STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
JOHN WESLEY BARNES
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Thomas O. Lawton III, for the State.
McCotter, McAfee & Ashton, PLLC, by Rudolph A. Ashton, III and
Robert J. McAfee, for defendant-appellant.
McGEE, Judge.
John Wesley Barnes (defendant) was indicted on 10 August 1998
for attempted statutory rape, statutory rape, statutory sexual
offense of a person under thirteen years old, indecent liberties
with a child, and incest of his thirteen-year-old daughter.
Defendant filed a motion to suppress on 16 February 1999, seeking
to exclude statements made by defendant to law enforcement
officers.
A hearing was held on defendant's motion to suppress on 13
September 1999. The State presented the testimony of Laurel Miller
(Officer Miller), an investigator with the Beaufort County
Sheriff's Department. Officer Miller testified that a complaint
was filed with the Sheriff's Department in the summer of 1998
concerning sexual abuse of defendant's daughter, and that afterinvestigation, it was determined that defendant was a suspect.
Defendant called the Sheriff's Department on 19 July 1998 to
inquire whether any warrants had been issued for his arrest.
Defendant was told there were no warrants for his arrest, but that
accusations had been made against him.
Officer Miller testified that defendant voluntarily came to
the Sheriff's Department the following day and met with her. They
talked in an interview room with the door closed, but unlocked.
Officer Miller testified she told defendant he was not under arrest
and was free to leave at any time. She testified defendant did not
ask for an attorney. During the conversation, defendant did ask to
go to the restroom. A male investigator unlocked the men's
bathroom door and waited outside for defendant. Defendant later
asked to take a cigarette break. Defendant and Officer Miller left
the interview room and smoked cigarettes outside the building.
During the interview, Officer Miller told defendant that his
daughter was pregnant. Officer Miller testified she had no
evidence that this statement was true. However, she used the
statement as an "investigative technique" because the victim told
Officer Miller that her father's greatest fear was that she might
be pregnant, and "that if [defendant] was in fact having sex with
[his daughter] that this would cause him to tell the truth about
it." Defendant later wrote his own statement admitting he sexually
assaulted his daughter. He then left the Sheriff's Department.
Defendant was arrested later that week.
Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that when hearrived at the Sheriff's Department and met Officer Miller, he
walked in and sat down [] and [Officer Miller]
said, 'I want to ask you a few questions,' and
I said 'Do I need a lawyer?' . . . [S]he
said, 'No,' we [were] just going to have a
little chit-chat between me and her and that
was it. And then she started asking me
questions and stuff.
Defendant also testified he had been drinking and taking "Valiums
and Preludes" the morning that he went to the Sheriff's Department.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress in an
order entered 11 May 2001, nunc pro tunc October 2000. Defendant
pled guilty on 5 March 2001 to attempted statutory rape of a person
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen. The State dismissed the
remaining charges. The transcript of plea noted the State and
defendant agreed defendant retained the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b)(2001).
I.
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress statements he made to Officer Miller concerning
the sexual assault of defendant's daughter. Defendant contends the
statements were made involuntarily and therefore his due process
rights were violated.
Defendant also argues he did not receive any Miranda warnings.
Defendant asserts that because of the false "information" given to
him by Officer Miller about his daughter's pregnancy, he confessed
against his will. He further contends his prior consumption of
prescription drugs and alcohol altered his mental state, resulting
in his confession of sexually assaulting his daughter. He contendsthe totality of the circumstances constituted police coercion which
extracted an involuntary confession. Therefore, the trial court's
denial of his motion to suppress violated his Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights.
The false statement made by Officer Miller about defendant's
daughter being pregnant is insufficient to render defendant's
confession inadmissible. As defendant acknowledges, the use of
false statements and trickery by police officers during
interrogations is not illegal as a matter of law. Our Supreme
Court stated in State v. Jackson that:
The general rule in the United States, which
this Court adopts, is that while deceptive
methods or false statements by police officers
are not commendable practices, standing alone
they do not render a confession of guilt
inadmissible. The admissibility of the
confession must be decided by viewing the
totality of the circumstances, one of which
may be whether the means employed were
calculated to procure an untrue confession.
