Workers' Compensation--compensability--disputed amount--exclusive
jurisdiction of Industrial Commission
The superior court erred in a workers' compensation case by
entering judgment enforcing payment of an amount of compensation
that was in dispute. A defendant admits only the compensability
of an injury by executing a Form 60 and paying compensation; that
admission becomes an award of the Commission as to compensability
and the superior court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment
enforcing the award. Disputed issues other than compensability
are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission.
Judge Edmunds concurred in this opinion prior to 31 December
2000.
Kenneth Clayton Dawson for plaintiff-appellee.
Lewis & Roberts, P.L.L.C., by Timothy S. Riordan and John H.
Ruocchio, for defendant-appellants.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, L.L.P., by Linda Stephens
and Tracey L. Jones, amicus curiae, for the North Carolina
Association of Defense Attorneys.
MARTIN, Judge.
Plaintiff, Jimmy Lewis Watts, injured his left shoulder on 26
September 1995 when he fell off a log while working for Hemlock
Homes of the Highlands, Inc. (“Hemlock”). In response to the
accident, defendant Hemlock completed a North Carolina Industrial
Commission Form 19 on 2 October 1995. The Form 19 stated that
plaintiff was a carpenter with an average weekly wage of $480.00,based on a 40-hour work week and wages of $12.00 per hour. On 6
October 1995, a claims representative from Hemlock's carrier,
Consolidated Administrators, Inc., a predecessor of defendant
Builders Mutual, filed a North Carolina Industrial Commission Form
60, "Employer's Admission of Employee's Right to Compensation
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18(b)." The Form 60 admitted
Hemlock's liability for the injury and plaintiff's right to
compensation. The Form 60 recited that plaintiff's average weekly
wage was $480.00, which resulted in a weekly compensation rate of
$320.01. Plaintiff was paid compensation at this rate until
January 1996. Compensation at the same rate was reinstated on 22
February 1996. On 26 February 1996, defendants executed another
Industrial Commission Form, Form 62, "Notice of Reinstatement of
Compensation Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-32.1 or N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-18(b)," again stating the plaintiff's average weekly
wage as $480.00 with a weekly compensation rate of $320.01. On the
same date defendants executed the Form 62, defendant Builders
Mutual prepared a letter to defendant Hemlock, which stated the
following:
We have received the Wage Transcript on the
above employee. Agreements previously signed
by this employee indicated that his Average
Weekly Wages were $480.00. After computation
of this Wage Transcript, we have determined
that the Average Weekly Wage has now been
changed to $244.73. Thus the Compensation
Rate for this employee has been corrected from
$320.01 to $163.16.
Please have the employee above [Mr. Watts]
sign this letter below and return to the
address shown below of [sic] this letter.
Plaintiff signed the letter as directed by defendant Hemlock. Defendants sent a copy of the letter to the Industrial Commission
on 18 March 1996 and again on 21 March 1996.
On 21 October 1998, plaintiff filed a certified copy of the
Form 60 with the Clerk of Superior Court for Jackson County and
served a copy on defendants. On 25 February 1999, plaintiff moved
for the entry of judgment in the amount of $26,691.70, which is the
difference between the amount due plaintiff at the compensation
rate shown on the Form 60 and the amount actually paid by
defendants. The Superior Court rendered judgment in favor of
plaintiff, requiring defendants to pay plaintiff $29,571.88 in past
due compensation and to pay “ongoing compensation to Plaintiff
consistent with the Form 60 in the amount of $320.01.” Defendants
appeal.
[a]ny party in interest may file in the
superior court of the county in which the
injury occurred a certified copy of a
memorandum of agreement approved by theCommission, or of an order or decision of the
Commission, or of an award of the Commission
unappealed from or of an award of the
Commission affirmed upon appeal, whereupon
said court shall render judgment in accordance
therewith, and notify the parties.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-87 (emphasis added).
