Appeal by plaintiffs from orders entered 6 February 2001, 13
February 2001, and 16 February 2001 by Judge W. Douglas Albright in
Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14
February 2002.
Ottway Burton, P.A., by Ottway Burton, for plaintiff-
appellants.
Frederick M. Dodge, II, for defendant-appellees Jesse H.
Harrelson, Executor, Jesse H. Harrelson, individually, and
wife, Dorothy J. Harrelson.
O'Briant, Bunch & Robins, by W. Edward Bunch, for defendant-
appellee Dorothy Burnside.
Lori J. Williams for defendant-appellee Magnolia O. Hilton.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by
Randall A. Underwood and Jennifer T. Harrod, for defendant-
appellees, Michael A. Stevens, Margaret Mastin Stevens and
Branch Banking and Trust.
MARTIN, Judge.
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking judgment against
defendants for a sum in excess of $10,000 for personal services
allegedly rendered to Ruth B. Sykes, who is deceased. All
defendants filed answers to the complaint and motions to dismisspursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure for plaintiffs' failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Defendants' motions to dismiss were granted
by the trial court and plaintiffs appeal.
The decedent, Ruth B. Sykes, a citizen and resident of
Randolph County, died testate on 21 June 1999. On 24 June 1999,
defendant, Jesse H. Harrelson, was appointed executor of decedent's
estate. Defendants (Jesse H. Harrelson, Dorothy Burnside, and
Magnolia O. Hilton) were named as heirs in decedent's will.
In his capacity as executor, Jesse Harrelson improperly placed
a notice to claimants in the
High Point Enterprise, a newspaper of
general circulation in Guilford County. The notice indicated that
all claims against the estate of Ruth B. Sykes were required to be
filed by 30 September 1999. Since decedent had been a resident of
Randolph County at the time of her death, the executor correctly
readvertised a notice to creditors in
The Courier-Tribune, a
newspaper of general circulation in Randolph County. This second
notice required that claims against decedent's estate be filed by
1 January 2000.
Though plaintiffs alleged that they presented a notice of
claim to the executor, on 25 September 1999, their notice of claim
was not filed with the Clerk of Superior Court of Randolph County
until 29 December 1999. Plaintiffs' notice of claim does not state
any specific amount alleged to be due, but simply demands “the sum
in excess of $10,000.” Plaintiffs' claim against decedent's estate
purports to be for personal services performed by plaintiffs fordecedent during the three and a half years prior to her death.
On 19 January 2000, Jesse Harrelson, as executor, rejected
plaintiffs' notice of claim. Harrelson gave the following reasons
for rejecting the notice of claim: the claims did not have basis
in fact; the claims sought an unreasonable amount for the services
described; the claims failed to describe with particularity the
dates services were provided, the amount of service expended, and
the charges for the services; the claims did not detail the basis
by which the deceased agreed to pay for such services; and
decedent's estate did not have sufficient assets to pay the claims.
Decedent owned real property, described as Lots 42 and 43 of
Manor Ridge in Randolph County, at the time of her death. A deed
from Jesse Harrelson, individually and in his capacity as executor
of the estate, his wife, Dorothy J. Harrelson, and the other heirs,
Dorothy Burnside and Magnolia O. Hilton, to defendants, Michael A.
Stevens and his wife, Margaret Mastin Stevens, for this property
was signed on 1 and 4 October 1999 and recorded in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Randolph County. The grantees, Mr. and
Mrs. Stevens, executed a deed of trust in favor of Branch Banking
and Trust Company to secure repayment of a loan in the amount of
$27,000.
After their claim was rejected by the executor, plaintiffs
filed a complaint on 8 May 2000 seeking damages in excess of
$10,000 against the named defendants for services allegedly
provided by plaintiffs to Ruth B. Sykes. Plaintiffs did not allege
that they performed these services pursuant to an agreement orcontract with decedent; instead, they alleged that they performed
these services with the expectation of payment therefor.
Plaintiffs alleged that, after they presented Mrs. Sykes' executor
with the notice of claim, he, with full knowledge of the scope and
extent of plaintiffs' claim, distributed all of decedent's personal
property to himself and his wife, Dorothy Harrelson, and to
defendants Magnolia Hilton and Dorothy Burnside. Plaintiffs
alleged that such personal property should have been sold and that
the proceeds of such sale would have been sufficient to pay their
claim.
Plaintiffs also allege that on 8 October 1999, Jesse
Harrelson, Dorothy Harrelson, Dorothy Burnside, and Magnolia
Hilton, with full knowledge of the scope and extent of plaintiffs'
claim, sold the real property owned by decedent to defendants
Michael and Margaret Stevens and divided the proceeds of the sale
among decedent's heirs. Plaintiffs allege that the proceeds from
this sale were sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs' pending claim. In
addition to damages, plaintiffs sought to set aside the deed to the
Stevens, and for the deed of trust to be stricken from the record
book in the Randolph County Register of Deeds Office.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in
granting defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under
N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Our standard of review of an order
allowing a motion to dismiss is “whether, as a matter of law, the
allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legaltheory, whether properly labeled or not.”
Harris v. NCNB Nat'l
Bank of N.C., 85 N.C. App. 669, 670, 355 S.E.2d 838, 840 (1987).
In ruling upon such a motion, the complaint is to be liberally
construed, and the court should not dismiss the complaint “unless
it appears beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff could prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Dixon v. Stuart, 85 N.C. App. 338, 340, 354 S.E.2d 757, 758 (1987).
To present a proper claim against a decedent's estate, a
claimant must comply with the provisions of G.S. § 28A-19-1(a),
which require that a written statement of the claim be hand
delivered or mailed to the personal representative or to the clerk
of court. G.S. § 28A-19-1(a) specifically requires that
[a] claim against a decedent's estate must be
in writing
and state the amount or item
claimed, or other relief sought, the basis for
the claim, and the name and address of the
claimant. . . . (emphasis added)
The notice of claim filed by plaintiffs in the instant case did not
comply with the statute. First, plaintiffs failed to “state the
amount or item claimed.” Plaintiffs notice of claim, stating only
a claim for a sum “in excess of $10,000.00," is not definite enough
to satisfy the statute. Additionally, plaintiffs failed to state
the basis for their claim with particularity. Plaintiffs claimed
that they were entitled to payment for the following personal
services:
domestic duties in and about the dwelling of
the deceased as well as numerouse [sic] other
services relating to the running of a
household and caring for personal individual
healthcare services. That these services also
relate to general errand runnings [sic] forshopping and providing transportation to and
from facilities that provide personal
services, medicines and food.
Plaintiffs did not specify the dates upon which such services were
rendered, the specific service expended, or the charge for such
service. Plaintiffs only stated that they were demanding payment
for services rendered from 1 January 1996 through 22 June 1999.
Therefore, plaintiffs did not present a proper notice of claim
under G.S. § 28A-19-1(a).
A claim which is not presented to the personal representative
pursuant to G.S. § 28A-19-1 by the date specified in the general
notice to creditors is forever barred against the estate, the
personal representative, the collector, the heirs, and the devisees
of the decedent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-19-3(a) (1999). Plaintiffs
in the present case did not seek to correct their insufficient
notice of claim against Ms. Sykes' estate to comply with G.S. § 28-
19-1 at any time prior to 1 January 2000. Therefore, their claim
is barred and the trial court correctly granted defendants' motions
to dismiss.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur.
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