Workers' Compensation--heart attack--denial of benefits
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by denying
benefits to plaintiff employee who suffered a heart attack on 20 March 1997 while on a job-
related assignment based on the conclusion that the heart attack did not constitute an injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment because: (1) the Commission
found that plaintiff's heart attack was not the result of unusual or extraordinary exertion, but was
due to plaintiff's heart disease; and (2) the Commission found that plaintiff was angry and that
his confrontation with his nephew on a job-related assignment precipitated the heart attack, but
that this confrontation did not involve any unusual or extraordinary exertion.
Appeal by plaintiff from Opinion and Award of the North
Carolina Industrial Commission entered 27 April 2000. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 22 August 2001.
The Jernigan Law Firm, by Leonard T. Jernigan, Jr., for the
plaintiff-appellee.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Allan R. Gitter
and John W. O'Tuel III, for the defendants-appellees.
WYNN, Judge.
This appeal arises out of the denial of workers'
compensation benefits to a plaintiff who suffered a heart attack
on 20 March 1997. We affirm that denial.
Pinkerton's Security and Investigations (“Pinkerton's”)
employed plaintiff as a patrol supervisor. In late 1996 or early
1997, plaintiff convinced Pinkerton's to hire his nephew, Jimmy
Young, as a security guard. Pinkerton's supplied Young with a
uniform, patrol book (containing alarm codes and descriptions of
keys for the buildings), statement log (to make inspectionreports), and set of keys to the various buildings. However,
when Young stopped working for Pinkerton's in early March 1997,
he did not return those items. As Young's supervisor, plaintiff
was responsible for recovering the items from him.
On 20 March 1997, plaintiff's wife called him at work to
inform him that Young would be coming to their house that
afternoon. When Young arrived at plaintiff's house, plaintiff's
wife paged plaintiff at work, and plaintiff left work to address
Young. Upon arriving at his house, plaintiff pulled into the
driveway, blocking the exit. Young was engaged in an argument
with Al Drummond, a friend of plaintiff's, over money owed by
Young for a car that Drummond sold to him. Both Young and
Drummond approached plaintiff's truck as he pulled into the
driveway. Plaintiff told Young to return Pinkerton's keys to
him; when Young refused, plaintiff began to get out of his truck,
whereupon he suffered a heart attack and was taken to the
hospital. Thereafter, plaintiff was out of work for several
weeks, but ultimately returned to full-time work with no
restrictions.
Following a hearing, Deputy Commissioner Morgan S. Chapman
denied plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Upon plaintiff's appeal, the full Commission affirmed and found
in pertinent part that:
14. Prior to his heart attack on 20 March
1997, plaintiff had preexisting coronary
artery disease with plaque formation inside
the arteries. The emotionally charged
confrontation with Mr. Young on 20 March 1997
could have caused the plaque to fracture,
causing a blood clot which occluded the
artery and thereby causing plaintiff's heartattack. Plaintiff's heart attack also could
have occurred at any time and from any event,
such as simply smoking a cigarette.
15. On the afternoon of 20 March 1997,
plaintiff wanted to retrieve the car keys for
Mr. D[r]ummond, but he was equally motivated
by his desire to retrieve the patrol book and
keys for defendant-employer. Plaintiff went
home on company business. The particular
scenario involving Mr. Young and the keys was
somewhat unusual; however, the level of
exertion involved in the confrontation with
Mr. Young was not unusual or extraordinary.
Plaintiff was simply angry.
16. Plaintiff's [heart attack] on 20 March
1997 was due to heart disease. The
confrontation with Mr. Young was the event
that precipitated plaintiff's heart attack,
but the confrontation itself did not involve
any unusual or extraordinary exertion.
The Commission then made the following conclusions of law:
1. Plaintiff's heart attack on 20 March 1997
was not caused by unusual or extraordinary
exertion; therefore, it did not result from
an injury by accident arising out of and in
the course of his employment with defendant-
employer. []
2. Plaintiff is not entitled to benefits
under the Act for his heart attack. []
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the Commission erred in
denying him benefits because there was evidence that he suffered
an “unusual event” leading to his heart attack. Plaintiff also
contends that the Commission erred in finding no unusual or
extraordinary exertion on his part, and finding that he “was
simply angry.” We find no error.
In reviewing an appeal from a decision by the Industrial
Commission, “this Court is limited to determining: (1) whether
competent evidence exists to support the Commission's findings,
and (2) whether those findings justify its conclusions of law.” Jarvis v. Food Lion, Inc., 134 N.C. App. 363, 367, 517 S.E.2d
388, 391, disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 356, 541 S.E.2d 139
(1999); see Wall v. North Hills Properties, Inc., 125 N.C. App.
357, 481 S.E.2d 303, disc. review denied, 346 N.C. 289, 487
S.E.2d 573 (1997). If there is any competent evidence to support
the Commission's findings of fact, those findings are deemed
conclusive on appeal even if there is evidence supporting
contrary findings. See id.; see also Wall.
Under the Workers' Compensation Act, an injury must result
from an “accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment” to be compensable. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (1999);
see Wall, 125 N.C. App. at 361, 481 S.E.2d at 306. The claimant
bears the burden of proving these elements. See Pickrell v.
Motor Convoy, Inc., 322 N.C. 363, 366, 368 S.E.2d 582, 584
(1988). As to workers' compensation benefits for injuries
sustained due to a heart attack, this Court has held:
When an employee is conducting his work in
the usual way and suffers a heart attack, the
injury does not arise by accident and is not
compensable. However, an injury caused by a
heart attack may be compensable if the heart
attack is due to an accident, such as when
the heart attack is due to unusual or
extraordinary exertion . . . or extreme
conditions.
