FRANK L. SCHRIMSHER, Administrator of the Estate of EUGENE A.
GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v
.
RED ROOF INNS, INC.,
Defendant.
Joseph L. Ledford for plaintiff appellant.
Templeton & Raynor, P.A., by Kenneth R. Raynor, for defendant
appellee.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Frank Schrimsher ("plaintiff"), the administrator of the
estate of Eugene Griffin ("decedent"), appeals from judgment
granting directed verdict in favor of decedent's former employer,
Red Roof Inns, Inc. ("defendant"). The facts pertinent to the
present appeal are as follows: Decedent was shot and killed while
performing his work as an independent contractor providing security
services at a motel ("the motel") owned by defendant and located in
Charlotte, North Carolina. At the time of his death, decedent was
a Mecklenburg County police officer with twenty-one years of
experience, but he worked at the motel in an off-duty capacity. On
the evening of 21 November 1991, decedent confronted several men
who were creating a disturbance in the motel parking lot andordered them to leave the premises. One of the men, Allen Gaines
("Gaines"), subsequently returned to the motel and shot and killed
decedent, who at the time was sitting in the motel lobby. Gaines
entered the lobby through an unlocked door.
Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against defendant, alleging
that defendant violated its own security regulations by failing to
secure the front door through which Gaines gained access to the
motel lobby. The case came before a jury on 23 October 2000. At
the close of plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved for directed
verdict, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff now appeals to
this Court.
_____________________________________________________
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
granting directed verdict in favor of defendant. For the reasons
stated herein, we affirm the trial court.
On a motion by a defendant for directed verdict pursuant to
section 1A-1, Rule 50, of our General Statutes, the trial court
must consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, who is “entitled to the benefit of every reasonable
inference which may legitimately be drawn from the evidence.” Mann
v. Transportation Co. and Tillett v. Transportation Co., 283 N.C.
734, 746, 198 S.E.2d 558, 566 (1973). In the absence of any direct
or circumstantial evidence of the defendant's negligence, however,
directed verdict is proper. See Jenkins v. Starrett Corp., 13 N.C.
App. 437, 444, 186 S.E.2d 198, 203 (1972). Directed verdict is
also appropriate where a defendant establishes an affirmativedefense as a matter of law. See Goodwin v. Investors Life
Insurance Co. of North America, 332 N.C. 326, 329, 419 S.E.2d 766,
768 (1992). In such instances, “there are no issues to submit to
a jury and a plaintiff has no right to recover.” Id.
"Ordinarily an employer of an independent contractor may not
be held liable for injuries which have been sustained in the
performance of the contract by the contractor himself." Deaton v.
Elon College, 226 N.C. 433, 438, 38 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1946). Where
the independent contractor is a specialist in his field, the
employer has a duty to warn of hidden dangers known to the employer
but unknown to the independent contractor. See Henry v. White, 259
N.C. 283, 284, 130 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1963) (per curiam). An
employer is not liable, however, for injuries arising from
dangerous conditions that are open and obvious to the independent
contractor. See Deaton, 226 N.C. at 438, 38 S.E.2d at 565.
In the instant case, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in
granting directed verdict for defendant. Plaintiff asserts that
there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that
defendant was negligent in that its employee "increase[d] the risk
to which [decedent] was exposed by the manner in which [defendant]
conducted [its] business and how [defendant] exercised [its]
responsibility for those matters exclusively within [its] control."
Specifically, plaintiff contends defendant was negligent in that,
on the night of decedent's death, one of its employees may have
left open the door to the motel lobby, thereby allowing Gaines toenter the building and shoot decedent. We reject plaintiff's
argument on two grounds.
First, plaintiff produced no evidence that defendant's
employee left the motel lobby door open on the night of decedent's
death. Although there was evidence that the employee had left the
door open on previous occasions, there was no evidence that he had
done so the night of decedent's death. “'[E]vidence which merely
shows it possible for the fact in issue to be as alleged, or which
raises a mere conjecture that it was so, is an insufficient
foundation for a verdict and should not be left to the jury.'”
Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 116, 203 S.E.2d 330, 334 (quoting
Lee v. Stevens, 251 N.C. 429, 434, 111 S.E.2d 623, 627 (1959)),
affirmed per curiam, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974).
Second, all of the evidence in the case tended to show that
decedent was an experienced law enforcement officer, skilled in the
area of security services. Decedent's knowledge of appropriate
security measures, including the effect of allowing the lobby door
to be unlocked at nighttime, was equal to or superior than the
knowledge of defendant. There was no evidence to suggest that the
unsecured door was a "hidden danger" of which decedent had no
knowledge. Indeed, decedent was hired by defendant to prevent the
very kinds of criminal acts from which decedent died.
We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly granted
directed verdict in favor of defendant. Accordingly, the trial
court is hereby
Affirmed. Judges BRYANT and SMITH concur.
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