DOROTHIA SMITH,
Plaintiff-Employee
v
.
North Carolina
Industrial Commission
BEASLEY ENTERPRISES, INC./ I.C. No. 826179
RED APPLE,
Defendant-Employer
and
MANAGED CARE, USA,
Defendant-Carrier
Law Offices of Robert J. Willis, by Robert J. Willis, for
plaintiff-appellant.
Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Jennifer
Ingram Mitchell, for defendant-appellee.
WALKER, Judge.
Plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim on 22 April 1998
seeking benefits for her carpal tunnel syndrome which she alleges
is an occupational disease. The deputy commissioner denied her
claim and, on 15 December 2000, the Full Commission (Commission)
issued an opinion and award affirming the deputy commissioner's
holding.
The relevant facts as found by the Commission show the
following: In 1988, plaintiff began employment as a deli worker ina convenience store owned by defendant. Her various job
responsibilities included washing pieces of chicken and trimming
any excess fat from them. To do this, plaintiff held the chicken
piece in her left hand and used a knife with her right hand.
During a normal workday, this task took between two to three hours
to complete.
In June 1993, during an annual physical examination, plaintiff
reported pain and numbness in both hands. However, no diagnosis
was made at that time. On 20 January 1998, plaintiff sought
treatment at Rich Square Medical Center. She reported to a
physician's assistant, Delina Cooley (Ms. Cooley), that she had
difficulty grasping items with her hands and that she had problems
sleeping due to pain in her hands. After examining plaintiff, Ms.
Cooley referred her to East Carolina Neurology in Greenville for
nerve conduction studies. The referral was confirmed by Ms.
Cooley's supervising physician, Dr. Gilberto Navarro (Dr. Navarro).
In March 1998, Dr. Rakesh Jaitley (Dr. Jaitley), a neurologist
with East Carolina Neurology, performed nerve conduction studies on
plaintiff's hands and arms. These studies suggested that she
suffered from bilateral distal median entrapment neuropathy (carpal
tunnel syndrome). Plaintiff notified defendant of this diagnosis.
Shortly thereafter, she received steroid injections in her wrists.
On 1 September 1998, plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. John R.
Leonard, III (Dr. Leonard), a neurosurgeon at East Carolina
Neurosurgical Associates, at which time she complained that her
symptoms were more severe in her left hand. Consequently, Dr.Leonard performed carpal tunnel decompression surgery on
plaintiff's left arm. Following this surgery, Dr. Leonard
instructed plaintiff to return to him if she had any further
problems with her left hand or if she wanted to schedule surgery
for her right hand. After a follow-up evaluation, Dr. Leonard
opined that plaintiff had normal median nerve function in her left
hand, and on 30 November 1998, he released her to return to regular
duty work. Plaintiff had no further contact with Dr. Leonard, and
she has not worked for defendant since June 1998.
We summarize plaintiff's assignments of error as two issues:
(1) whether the Commission impermissibly disregarded the testimony
of plaintiff's medical witnesses; and (2) whether the Commission
erred in concluding that plaintiff had failed to establish her
carpal tunnel syndrome as an occupational disease.
On appeal, the standard of review for a workers' compensation
case is whether there is any competent evidence in the record to
support the Commission's findings and whether these findings
support the Commission's conclusions. Sidney v. Raleigh Paving &
Patching, 109 N.C. App. 254, 426 S.E.2d 424 (1993). If the
Commission's findings are supported by competent evidence, they are
to be upheld even if the record presents evidence which would
support contrary findings. Id. Thus, this Court's role is to
determine whether competent evidence exists to support the
Commission's findings and whether those findings justify itsconclusions and award. Simmons v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation,
128 N.C. App. 402, 496 S.E.2d 790 (1998).
Plaintiff first asserts the Commission failed to consider the
causation testimonies of Ms. Cooley, Dr. Jaitley and Dr. Navarro
when it concluded she did not establish her carpal tunnel syndrome
as an occupational disease. In making her assertion, plaintiff
relies on this Court's precedent that the Commission must consider
and weigh all competent evidence. Jenkins v. Easco Aluminum Corp.,
142 N.C. App. 71, 541 S.E.2d 510 (2001); Lineback v. Wake County
Board of Commissioners, 126 N.C. App. 678, 486 S.E.2d 252 (1997);
and Weaver v. American National Can Corp., 123 N.C. App. 507, 473
S.E.2d 10 (1996). She maintains that because the Commission's
findings do not specifically reference her medical expert's opinion
testimony, it impermissibly disregarded competent evidence.
