GUILFORD COUNTY, BY AND THROUGH ITS CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
OFFICE, ex rel., LISA MANNING,
Plaintiff
v.
TONY RICHARDSON,
Defendant
Guilford County Attorney's Office, by Deputy County Attorney
Michael K. Newby, for plaintiff appellant.
No brief filed for defendant appellee.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Plaintiff instituted this action on 11 January 2000 seeking
establishment of paternity to the minor child, Cynterria N.
Armstrong, born 1 February 1993, current support, and reimbursement
for public assistance provided for the benefit of the minor child.
After hearing evidence from both plaintiff and defendant, the trial
court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
2. That the Defendant was sent a letter on
12/6/99 notifying that he had been named
as the father of the above named child
and requesting he contact the Child
Support Enforcement Agency concerning
establishing his support obligation. He
did not contact the Agency and his
complaint, as described above, was
originally filed on January 11, 2000,
amended on March 30, 2000 and served on
April 5, 2000.
3. That after service of the complaint, the
Defendant contacted the Child Support
Enforcement Agency and requested a
paternity test and the paternity tests
were done finding 99.99 percent
probability that the defendant was the
father of the minor child named above.
4. That according to the income of the
Defendant, he should be paying the amount
of $248.00 per month current support
under the applicable North Carolina
Guidelines as shown in Exhibit A attached
hereto and made a part thereof.
5. The Plaintiff has submitted evidence that
$10,377.67 in past paid public assistance
was provided for the support and benefit
of the minor child named above until the
hearing of this matter.
6. The defendant appears in court today and
first acknowledges paternity of the minor
child, Cynterria N. Armstrong (DOB
2/1/93). Defendant also agrees to
payment of current support in the amount
of $248.00 per month, however he contests
the establishment of past paid public
assistance obligation in this matter.
Defendant contends that the mother of the
child previously indicated another man
was the father and that he did not know
he could be the father until contacted by
Child Support Enforcement Agency. Prior
to the filing of the complaint, he did
not consider himself the child's father
until the results of the paternity tests
were received.
7. Upon the court's request, past paid
public assistance was calculated from the
original demand notice to the Defendant
until the hearing of this matter. The
court takes judicial notice that
$3,645.31 has accrued after the notice
from IV-D to the Defendant of his
possible paternity of his child.
Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that
defendant was the father of the child and that the establishment ofa current support obligation in the amount of $248.00 per month was
appropriate. The trial court also concluded that
4. It is appropriate that the Defendant only
repay the amount of $3,645.31 and accrue
past paid public assistance since he was
not informed of his possible paternity
until December 6, 1999 when he was served
with a demand letter from the Child
Support Enforcement Agency.
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay
monthly support in the amount of $248.00 and to repay a past paid
public assistance debt in the amount of $3,645.31 at the rate of
$52.00 per month, beginning 1 February 2001.
Plaintiff appealed from this order, contending that the trial
court erred by requiring defendant to repay only the past paid
amount which accrued after he was served with the demand letter on
6 December 1999. We agree. In State ex rel. Terry v. Marrow, 71
N.C. App. 170, 321 S.E.2d 575 (1984), the trial court limited
reimbursement by the father to payments made after the date the
child support enforcement agency first demanded payment of support
by the father. On appeal, the father argued the trial court
correctly determined that the State was not entitled to recover
from him payments made “before he had any knowledge of the birth of
his son and before demand was made upon him to support the child.”
Id. at 173, 321 S.E.2d at 577. The Marrow Court based its
decision, in part, on language from Tidwell v. Booker, 290 N.C. 98,
225 S.E.2d 816 (1976) as follows:
The duty of the father of an illegitimate
child to support such child is not created by
the judicial determination of paternity. That
determination is merely a proceduralprerequisite to the enforcement of the duty by
legal action. The father's duty to support
his child arises when the child is born.
Marrow, 71 N.C. App. at 174, 321 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting Tidwell,
290 N.C. at 116, 225 S.E.2d at 827). This Court ultimately rejected
the father's arguments, overturned the trial court's decision, and
remanded for entry of a new judgment. Marrow, 71 N.C. App. at 174-
75, 321 S.E.2d at 578.
We conclude that Marrow is on point and controls the outcome
of this case. We therefore reverse the order of the trial court
and remand for entry of a new order in accordance with this
opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.
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