Appeal by respondent-appellant from order filed 16 March 2001
and from amended order dated 26 March 2001 by Judge Marcia H. Morey
in Durham County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16
April 2002.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Mabel Y. Bullock, for the State.
County Attorney S.C. Kitchen, by Deputy Durham County Attorney
Lowell L. Siler and Assistant Durham County Attorneys Curtis
O. Massey, II, and Lucy Chavis, for respondent-appellant,
Durham County.
Phillip W. Evans, for respondent-appellee, juvenile.
GREENE, Judge.
Durham County (the County) appeals a juvenile order filed 16
March 2001 and an amended juvenile order dated 26 March 2001
ordering it to pay the costs of Anthony Braithwaite's (Braithwaite)
residential treatment.
Braithwaite was first adjudicated delinquent on 28 March 2000
for felony breaking and entering and felony larceny and again on 9
February 2001 for assault. Subsequently, on 16 March 2001, the
trial court determined Braithwaite was in need of residential
treatment for a mental illness and substance abuse. After findingBraithwaite's mother unable to afford the cost of her son's
treatment, the trial court ordered the County to “pay the costs of
[Braithwaite's] residential treatment and that the . . . mother
. . . contribute $100 monthly to the [C]ounty for her son's
treatment.”
On 2 April 2001, the County filed its notice of appeal and on
29 June 2001, filed a petition for writ of certiorari.
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The dispositive issue is whether this Court has the right to
grant a writ of certiorari and review the trial court's orders in
this case.
A trial court may order a county “to arrange for evaluation or
treatment of [a] juvenile and to pay for the cost of the evaluation
or treatment.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2502(b) (1999). While a county must
be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order to
pay costs can be issued,
id., a county does not have a “statutory
right to appeal in a juvenile proceeding in this state,”
In re
Voight, 138 N.C. App. 542, 545, 530 S.E.2d 76, 78,
disc.
review
denied,
cert.
denied,
and remedial writ denied, 352 N.C. 674, 545
S.E.2d 728 (2000);
In re Wharton, 305 N.C. 565, 569, 290 S.E.2d
688, 690 (1982);
In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 547, 272 S.E.2d 861,
870 (1981). Although
Brownlee and
Wharton held that a county does
not have a right to appeal in a juvenile delinquency action, our
Supreme Court exercised its power under the N.C. Constitution,
Article IV, Section 12(1) and issued a remedial writ to hear the
appeals.
Voight, 138 N.C. App. at 545, 530 S.E.2d at 78. ThisCourt, however, “does not have the power to issue a remedial writ
under our Constitution” but does “have the power to issue certain
prerogative writs under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32 (1999).”
Id. One
of these prerogative writs is certiorari. N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(c)
(1999). This Court has authority to issue a writ of certiorari
only
in appropriate circumstances . . . to permit
review of the judgments and orders of trial
tribunals when the right to prosecute an
appeal has been lost by failure to take timely
action, or when no right of appeal from an
interlocutory order exists, or for review
pursuant to G.S. 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of
the trial court denying a motion for
appropriate relief.
N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1).
In this case, the County has not failed to take timely action,
is not attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order, and is not
seeking review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1422(c)(3). Thus,
this Court does not have the authority to issue a writ of
certiorari pursuant to Rule 21(a)(1). Accordingly, because the
County does not have a right to appeal and this Court is without
authority to issue remedial writs or grant a writ of certiorari
under the circumstances of this case, the County's appeal is
dismissed.
Dismissed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur.
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