1. Workers' Compensation--plaintiff's doctor--testimony disregarded
The Industrial Commission erred in a workers' compensation case by failing to indicate
that it considered the testimony of a doctor specializing in vocational analysis when the
Commission found that the job plaintiff returned to do after her injury was suitable employment
and was a competitive job in the local job market because, while the Commission is the sole
judge of the credibility of witnesses and may believe all or a part or none of any witness's
testimony, it may not wholly disregard competent evidence.
2. Workers' Compensation--failure to consider motion to submit newly discovered
evidence--failure to rule on objection
The Industrial Commission abused its discretion in a workers' compensation case by
failing to consider plaintiff employee's motion to submit newly discovered evidence and by
failing to rule on plaintiff's objection to defendant employer's submission of new evidence at the
hearing before the full Commission.
3. Workers' Compensation--findings of fact--insufficient
The Industrial Commission failed to make sufficient findings of fact in a workers'
compensation case to support its conclusion that plaintiff employee was not entitled to a 10%
increase in compensation for defendant employer's alleged violation of a statutory safety
requirement under N.C.G.S. § 97-12, because: (1) the Commission inexplicably failed to make
any findings based on the testimony of plaintiff's coworker, although the deputy commissioner
who originally heard this case made at least three findings based on her testimony; and (2) the
coworkers' testimony appears to support plaintiff's position with regard to possible safety
violations.
4. Workers' Compensation--permanent partial disability--failure to award error
The Industrial Commission erred in a workers' compensation case by failing to award
plaintiff employee permanent partial disability for the loss of her fingers when the parties
stipulated to a Form 25R signed by a doctor that found plaintiff had 75% disability to four fingers
on her left hand.
Judge GREENE dissenting.
Law Offices of George W. Lennon, by George W. Lennon and
Michael W. Ballance, for plaintiff appellant.
Cranfill, Sumner and Hartzog, L.L.P., by Brady W. Wells, for
defendant appellees.
HORTON, Judge.
Plaintiff was totally disabled as the result of her injuriesfrom 17 May 1993 to 10 April 1994, and was paid tempora
ry total
disability pursuant to a Form 21 agreement during that time. The
Industrial Commission approved the Form 21 agreement, which
provided that defendants would pay compensation of $216.54 per week
to plaintiff for "necessary" weeks. As a result of the agreement,
plaintiff was "cloaked in the presumption of disability, and the
burden was on the employer to rebut that presumption." Saums v.
Raleigh Community Hospital, 346 N.C. 760, 764, 487 S.E.2d 746, 750
(1997). The employer may rebut the presumption of continuing
disability with medical evidence. Alternatively, the employer can
"come forward with evidence to show not only that suitable jobs are
available, but also that the plaintiff is capable of getting one,
taking into account both physical and vocational limitations."
Kennedy v. Duke Univ. Med. Center, 101 N.C. App. 24, 33, 398 S.E.2d
677, 682 (1990). "A 'suitable' job is one the claimant is capable
of performing considering his age, education, physical limitations,
vocational skills, and experience." Burwell v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh,
114 N.C. App. 69, 73, 441 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1994).
The employer may not rebut the presumption of continuing
disability by creating a position within the employer's company
which is "'not ordinarily available in the competitive job market,'
because such positions do not accurately reflect the employee's
capacity to earn wages." Stamey v. N.C. Self-Insurance Guar.
Ass'n, 131 N.C. App. 662, 666, 507 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1998) (citation
omitted) (quoting Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 438,
342 S.E.2d 798, 806 (1986)). Here, the defendant-employer sought to rebut the presumption
of continuing disability by showing that plaintiff returned to work
for Easco as a quality control inspector on 11 April 1994 at an
hourly wage equal to, or higher than, her previous rate of pay.
Plaintiff contends, however, that the Industrial Commission erred
in finding that the quality control inspection job was suitable
employment and was a competitive job in the local job market.
Plaintiff argues that the inspector position was "make work" and
was modified especially for her. As such, she argues, it was an
unreliable indicator of her earning capacity and did not rebut the
presumption that her disability continues.
Our Supreme Court has recently stated that "the fact that an
employee is capable of performing employment tendered by the
employer is not, as a matter of law, an indication of plaintiff's
ability to earn wages." Saums, 346 N.C. at 764, 487 S.E.2d at 750
(citing Peoples, 316 N.C. at 434, 342 S.E.2d at 804.) The Peoples
Court explained that
[i]f the proffered employment does not
accurately reflect the person's ability to
compete with others for wages, it cannot be
considered evidence of earning capacity.
