1. Termination of Parental Rights--lack of stability--clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence
Although respondent mother contends the trial court erred by terminating respondent
mother's parental rights based on evidence that she still suffered from a mental condition which
rendered her incapable of providing for the care and supervision of her children on the date of the
termination hearing, the trial court's primary basis for its decision to terminate her parental status
was based on her lack of stability, and there was clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the
mother's life was no more stable now than it was when the minor children were removed from
her custody and that she had willfully left the children in foster care for more than twelve months
without making reasonable progress toward correcting those conditions which led to their
removal since: (1) the mother was still not employed and had not obtained stable housing; and
(2) the mother did not appear at the termination hearing despite the best efforts of her attorney to
contact her by letter at her last known address, and her whereabouts were unknown.
2. Termination of Parental Rights--diligent efforts requirement
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent mother's parental
rights even though the mother asserts the Department of Social Services (DSS) failed to provide
services to the mother to assist her in correcting the conditions that led to her children's removal,
because N.C.G.S. 7B-1111(a)(2) deleted the diligent efforts requirement, and therefore, a
determination that DSS made diligent efforts to provide services to a parent is no longer a
condition precedent to terminating parental rights.
Stephen M. Schoeberle for petitioner-appellee Burke County
Department of Social Services.
No brief filed by guardian ad litem Mary McKay.
Russell R. Becker for respondent-appellant.
SMITH, Judge.
The Burke County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) first
provided services to the Frasher children in 1989, and haveprovided treatment for reports of improper care, improper
discipline, and physical and sexual abuse. On 17 March 1999, a
petition was filed by DSS alleging that Wilbur James Robert Frasher
and Carrie Ann Frasher were neglected and abused juveniles. DSS
stated in the petition that the children's maternal grandfather,
James Metcalf, was sleeping in the same bed as Wilbur and had
touched Wilbur's genitals several times. The petition further
alleged that Metcalf had inappropriately disciplined the juveniles,
having beaten them with fan blades and switches. Additionally,
Metcalf had allowed Wilbur to drink beer and smoke cigarettes,
their home was filthy and roach infested, and Carrie was sleeping
on the floor. Finally, DSS noted that Wilbur had been diagnosed
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and medication had
been prescribed, but Metcalf had failed to monitor the
administration of Wilbur's medication. The children had been
placed in Metcalf's custody by respondent-mother after she was
imprisoned for violating her probation for larceny and stabbing a
man. At the time the petition was filed, respondent-mother was
living with her boyfriend.
On 5 May 1999, at a pre-hearing conference, respondent-mother
and the children's father stipulated that they “did not resist a
finding that the allegations contained in the petition are true”
and that the children were therefore abused and neglected
juveniles. Accordingly, on 1 June 1999, Wilbur was adjudicated an
abused and neglected juvenile and Carrie was adjudicated a
neglected juvenile. The children were placed in the custody of
DSS, and respondent-mother was ordered to: (1) undergo a completepsychological and substance abuse evaluation and cooperate with any
recommendations; (2) notify DSS of any change in address; (3)
maintain a stable and appropriate residence; and, (4) obtain
employment.
On 15 June 2000, DSS filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of respondent-mother and the children's father. A
hearing was held on 2 November 2000, but respondent-mother did not
attend the hearing. On 30 November 2000, nunc pro tunc 2 November
2000, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's parental
rights. Respondent-mother appeals.
[1]Respondent-mother first argues that there was insufficient
evidence that she still suffered from a mental condition which
rendered her incapable of providing for the care and supervision of
her children on the date of the termination hearing. Respondent-
mother contends that the trial court should have ordered a
psychological evaluation because there had been changed
circumstances between the time of the initial evaluation and the
hearing date.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. G.S. 7B-1111 sets out the statutory
grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding of any one of
the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to support a
termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230,
233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the termination must
show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that grounds
authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.” In reYoung, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997)(citing G.S.
7A-289.30(e)). Here, the trial court concluded that the children
were abused and neglected juveniles, and that respondent-mother had
willfully left the children in foster care for twelve months
without showing to the satisfaction of the Court that reasonable
progress under the circumstances had been made within those twelve
months in correcting those conditions which led to the children's
removal. G.S. 7b-1111(1) and (2). The trial court based its
conclusion on its finding that:
Ms. Harbison [the respondent mother] initially
and repeatedly has been ordered to obtain and
maintain employment, maintain a stable and
appropriate residence and notify the
Department of any address changes. She has
failed to do so, and her whereabouts today are
unknown. She has resided in multiple
residences, some without electricity. Her
psychological evaluation revealed a diagnosis
of narcissistic personality disorder with
histrionic and depressive personality
features. She was deemed not to be a good
candidate for psychotherapy or changing
behavior, and she had not participated in any
treatment. Her life is no more stable now
tha[n] it was when the minor children were
removed from her custody. She has not
corrected those conditions which led to the
removal of the minor children from her
custody. She has difficulty meeting her own
needs and supporting herself and she is not
capable of supporting and appropriately
meeting the needs of the minor children.
Although the trial court considered respondent-mother's mental
status, the trial court did not conclude that her intelligence or
mental status rendered her incapable of caring for her children.
See G.S. 7B-1111(a)(6). Instead, the primary basis for the trial
court's decision to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights
was her lack of stability. Dalena Jackson, a DSS social worker,testified that respondent-mother was still not employed and had not
obtained stable housing. Additionally, respondent-mother did not
appear at the termination hearing “despite the best efforts of her
attorney to contact her by letter at her last known address.” The
trial court stated that her whereabouts were “unknown.” Thus, the
trial court found that respondent-mother's life was “no more stable
now than it was when the minor children were removed from her
custody.” Accordingly, we conclude there was clear, cogent and
convincing evidence to support the trial court's finding that
respondent had willfully left Wilbur and Carrie in foster care for
twelve months without making reasonable progress towards correcting
those conditions which led to their removal.
[2]Respondent-mother next argues that the trial court abused
its discretion by terminating her parental rights. Respondent-
mother asserts that DSS was obligated to provide services to her to
assist her in correcting the conditions that led to her children's
removal, but DSS failed to do so. See In re Harris, 87 N.C. App.
179, 185-86, 360 S.E.2d 485, 488-89 (1987). We do not agree.
G.S. 7A-289.32(3), the applicable termination statute when
Harris was decided, included a requirement that DSS undertake
“diligent efforts” to “encourage the parent to strengthen the
parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through
with constructive planning for the future of the child.” However,
G.S. 7A-289.32(3) was repealed and replaced by 7B-1111(a)(2)
effective 1 July 1999. 7B-1111(a)(2) deleted the “diligent
efforts” requirement, indicating an intent by the legislature to
eliminate the requirement that DSS provide services to a parentbefore a termination of parental rights can occur. Thus, we hold
that a determination that DSS made diligent efforts to provide
services to a parent is no longer a condition precedent to
terminating parental rights.
Accordingly, the order terminating respondent's parental
rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges MCGEE and HUNTER concur.
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