308 N.C. 549, 574, 304 S.E.2d 134, 148 (1983) (citations omitted).
This Court agrees with defendant that deceptive law
enforcement tactics and false statements during questioning are not
commendable practices. However, only in limited circumstances are
deceptive methods and attendant consequences sufficient to render
a confession invalid. The admissibility of a confession under the
shadow of false inducing statements by law enforcement hinges on
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession.
Jackson, 308 N.C. at 574, 304 S.E.2d at 148. To determine whether
a confession is voluntary, the question to be answered is whether
a defendant's will was overborne when he incriminated himself. Ifso, the confession was not the result of a rational, willful
decision to confess. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534, 9 L.
Ed. 2d 922, 926 (1963).
The purpose behind placing restraints on law enforcement when
interviewing suspects is to avoid forcing false confessions or
coerced confessions ; however, the ability of investigators to
procure voluntary confessions should not be undermined. See
generally State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 543 S.E.2d 823 (2001);
State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E. 2d 134 (1983). For this
reason, deceiving suspects, while not commendable, is insufficient
to suppress a confession. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 574, 304 S.E.2nd at
148.
Findings of fact relating to the voluntariness of a confession
are binding on our Court if supported by competent evidence in the
record. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 336, 543 S.E.2d at 826. We may not
set aside or modify findings substantiated by evidence, even if the
evidence is conflicting. Jackson, 308 N.C. at 569, 304 S.E.2d at
145 (citations omitted).
While the record supports defendant's assertion that his worst
fears were realized upon hearing that his daughter was pregnant,
the type of fear that justifies suppression of a confession
involves threats of violence or harsh treatment by law enforcement,
especially if better treatment is offered in exchange for a
confession. See State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92
(1975); State v. Rook, 304 N.C.201, 218-19, 283 S.E.2d 732, 742-43
(1981). In the case before us, the tactics used did not implantfear of physical violence or hope of better treatment. Cf. State
v. Simpson, 299 N.C. 335, 345, 261 S.E.2d 818, 824 (1980).
Deception is only one factor to be considered when looking at
the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's
confession. In the case before us, other circumstances of
defendant's confession do not support a conclusion that the
confession was involuntary. Defendant was not tricked about the
nature of the crime involved or possible punishment. Officer
Miller did not subject defendant to threats of harm, rewards for
confession, or deprivation of freedom of action. In fact,
defendant exercised his freedom of action by leaving the Sheriff's
Department at the end of the interview. See Jackson at 577, 304
S.E. 2d at 149-50.
The evidence in the record does not show an oppressive
environment. As in Rook, a single interviewer conducted the
interview. Nothing in the record suggests Officer Miller used
threats or a show of violence. Further, defendant was not
subjected to physical touching or bodily harm. For these reasons,
the unsubstantiated statement about his daughter's pregnancy was
insufficient to render defendant's incriminating statements
involuntary.
Defendant also argues his prior consumption of prescription
drugs and alcohol makes his incriminating statements involuntary.
However, a defendant's intoxication at the time of a confession
does not preclude a conclusion that a defendant's statements were
freely made. "An inculpatory statement is admissible unless thedefendant is so intoxicated that he is unconscious of the meaning
of his words." State v. Oxendine, 303 N.C. 235, 243, 278 S.E.2d
200, 205 (1981). The record does not show defendant was so heavily
under the influence that he could not understand the implications
of confessing to sexually assaulting his daughter. There was no
evidence defendant was unable to walk or carry on a normal
conversation. Defendant's own testimony was the only evidence
tending to prove any use of prescription drugs and alcohol, and
defendant contends only that he was under the influence of alcohol
and perhaps prescription drugs. Lastly, defendant was able to
relate the events of 20 July 1998 to a degree of detail
inconsistent with someone who was impaired and unaware of the
meaning of his words.
The trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent
evidence in the record. The totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interview show that defendant's confession was
voluntary and that Officer Miller did not extract defendant's
confession. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting
defendant's statements.
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