Appeal by defendant from judgment dated 2 April 2001 and from
order filed 4 June 2001 by Judge Ronald K. Payne in Watauga County
Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2002.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Isaac T. Avery, III and Assistant Attorney General
Patricia A. Duffy, for the State.
Wilson, Palmer, Lackey & Rohr, P.A., by Timothy J. Rohr, for
defendant-appellant.
GREENE, Judge.
Kenneth Mast Dickson (Defendant) purports to appeal from a
judgment dated 2 April 2001 entered consistent with his plea of
guilty to impaired driving and from an order filed 4 June 2001
denying his motion to dismiss. In the alternative, Defendant
petitions this Court for writ of certiorari.
On 7 March 2001, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the
charge of impaired driving. Defendant's motion was denied both in
open court on 2 April 2001 and in an order filed 4 June 2001.
Subsequently, Defendant pled guilty to impaired driving. Defendant
assigns as error the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss
the charge against him.
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The dispositive issue is whether this Court has the authority
to review the trial court's judgment entered consistent with
Defendant's plea of guilty.
Unless appealing sentencing issues or the denial of a motion
to suppress, a defendant “is not entitled to appellate review as a
matter of right when he has entered a plea of guilty . . . to a
criminal charge in the superior court, but he may petition the
appellate division for review by writ of certiorari.” N.C.G.S. §
15A-1444(e) (2001). While N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e) allows a
defendant to petition for writ of certiorari, this Court is limited
to issuing a writ of certiorari
in appropriate circumstances . . . to permit
review of the judgments and orders of trial
tribunals when the right to prosecute an
appeal has been lost by failure to take timely
action, or when no right of appeal from an
interlocutory order exists, or for review
pursuant to G.S. 15A-1422(c)(3) of an order of
the trial court denying a motion for
appropriate relief.
N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). The North Carolina Constitution “gives
exclusive authority to [our] Supreme Court to make rules of
practice and procedure for the appellate division,” thus, where, as
here, “the North Carolina General Statutes conflict with Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the Rules of Appellate Procedure will
prevail.”
Neasham v.
Day, 34 N.C. App. 53, 55-56, 237 S.E.2d 287,
289 (1977).
In this case, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(e), Defendant
has no right to appeal the judgment entered consistent with his
guilty plea. In addition, Defendant has not failed to take timelyaction, is not attempting to appeal from an interlocutory order,
and is not seeking review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
1422(c)(3). Thus, this Court does not have the authority to issue
a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, because Defendant does not have
a right to appeal and this Court is without authority to grant a
writ of certiorari, Defendant's appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed.
Judges HUDSON and BIGGS concur.
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