Proffered employment would not accurately
reflect earning capacity if other employers
would not hire the employee with the
employee's limitations at a comparable wage
level. The same is true if the proffered
employment is so modified because of the
employee's limitations that it is not
ordinarily available in the competitive job
market. The rationale behind the competitive
measure of earning capacity is apparent. If
an employee has no ability to earn wages
competitively, the employee will be left with
no income should the employee's job be
terminated.
Peoples, 316 N.C. at 438, 342 S.E.2d at 806.
[1]Thus, our task on review is to determine whether the
defendant-employer has met its burden of showing that the quality
control inspector job plaintiff performed at Easco was "suitable"
employment; that is, that it accurately reflected plaintiff's
ability to compete with others for wages in the marketplace.
Our review of an opinion and award of the Industrial
Commission requires that we first determine whether there is any
competent evidence on record which supports the findings of fact
made by the Commission, and then determine whether those findings
of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law. Saums, 346
N.C. at 765, 487 S.E.2d at 750-51. In response to plaintiff's
contentions that the inspector job was not "suitable" employment,
the Commission made the following findings of fact:
7. Plaintiff returned to work at Easco
on 11 April 1994, in Quality Control as an
Inspector, at a pay rate of $9.37 an hour,
which was equal to or higher than her prior
rate of pay. This job has been in existence
at Easco since the plant opened. There are
three employees on each shift who perform this
function of mainly measuring and checking the
quality of metal pieces within the plant. The
inspector positions were held by female
employees and all of them would need help from
time to time lifting heavy parts.
8. The inspector job at Easco was a
competetive [sic] job in the local job market.
This was illustrated by a research analysis
done by Annette Ruth, a certified rehab
counselor with American Rehabilitation, in
which various industries in Hertford County
were found to have similar positions with
similar job duties. In addition to being
called quality inspectors, they were also
called grader testers, and assurance
inspectors.
9. Dr. Joan Rose viewed eight available
jobs on videotape and approved only the Saw
Helper position for plaintiff. However, the
inspector position was not included on the
video for her consideration, since there was
not an opening at the inspector position at
that time. There was no doubt that the
inspector position was suitable employment for
the plaintiff, in that she satisfactorily
performed this job for two and a half years.
Based on these findings of fact, the Commission then made the
following conclusion of law:
3. The inspector position at Easco has
no similarities with the job that was
characterized as "make-work" in the case of
Peoples v. Cone Mills, 316 N.C. 426, 342
S.E.2d 798 (1986). In Peoples, the job
offered to the claimant had never before
existed at Cone Mills and it was created
especially for plaintiff. Furthermore, the
claimant was not required to work "if he did
not feel like doing so." At Easco, plaintiff
filled a position that had been at the plant
for over 20 years. She was one of three
inspectors working that specific position at
Easco, and she worked a complete shift. The
job was not created for her, and it was not
modified especially for plaintiff. The only
help plaintiff needed was with the heavier
parts, and that was true with all three
females who worked as inspectors.
Here, there was testimony from plaintiff that there had been
an inspector's job at Easco during her entire 20 years' employment
there, that there were a number of tasks for her to perform on the
job, that she was in fact able to perform the inspector job, and
that her duties were similar to those of the other inspectors.
There was evidence that plaintiff needed special assistance lifting
the heavier parts, that such assistance was required for some 15 to
30 minutes of each work day, and that other female inspectors also
needed assistance with the heavier parts. Further, there wasevidence that plaintiff occasionally needed help reading blueprints
and differentiating between critical and non-critical dimensions,
but those difficulties were not unique to her. Still further,
rehabilitation counselor Annette Ruth testified that plaintiff's
quality control inspector job was generally available in the
economy, that there were similar positions at several other
companies in Hertford County, and that the inspector job as
performed by plaintiff was not "make work" or "sheltered work."
Plaintiff argues, however, that defendant Easco made special
accommodations, or modifications, to her inspector job to allow her
to perform the job, and that she would not be able to compete for
the job in the competitive job market, considering her physical and
vocational limitations. See Kennedy, 101 N.C. App. at 33, 398
S.E.2d at 682 (explaining what the employer must demonstrate to
successfully rebut the presumption of continuing disability).
Plaintiff testified that she could do the inspector job, but had to
have help "most of the time." She further testified that she needed
help on a daily basis with various aspects of her job, such as
lifting heavy parts and reading blueprints, and stated that she
"wasn't really good in quality control."
