1. Insurance--automobile--parent's claim for minor's medical
expenses--derivative of child's claim
The trial court properly granted summary judgment for
defendant-insurance company on a claim for injuries to the minor
plaintiff arising from a car accident where defendant had settled
the claim by tendering the per person limit for bodily injury for
the minor's injury, but plaintiff-mother contended that her claim
for reimbursement of medical expenses was separate from her
daughter's claim, so that the aggregate bodily injury limit
applied rather than the per person limit. The mother's claim for
expenses is derivative in nature and was subsumed in the
settlement of the daughter's claim.
2. Insurance--automobile--medical expenses--not property damage
The trial court properly granted summary judgment for
defendant-insurance company on a mother's claim under a property
damage provision for medical expenses which she paid following
her daughter's automobile accident. There is nothing tangible
about this claim and it is not properly characterized as a
separate claim for lost money compensable as property damage.
Hill & High, L.L.P., by John Alan High, for the plaintiff-
appellants.
Johnson & Lambeth, by John G. Tillery, III, for the defendant-
appellee.
LEWIS, Judge.
On 30 March 1995 the minor plaintiff, Mary Elizabeth Holt, was
injured in a single-car accident. She was a passenger in an
automobile driven by Michael Ray Willoughby. The automobile was
insured under an insurance policy issued by Atlantic CasualtyInsurance Company ("Atlantic policy"), in which Willoughby was the
named insured. The Atlantic policy provided bodily injury
liability coverage of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident,
and property damage liability coverage of $25,000 per accident.
Roberta Holt, Mary Elizabeth's mother, incurred medical
expenses for the treatment of her daughter as a result of injuries
arising from the accident. Consequently, plaintiffs filed a
negligence action against Willoughby seeking to recover for Mary
Elizabeth's injuries. Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company
("Atlantic") settled this claim by tendering the $25,000 per person
limit for bodily injury for settlement of Mary Elizabeth's injuries
under the Atlantic policy.
Despite payment of that policy limit, plaintiffs instituted
the present declaratory judgment action against Atlantic asserting
that Roberta Holt suffered a separate and distinct injury through
payment of her daughter's medical expenses, entitling her to
coverage under the Atlantic policy provisions for either bodily
injury or property damage. The complaint does not state the total
amount of Mary Elizabeth's medical expenses; however, the
settlement agreement stipulates that in the event Roberta Holt
prevails in the declaratory judgment action, her damages total
$8146.45. On 21 June 1999, the trial court entered summary judgment for
Atlantic, concluding that the maximum policy limits had been
exhausted and Roberta Holt was not entitled to any additional
coverage, citing Howard v. Travelers Insurance Cos., 115 N.C. App.
458, 445 S.E.2d 66 (1994). Plaintiffs appeal.
[1]We first address plaintiffs' argument that Roberta Holt is
afforded coverage under the bodily injury provisions in the
Atlantic policy, despite the fact that Atlantic already tendered
the per person limit for bodily injury in favor of Mary Elizabeth. Plaintiffs contend that Roberta Holt's claim for reimbursement of
medical expenses is separate from Mary Elizabeth's claim, such that
the aggregate bodily injury policy limits of $50,000 apply, instead
of the $25,000 per person limit.
The "bodily injury" provisions in the Atlantic policy provide
as follows:
1. Insureds;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.
(Emphasis added).
In Howard, the parents of a minor child sought to collect for
their child's medical expenses in the amount of $305,919.09. 115N.C. App. at 460, 445 S.E.2d at 67. The bodily injury limits on
the policy at issue were $100,000 per person and $300,000 per
accident. Id. at 459, 445 S.E.2d at 67. As in this case, the
parents in Howard contended their claim for medical expenses was
separate from their minor child's claim for bodily injury,
asserting they were entitled to the full amount of the child's
expenses under the aggregate bodily injury limit of $300,000. Id.
at 460, 445 S.E.2d at 68. Our Court in Howard determined that the
per person policy limit of $100,000 applied, concluding that "[t]he
parent's claim for the child's medical expenses is derivative in
nature; accordingly the parents cannot recover since they
themselves have sustained no 'bodily injury' within the meaning of
the policy." Id. at 463, 445 S.E.2d at 69.
The Howard opinion was supported by South Carolina Insurance
Co. v. White, 82 N.C. App. 122, 345 S.E.2d 414 (1986). The "Limit
of Liability" language at issue in White was similar to the
Atlantic policy language in this case. Id. at 124, 345 S.E.2d at
415. In White, the injured party was insured by a policy with
bodily injury limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per
accident. Id. After the insurance company paid the injured party
$25,000 in full settlement of his damage claim, his wife sought
damages for loss of consortium, asserting that the aggregate policy
limit applied. Id. The White Court held the insurance company had
no obligation toward the wife for her derivative claim, stating:
The term "all damages" used in the policy is
all-inclusive. It includes not only direct
damages for bodily injury sustained by [the
husband], but also any indirect orconsequential damages for loss of consortium.
Perhaps when the award to the person who
sustained the direct bodily injury does not
exhaust the maximum policy limits, a
consequential or derivative damage claim for
the difference may be maintained. But when,
as in this case, the policy limit has been
exhausted by the settlement of $25,000 paid to
the person who sustained the direct bodily
injury, all consequential or derivative damage
claims for personal injuries are subsumed
within the settlement award.
Id.
Pursuant to Howard and White, we conclude Roberta Holt's claim
for Mary Elizabeth's medical expenses is derivative in nature.
Thus, when Atlantic exhausted the per person limit of $25,000 in
settling Mary Elizabeth's claim, who sustained the direct bodily
injury, Roberta Holt's derivative damage was subsumed within that
settlement award. Howard, 115 N.C. App. at 463, 445 S.E.2d at 69;
cf. White, 82 N.C. App. at 124, 345 S.E.2d at 415 ("Perhaps when
the award to the person who sustained the direct bodily injury does
not exhaust the maximum policy limits, a consequential or
derivative claim for the difference may be maintained.").
[2]We next consider plaintiffs' contention that Roberta Holt
is entitled to recover under the property damage provisions of the
Atlantic policy. As previously noted, the policy provides coverage
for "property damage," which is defined as "physical injury to,
destruction of or loss of use of tangible property." (Emphasis
added). Plaintiffs contend that Roberta Holt lost the use of her
money through payment of her daughter's medical expenses, and that
money is "tangible property," entitling her to coverage under this
provision. At least one other court has addressed this issue, and
concluded that a parent may not recover medical expenses resulting
from injury to its minor child under the property damage provision
in an insurance policy. Virginia Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Frazier, 440 S.E.2d 898 (Va. 1994). The property damage provision
in Frazier similarly afforded coverage for damage to tangible
personal property, and not for damage to intangible personal
property. Id. at 900. The Frazier court concluded that the
parents' claims for damages sustained by reason of paying their
minor daughter's medical expenses constituted intangible property,
and thus did not qualify as property damage. Id. at 901.
We also conclude there is nothing tangible about Roberta
Holt's claim for damages sustained by reason of paying her
daughter's medical expenses. Roberta ultimately seeks coverage for
the medical expenses arising from her daughter's bodily injury.
Her claim is not properly characterized as a separate claim for
lost money compensable as property damage, as plaintiffs contend.
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in
favor of Atlantic.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
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