Juveniles--probation violation--authority to extend original probation
The juvenile court did not err by finding that a juvenile violated his terms of probation
and by extending the juvenile's probation after the expiration of his original term of probation,
because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7B-2510 confers limited discretion on the trial court to modify probation
within a reasonable time after its expiration; (2) the determination of what amount of time is
reasonable should be made in light of the time necessary to schedule a hearing on a juvenile's
probation and the time needed by the juvenile and the State to prepare for such a hearing; and (3)
the juvenile counselor in this case was affording the juvenile an extended opportunity to
complete his required hours of community service, but to no avail.
Attorney General Michael F. Easley, by Assistant Attorney
General Lisa Granberry Corbett, for the State.
UNC Clinical Programs, by Joseph E. Kennedy, for juvenile-
appellant.
WALKER, Judge.
The juvenile was initially adjudicated delinquent for
possession of stolen property. On 2 February 1999, the juvenile
was placed on probation for a period of one year and ordered to
complete 48 hours of community service. On 21 January 2000, prior
to the expiration of the juvenile's probation, his court counselor
filed a motion for review alleging he had not completed the
required hours of community service. A hearing was held on 14
February 2000, at which the juvenile admitted violating his
probation. The juvenile court extended the juvenile's probation
for six months on the condition that he complete the remaininghours of community service.
The sole question on appeal is whether the juvenile court,
upon a motion for review and a finding that a violation of
probation had occurred, had the authority to extend the juvenile's
probation after the expiration of his original term of probation.
When the juvenile was placed on probation, N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-649(8) was in effect. This statute was repealed and replaced by
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2500 et seq. effective 1 July 1999. While
review would be appropriate under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-649(8), all
relevant portions of this statute have been carried forward into
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(c), upon which we base our analysis.
We note at the outset that the purpose of the juvenile code is
to “give to delinquent children the control and environment which
may lead to their reformation and enable them to become law abiding
and useful citizens . . . .” In re Whichard, 8 N.C. App. 154, 161,
174 S.E.2d 281, 285 (1970). Juvenile dispositions should emphasize
“accountability and responsibility.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
2500(2)(1999).
The juvenile court's authority to modify an order is contained
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2600(c)(1999). This statute provides, in
part, that where a juvenile has been found delinquent, the juvenile
court has authority to modify any order or disposition “during the
minority of the juvenile” or “until terminated by order of the
court.” However, when considering probation modifications, this
authority must be considered in connection with N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-2510 (1999).
The juvenile contends the authority of the juvenile court toextend the period of probation is governed by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-
2510(c) which provides:
(c) An order of probation shall remain in
force for a period not to exceed one year from
the date entered. Prior to expiration of an
order of probation, the court may extend it
for an additional period of one year after a
hearing, if the court finds that the extension
is necessary to protect the community or to
safeguard the welfare of the juvenile.
The juvenile argues this statute only permits the juvenile
court to review a juvenile's probation “prior to the expiration of
the order” and that once the original probation period has expired,
the juvenile court is without authority to extend probation. The
State contends that subsection (c) is applicable only when “the
court finds that the extension is necessary to protect the
community or to safeguard the welfare of the juvenile.” The State
further argues that subsection (c) must be interpreted in
connection with sections (d) and (e) of the statute which provide,
in pertinent part:
(d) On motion of the court counselor or the
juvenile, or on the court's own motion, the
court may review the progress of any juvenile
on probation at any time during the period of
probation or at the end of probation. The
conditions or duration of probation may be
modified only as provided in this Subchapter
and only after notice and a hearing.
(e) If the court, after notice and a hearing,
finds by the greater weight of the evidence
that the juvenile has violated the conditions
of probation set by the court, the court may
continue the original conditions of probation,
modify the conditions of probation, or, except
as provided in subsection (f) of this section,
order a new disposition at the next higher
level on the disposition chart in G.S. 7B-
2508. In the court's discretion, part of thenew disposition may include an order of
confinement in a secure juvenile detention
facility for up to twice the term authorized
by G.S. 7B-2508. (emphasis added).
Sections (d) and (e) of the statute give the juvenile court the
authority to review the progress of the juvenile “at any time
during the period of probation or at the end of probation.” In
contrast, the statute governing the extension and modification of
probation for adults specifically states that such alterations must
be made “prior to the expiration or termination of the probationary
period.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d)(1999). Furthermore, the
adult statute outlines specific situations in which the
probationary period may be tolled to allow modifications after the
original expiration date. Id. We hold the lack of such
specificity in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510 exhibits an intent by the
legislature that the juvenile court not be bound by a rigid
requirement that probation be modified or extended before the
expiration of the probationary period. Rather, the legislature's
edict that modification and alteration may occur “at the end” of
the probationary period confers limited discretion on the trial
court to modify probation within a reasonable time after its
expiration. The determination of what amount of time is reasonable
should be made in light of the time necessary to schedule a hearing
on a juvenile's probation and the time needed by the juvenile and
the State to prepare for such a hearing.
Here, after the juvenile's court counselor filed a motion for
review before the expiration of his probationary period and held a
timely hearing, it found the juvenile violated the terms of hisprobation. The juvenile asserts his violation was alleged to have
occurred in November 1999 but the motion to review was not filed
until January 2000. It is apparent the juvenile counselor was
affording the juvenile an extended opportunity to complete his
required hours of community service, but to no avail.
In keeping with the underlying purpose of the juvenile code,
it is obvious the legislature intended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(d)
and (e) to authorize the juvenile court to deal with precisely the
type of situation which confronted the court here. We conclude the
juvenile court properly reviewed the progress of the juvenile and
extended his probation. Therefore, the order of the juvenile court
is
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and THOMAS concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***