uncle and
another man engaging in sexual acts provided the source of the
information where some child ten years old could get . . . these
types of allegations. The State, however, argued G.H.'s exposure
to pornography did not provide a basis for his allegations. The
State contended what happened to [G.H.] that night was . . . awful
. . . . Do you think [G.H.] saw that on a pornographic video?
_________________________________
The dispositive issue is whether the records from GCDSS
concerning prior allegations of sexual abuse by G.H. contain
information that is favorable to Defendant and material to his
guilt or punishment.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in refusing to give him
access to the records of GCDSS. He asks this Court to review the
records to determine whether they contain any exculpatory
information. A defendant who is charged with sexual abuse of a minor has a
constitutional right to have the records of the child abuse agency
that is charged with investigating cases of suspected child abuse,
as they pertain to the prosecuting witness, turned over to the
trial court for an
in camera review to determine whether the
records contain information favorable to the accused and material
to guilt or punishment.
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58,
94 L. Ed. 2d 40, 58 (1987). If the trial court conducts an
in
camera inspection but denies the defendant's request for the
evidence, the evidence should be sealed and placed in the record
for appellate review.
State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 128, 235
S.E.2d 828, 842 (1977). On appeal, this Court is required to
examine the sealed records to determine if they contain information
that is both favorable to the accused and material to [either his]
guilt or punishment.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 57;
see also Hardy, 293 N.C. at 127-28, 235 S.E.2d at 842
; State v.
Jarrett, 137 N.C. App. 256, 267, 527 S.E.2d 693, 700,
disc. review
denied, 352 N.C. 152, --- S.E.2d --- (2000). If the sealed records
contain evidence which is both favorable and material,
defendant is constitutionally entitled to disclosure of this
evidence.
Id. at 60, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 59.
Evidence favorable to defendant
Favorable evidence includes evidence which tends to
exculpate the accused, as well as any evidence adversely affecting
the credibility of the government's witnesses.
U.S. v. Trevino,
89 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 1996);
see also Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d1305, 1313 (4th Cir. 1995).
We have reviewed the records of GCDSS which were sealed by the
trial court to determine if they contain information favorable to
Defendant. Prior to the incidents in this case, there are two
other allegations Defendant abused G.H. and R.H., neither of which
were substantiated by GCDSS. The allegation made in 1996 is
revealed in the four pages the trial court ordered be made
available to Defendant; and the November 1994 allegation of neglect
and improper discipline is contained in the records of the
undisclosed files of GCDSS. In the report on the November 1994
allegation, R.H., five years old at the time, gives an account of
what happened, stating Defendant skinned his weenie back and hit
it [seven times]. When the social worker asked him what skinned
means, he stated he doesn't know, his grandma told him what to
say. . . . [N]o one has touched his privates . . . [and] he didn't
know what his privates were until [the social worker] pointed to
them.
(See footnote 1)
G.H., six years old at the time, stated his grandma told
him the social worker was coming and that no one ever touched his
privates. [Defendant] never touches him or [R.H.], not even for a
bath.
(See footnote 2)
In addition, there is information contained in the sealed
documents that G.H.'s and R.H.'s grandmother was trying to obtaincustody of G.H. and R.H. and Hampton believed the grandmother
fabricated allegations of abuse in order to obtain custody.
(See footnote 3)
Evidence contained in the files of GCDSS tends to show that false
accusations were made against Defendant in 1994 and thus could
properly be used to impeach the credibility of key witnesses for
the State.
State v. Anthony, 89 N.C. App. 93, 96-97, 365 S.E.2d
195, 197 (1988) (evidence of previous false accusation admissible
to impeach credibility of witness). The Defendant was accordingly
denied evidence favorable to him.
Materiality
We must next determine if the favorable evidence is material
either to Defendant's guilt or punishment. [E]vidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494 (1985) (opinion
of Blackmun, J).
In this case, G.H. and R.H. were the only witnesses to give an
account of the events that happened in November 1997 and January
1998. The medical exam performed in April of 1998, almost four
months after the alleged sexual assault occurred, was normal and
Hampton testified she did not notice any discomfort in G.H. nor anyblood or feces in his underwear. There was evidence presented that
G.H. may have witnessed his uncle and another man having sex and
evidence G.H. had been exposed to pornographic videos outside of
Defendant's home. This evidence tends to rebut the State's theory
that G.H. was too young to have fabricated the abuse by Defendant.
Thus, there is a reasonable probability that had the records of
GCDSS been disclosed to Defendant, the result of the trial would
have been different. Accordingly, because this evidence is both
favorable and material, Defendant should have been given access to
this information and the trial court erred in denying that access.
Prejudicial error
The failure of the trial court to turn over evidence to
Defendant that was both favorable and material to Defendant does
not guarantee Defendant a new trial, unless the failure was
prejudicial to Defendant.
State v. Alston, 307 N.C. 321, 339, 298
S.E.2d 631, 644 (1983). The violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights is prejudicial unless this Court finds that
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(b)
(1999).
In this case, because we have determined evidence contained in
the records of GCDSS was both favorable and material, Defendant's
constitutional right to have the evidence was violated. The State
has the burden of showing the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. The State has made no argument on this
issue and thus has failed to meet its burden. Accordingly,
Defendant is entitled to a new trial. We have carefully reviewed Defendant's other assignments of
error and determine they are unlikely to arise upon retrial and,
accordingly, are not addressed.
New trial.
Judges MARTIN and EDMUNDS concur.
Footnote: 1