In Saums, the defendant-employer offered evidence that a job
as quality control clerk was available to the employee and paid the
same wages the employee was earning prior to her accident-related
disability. Saums, 346 N.C. at 764, 487 S.E.2d at 750. However,
the evidence further tended to show that the quality control clerk
position was "a new position created for [plaintiff's]
return to the work place." [sic] The job
consisted of general office-type duties such
as filing and answering the telephone, and
counting linens. The evidence showed that no
one else had been placed in the position,
either before or after plaintiff held the job,
and that ordinarily the duties were included
in other jobs. Additionally, based on the job
description stipulated into evidence by the
parties, plaintiff was not qualified for the
job. The "Position Summary" lists the job as
requiring a high school education, while
plaintiff had only a ninth-grade education.
Id. In Peoples, the job offered to the injured employee had never
existed and was created especially for the employee. Further, the
employee in Peoples was not required to report for work "if he
[did] not feel like doing so." Peoples, 316 N.C. at 429, 342
S.E.2d at 801. Unlike Saums and Peoples, the Commission found in
the case before us that the quality control position held by
plaintiff had been in existence at Easco since the plant opened,
that there were other employees performing the job, and that the
other employees were female and needed assistance from time to time
with heavy parts. The Commission also found that there were
similar inspecting jobs at various industries located in the
Hertford County area.
In response to the evidence offered by defendant, plaintiff
offered the testimony of Dr. Sheldon Downes, a Professor of
Rehabilitation Counseling and Director of the Rehabilitation
Counseling Program at East Carolina University. Dr. Downes
specializes in vocational analysis and teaches prospective
vocational professionals how to analyze jobs. Dr. Downes is also
a designated vocational expert for the Office of Hearings andAppeals of the Social Security Administration where he has been
analyzing jobs and testifying for more than 30 years. Dr. Downes
discussed quality control jobs, characterizing them as coveted jobs
usually awarded to deserving company employees, not to applicants
"off the street." Consequently, Dr. Downes said that quality
control inspector jobs were internal hire positions, rather than
competitive jobs in the marketplace.
Dr. Downes also testified that he performed manual dexterity
tests on plaintiff, and that the tests demonstrated that plaintiff
is incapable of performing any industrial production work requiring
hand or finger dexterity. Significantly, Dr. Downes opined that,
because of plaintiff's physical limitations and her limited
educational background and experience, there are no competitive
jobs she can perform. He felt that plaintiff would need "very
highly specialized" job placement assistance to locate a unique job
plaintiff could perform. Further, defendant's vocational expert,
Ms. Ruth, testified that she examined Dr. Downes' report and had no
reason to doubt either the results of the dexterity tests performed
by Dr. Downes, or his conclusions based on the results of those
tests.
Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in failing to
consider the testimony of Dr. Downes. We agree with plaintiff that
"[w]hile the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of
witnesses and may believe all or a part or none of any witness's
testimony, . . . it nevertheless may not wholly disregard competent
evidence[,]" Harrell v. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262
S.E.2d 830, 835, disc. review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980), "[a]lthough the Commission may choose not to believe
the
evidence after considering it . . . ." Lineback v. Wake County
Board of Commissioners, 126 N.C. App. 678, 680, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254
(1997).
In Lineback, plaintiff contended that the Industrial
Commission erred in failing to consider the testimony of his
orthopedic surgeon regarding the cause of plaintiff's injury to his
left knee. Id. at 680, 486 S.E.2d at 253-54. The testimony of the
orthopedist corroborated plaintiff Lineback's statement that his
injury was caused by a twisting motion as he exited his work
vehicle. Id. at 681, 486 S.E.2d at 254. In its opinion, however,
the Commission made no definitive findings to
indicate that it considered or weighed Dr.
Comstock's testimony with respect to
causation. Thus, we must conclude that the
Industrial Commission impermissibly
disregarded Dr. Comstock's testimony, and, in
doing so, committed error.
Id.
Here, Dr. Downes' testimony was certainly relevant to the
exact point in controversy, whether the quality inspector job
performed by plaintiff was an adequate indicator of her ability to
compete for similar jobs in the marketplace. There was, however,
no mention at all of Dr. Downes' testimony in the opinion and
award, nor any finding from which we can reasonably infer that the
Commission gave proper consideration to his testimony. Compare
Pittman v. International Paper Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 510 S.E.2d
705, disc. review denied, 350 N.C. 310, 534 S.E.2d 596, affirmed,351 N.C. 42, 519 S.E.2d 524 (1999), where the plainti
ff made a
similar argument with regard to a Dr. Markworth's deposition
testimony, but there were "various findings throughout the Opinion
and Award of the Commission indicat[ing] consideration of Dr.