Wall, 125 N.C. App. at 361, 481 S.E.2d at 306 (internal citations
omitted). See also Dillingham v. Yeargin Construction Co., 320
N.C. 499, 502-03, 358 S.E.2d 380, 382 (1987) (“injuries caused by
a heart attack must be precipitated by unusual or extraordinaryexertion in order to be compensable”); Lewter v. Enterprises,
Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 82 S.E.2d 410 (1954) (ordinarily a heart
attack does not result from an injury by accident arising out of
or in the course of employment unless it results from unusual or
extraordinary exertion incident to the employment).
In Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 328 N.C. 67, 399 S.E.2d 104
(1991), our Supreme Court considered a scenario similar to the
case at bar. There, the plaintiff-decedent's estate appealed
from the Industrial Commission's denial of workers' compensation
benefits following the decedent's death by heart attack while
working as a truck driver for the defendant lumber company. The
decedent had hauled a load of material to a paper mill in a
tractor-trailer truck. When he attempted to remove the tarp
covering the trailer, the tarp became caught on something, and
the decedent had to jerk the tarp several times to free it.
Another truck driver observed that this series of events appeared
to frustrate the decedent. The decedent then had difficulty
backing the truck up a ramp to a hydraulic lift, which also
appeared to aggravate the decedent. Shortly thereafter, the
decedent, who had a preexisting heart condition, suffered a fatal
heart attack.
The Industrial Commission found that the incident with the
tarp getting hung was the only occurrence that could be found to
have been out of the ordinary. However, the Commission found
that this occurrence was not the precipitating cause of the
decedent's heart attack, which occurred 15 to 20 minutes later. Instead, the Commission found that it was the decedent's
emotional response to the situation, in becoming aggravated and
frustrated, that was the precipitating cause of his heart attack.
The Commission denied the decedent's claim, finding that
“[f]rustration . . . is a common reaction to many things,” and
that this emotional response did not constitute an injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of the decedent's
employment. 328 N.C. at 69, 399 S.E.2d at 105.
This Court reversed, see Cody v. Snider Lumber Co., 96 N.C.
App. 293, 385 S.E.2d 515 (1989), having determined that the fatal
heart attack resulted from an injury by accident and was
therefore compensable. Upon review, our Supreme Court reversed
this Court's decision, stating:
We need not decide here whether the type of
“extraordinary exertion” which makes a
resulting heart attack compensable includes
extraordinary emotional exertion. Based upon
substantial and competent evidence, the
Commission found in the present case that the
only event which could be deemed unexpected
and extraordinary and, thus, an accident was
the sticking of the tarp. The Commission
also found, however, that the sticking of the
tarp was not a precipitating factor in the
decedent's death.
Cody, 328 N.C. at 72, 399 S.E.2d at 107. Accordingly, our
Supreme Court held that the Commission had properly denied the
decedent's claim, as his “heart attack was not the result of an
accident arising out of and in the course of the decedent's
employment[.]” Id. See Bason v. Kraft Food Serv., Inc., 140
N.C. App. 124, 535 S.E.2d 606 (2000) (affirming Commission's
denial of workers' compensation claim for death benefits arisingfrom employee-decedent's death from cardiac arrhythmia, where
Commission found nothing unusually strenuous about decedent's
activities prior to his death). See also Dye v. Shippers Freight
Lines, 118 N.C. App. 280, 454 S.E.2d 845 (1995) (affirming
Commission's denial of benefits where Commission found
plaintiff's heart attack was due to his pre-existing coronary
artery disease, and that plaintiff experienced no unusual
stresses that contributed to his heart attack); Bingham v.
Smith's Transfer Corp., 55 N.C. App. 538, 286 S.E.2d 570 (1982)
(denying claim for death benefits where decedent suffered from a
heart condition and evidence showed no overexertion or unusual
stress precipitating his heart failure).
In the instant case, the Commission found that plaintiff's
heart attack was not the result of unusual or extraordinary
exertion, but rather was due to plaintiff's heart disease. The
Commission found that plaintiff was angry and that his
confrontation with Mr. Young precipitated the heart attack, but
found that this confrontation “did not involve any unusual or
extraordinary exertion.” As in Cody, the Commission in the
instant case concluded based thereon that plaintiff's heart
attack did not constitute “an injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of [plaintiff's] employment with defendant-
employer[.]”
Having carefully reviewed the record, we hold that the
Commission's conclusions are supported by its findings of fact,
and those findings are supported by competent evidence in therecord, despite the presence of conflicting evidence. See
Jarvis, 134 N.C. App. 363, 517 S.E.2d 388; Wall, 125 N.C. App.
357, 481 S.E.2d 303. Indeed, the record shows that plaintiff
testified before Deputy Commissioner Chapman that his family had
a long history of heart disease, and that he personally had
repeatedly suffered heart trouble prior to the heart attack on 20
March 1997. Additionally, plaintiff's physician, Dr. Jack W.
Noneman, Jr., provided deposition testimony that plaintiff's
condition rendered him likely to suffer further heart trouble at
some point in his life. Dr. Noneman testified further that
plaintiff could have spontaneously suffered a heart attack at any
time, even in the absence of some triggering event. Moreover,
there was evidence that plaintiff was angry when he confronted
his nephew on the date of his heart attack. Because there is
competent evidence in the record supporting the Commission's
findings of fact, and those findings in turn support its
conclusions of law, we uphold the decision of the full
Commission.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and TYSON concur.
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