North Carolina Industrial Commission Form 60 was promulgated
by the Commission pursuant to G.S. § 97-18(b) which permits an
employer to admit the compensability of an employee's injury, to
pay compensation, and to notify the Commission by the Form 60,
“Employer's Admission of Employee's Right to Compensation,” of such
action. In Calhoun v. Wayne Dennis Heating & Air Conditioning, 129
N.C. App. 794, 798, 501 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998), review dismissed,
350 N.C. 92, 532 S.E.2d 524 (1999), this Court held that a Form 60,
properly executed by the employer, is an “award” within the meaning
of G.S. § 97-87 and may be converted into a court judgment.
Though plaintiff contends Calhoun controls the decision in the
present case, we construe the holding in Calhoun more narrowly and
believe its applicability is limited to the facts then before the
Court. In Calhoun, the employer executed a Form 60 agreeing the
employee was entitled to compensation, but then did not pay any
compensation. The employee sought to enforce the payment of
compensation. The employer moved to dismiss the action for failure
to state a claim and contended plaintiff was not entitled to
benefits. The employer made no issue as to the rate of
compensation to which the employee was entitled. This Court held
that the Form 60 constituted an “award” of the Commission and that
plaintiff had followed the proper procedure to have a judgment
entered by the superior court. The Court noted parentheticallythat pursuant to G.S. § 97-83, if the parties disagree as to
“benefits,” either may request a hearing before the Commission.
In the present case, there is no dispute as to compensability
and the record shows that defendants have paid plaintiff
compensation on a weekly basis since executing the Form 60. The
issue raised by defendants is not whether the superior court had
jurisdiction to enter judgment enforcing the award that plaintiff's
injury is compensable pursuant to the Form 60; rather, defendants
question whether the superior court had jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute between the parties as to the amount, or rate, of
compensation to which plaintiff is entitled, which depends on a
determination of his average weekly wage. We hold this to be a
question within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission.
G.S. § 97-82(b) specifically states that payment pursuant to
G.S. § 97-18(b) (a Form 60 Payment) “shall constitute an award of
the Commission on the question of compensability of and the
insurer's liability for the injury for which payment was made.”
(emphasis added). Moreover, Form 60 states only “[y]our employer
admits your right to compensation for an injury by accident on
(date) . . . .” Below this acknowledgment of liability is a
section provided for a description of the accident, the average
weekly wage and resulting compensation rate, and the date which
disability begins and ends. The section is captioned, in bold
print and capital letters: “ THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED FOR
INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT.”
In contrast, the North Carolina Industrial Commission Form 21,
which constitutes an award of the Commission as to bothcompensability and amount when properly approved, see Kisiah v.
W.R. Kisiah Plumbing, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 72, 77, 476 S.E.2d 434,
436 (1996), disc. review denied, 345 N.C. 343, 483 S.E.2d 169
(1997), states explicitly that the parties agree and stipulate not
only as to compensability but also to the employee's average weekly
wage. “Once the Form 21 agreement [is] reached and approved 'no
party . . . [can] thereafter be heard to deny the truth of the
matters therein set forth . . . .'” Id. (quoting Dalton v. Anvil
Knitwear, 119 N.C. App. 275, 282, 458 S.E.2d 251, 257 (1995)).
By executing a Form 60 and paying compensation pursuant
thereto, a defendant admits only the compensability of the
employee's injury. Such admission becomes an award of the
Commission as to compensability and the superior court has
jurisdiction to enter a judgment pursuant to G.S. § 97-87 enforcing
such award. However, where disputes arise regarding issues other
than compensability, as in this case, such issues are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the North Carolina Industrial Commission.
The Superior Court exceeded its jurisdiction in entering
judgment enforcing payment of an amount of compensation when such
amount was in dispute, and the judgment must be vacated. The issue
of the amount of compensation to which plaintiff is entitled based
on his average weekly wage must be determined by the Industrial
Commission. In reaching this decision, we express no opinion as to
the merits of the parties' respective contentions with respect to
plaintiff's average weekly wage and the amount of compensation to
which he is entitled.
Vacated. Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and EDMUNDS concur.
Judge Edmunds concurred in this opinion prior to 31 December
2000.
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