Markworth's opinion." Id. at 159, 510 S.E.2d at 710.
As we are bound by the reasoning of Lineback, we hold that the
Commission erred in failing to indicate that it considered the
testimony of Dr. Downes. Consequently, the opinion and award of
the Industrial Commission must be vacated, and the proceeding
"remanded to the Commission to consider all the evidence, make
definitive findings and proper conclusions therefrom, and enter the
appropriate order." Lineback, 126 N.C. App. at 683, 486 S.E.2d at
255.
[2]Plaintiff also contends that the Commission erred by
failing to consider her motion to submit newly discovered evidence
and by failing to rule on her objection to defendant's submission
of new evidence at the hearing before the Full Commission. We
agree. We have recently held that it is an abuse of discretion for
the Commission to fail to rule on motions to admit evidence and
objections to the admissibility of evidence. Allen v. K-Mart, 137
N.C. App. 298, 303, 528 S.E.2d 60, 64 (2000) ("The failure of the
Commission to timely address defendants' pending requests, motions,
and objections without a doubt prejudiced the defendants in that
they had no reason to seek other means by which they could protect
their interests."). On remand, the Commission is to rule on
plaintiff's pending motion and objections. [3]Plaintiff also argues that the Commission did not make
sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusion that
plaintiff was not entitled to a 10% increase in compensation for
defendant's alleged violation of a statutory safety requirement.
Again, we agree with plaintiff. North Carolina law punishes
willful violations of safety standards by employers. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-12 (1999) states that "[w]hen the injury or death is
caused by the willful failure of the employer to comply with any
statutory requirement or any lawful order of the Commission,
compensation shall be increased ten percent (10%). . . . The burden
of proof shall be upon him who claims an exemption or forfeiture
under this section." The 10% penalty imposed on employers for
willful OSHA violations is added to a successful plaintiff's total
award. As to the increase in compensation, the Commission
concluded that:
5. The plaintiff has the burden of
proof to show a willful failure of the
employer to comply with any statutory
requirement. Since the plaintiff has not met
this burden, the request for a ten percent
(10%) increase in compensation is hereby
DENIED. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-12.
In support of that conclusion, the Commission found that:
10. Billy Saulter was a paid expert, who
testified on behalf of plaintiff. . . .
According to Mr. Saulter, there is an
exception within OSHA requirements pertaining
to Press Brakes. CFR 1910.212 states that
guards should be applied where possible.
11. Melvin Gurganus has worked at Easco
for twenty-five years . . . . Melvin Gurganus
testified that he is not familiar with the
North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health
Standards for General Industry and is not
involved with the plant's safety-relatedconcerns such as compliance with OSHA
regulations. He was also uncertain as to the
requirements regarding guarding and any
exception that may be provided for with regard
to the Press Brake.
These findings fail to support the Commission's conclusion.
Moreover, the Commission inexplicably failed to make any findings
based on the testimony of plaintiff's coworker, Ms. Linda Ealey,
although the Deputy Commissioner who originally heard this case
made at least three findings based on her testimony. The testimony
of Ms. Ealey appears to support plaintiff's position with regard to
possible safety violations and should have been considered by the
Commission in its opinion and award. The Deputy Commissioner made
findings from the evidence that the press brake machine operated by
plaintiff was not "guarded," as defined by the North Carolina OSHA
manual, and that the machine did not prevent entry of the hands and
fingers into the point of operation, in violation of OSHA
standards. Without comment, the Full Commission failed to bring
forward any of those crucial findings by the Deputy Commissioner.
On remand, the Commission is to weigh and consider all evidence
bearing on the alleged safety violations, then make appropriate
findings of fact and conclusions of law based thereon.
[4]Finally, plaintiff contends that the Commission erred by
failing to award her permanent partial disability for the loss of
her fingers. We note that the parties stipulated to the Form 25R
signed by Dr. Robert Kahn, which found that plaintiff has 75%
disability to each of the index, second, third and fourth fingers
of her left hand. No award to plaintiff was made by the Commission
in its opinion and award however. On remand, after the Commissiondecides the issues of plaintiff's continuing disability and
eligibility for temporary total disability payments, it shall enter
such award as may be appropriate for plaintiff's loss of her
fingers.
Vacated and remanded.
Judge TYSON concurs.
Judge GREENE dissents in part.
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