The record shows the parties stipulated into evidence
plaintiff's medical records from Rich Square Medical Center and Dr.
Leonard. The Commission also had before it the depositions of Ms.
Cooley, Dr. Jaitley, Dr. Navarro and Dr. Leonard. Furthermore, the
Commission's opinion and award states that its decision was based
upon the entire record of evidence and the briefs and arguments
of the parties.
This Court has ruled that the Commission must make
'definitive findings to determine the critical issues raised by the
evidence,'. . . and in doing so must indicate in its findings that
it has 'considered or weighed' all testimony with respect to thecritical issues in the case. Bryant v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 130 N.C.
App. 135, 139, 502 S.E.2d 58, 62, disc. review denied, 349 N.C.
352, 515 S.E.2d 700 (1998)(internal citations omitted). However,
the Commission is not required to make exhaustive findings as to
each statement made by any given witness or make findings rejecting
specific evidence . . . . Id. The Commission must make findings
from which this Court may reasonably infer that it gave proper
consideration to all relevant testimony. Jenkins, 142 N.C. App. at
78-79, 541 S.E.2d at 515 (citing Pittman v. International Paper
Co., 132 N.C. App. 151, 510 S.E.2d 705, affirmed, 351 N.C. 42, 519
S.E.2d 524 (1999)).
In Jenkins and Lineback, we held the Commission did not give
proper consideration to the causation testimony of the plaintiffs'
medical experts where the findings made no mention of the experts
nor presented any evidence from which we could have reasonably
inferred that it had considered their testimony. Id; and Lineback,
126 N.C. App. at 680-81, 486 S.E.2d at 254. Likewise, in Weaver,
we held the Commission failed to consider the causation testimony
of the plaintiff's co-workers where its findings made no mention of
the co-workers, yet specifically stated the plaintiff had not
proven causation. Weaver, 123 N.C. App. at 510-11, 473 S.E.2d at
12. In contrast, the Commission here in its findings specifically
refers to evidence offered by Ms. Cooley and Dr. Jaitley. Fromthis, we conclude that the Commission considered the evidence
presented from these two witnesses.
Although the Commission's findings do not mention any evidence
from Dr. Navarro, the record reveals that, upon cross-examination,
he testified that he had never examined plaintiff, was unaware of
her specific job duties, and that he did not have an opinion to any
degree of medical certainty as to the cause of plaintiff's carpal
tunnel syndrome. As such, any causation testimony from Dr. Navarro
was not sufficiently reliable as to constitute competent medical
evidence. See Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227, 230, 538
S.E.2d 912, 914-15 (2000)(a medical expert's opinion testimony must
be sufficiently reliable to qualify as competent evidence).
Therefore, we conclude the Commission was not required to consider
his testimony. See Lineback, 126 N.C. App. at 680, 486 S.E.2d at
254 (the Commission may not wholly disregard or ignore competent
evidence)(emphasis added). We further conclude the Commission's
findings indicate that it considered all competent evidence with
respect to the critical issues in this case.
Plaintiff next contends the Commission erred in concluding
that she had failed to establish her carpal tunnel syndrome as an
occupational disease. Under our workers' compensation statute, an
occupational disease is:
Any disease, other than hearing loss . . .,
which is proven to be due to causes and
conditions which are characteristic of and
peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or
employment, but excluding all ordinarydiseases of life to which the general public
is equally exposed outside of the employment.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53(13)(1999). Based on this statutory
language, our Supreme Court has identified three elements which an
employee must show in order to prove the existence of an
occupational disease: (1) the disease is characteristic of a trade
or occupation; (2) the disease is not an ordinary disease of life
to which the public is equally exposed; and (3) proof of a causal
connection between the disease and the employment. Hansel v.
Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1981).
Plaintiff maintains that the opinions provided by Ms. Cooley,
Dr. Jaitley and Dr. Navarro provide competent medical evidence
sufficient to satisfy the three elements annunciated in Hansen. We
disagree.
The record shows the opinions proffered by these witnesses
were in response to a hypothetical question posed by plaintiff's
counsel. However, defendant correctly points out that the
hypothetical question inaccurately describes plaintiff's job
responsibilities. Although Ms. Cooley and Dr. Jaitley examined
plaintiff, they were unable to recall with specificity her job
responsibilities. Therefore, the Commission properly concluded
that plaintiff had failed to provide competent medical evidence
establishing her carpal tunnel syndrome as an occupational disease.
We have reviewed plaintiff's remaining assignments of error
and find them to be without merit. The opinion and award of the
Commission is affirmed. Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and THOMAS concur.
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