STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
WILLIAM LAMONTE QUICK,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Charles J. Murray, for the State.
Ligon and Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, for the defendant-
appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury,
possession of cocaine, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, for which he was sentenced to a minimum 362 months and a
maximum 454 months.
The charges all arose out of an altercation between defendant,
William Lamont Quick, and two Raleigh police officers who were
securing a home where they believed illegal drugs were being sold.
During these events, defendant shot and injured Officer R.B.
Edmundson and Officer R.L. Warner, and the officers shot at
defendant. Defendant ran away from the area, but later turned
himself into authorities. As a result of this incident, defendant was indicted for
possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious
injury, two counts of attempted murder, possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, and possession of a stolen firearm. Before
trial, defendant attempted suicide twice and was held “under a
safekeeping order in the Mental Health Ward at Central Prison.”
Because he was indigent, defendant requested and received funds
from the state to employ “an expert in the field of forensic
psychology to examine, evaluate and prepare to testify on behalf of
the defendant in this matter.” The defendant employed Dr. James E.
Bellard, a forensic psychiatrist, who examined defendant and
prepared a report concerning defendant's mental condition. At
trial, defendant's attorney introduced the report under seal, but
did not call Dr. Bellard to testify until the sentencing hearing.
At the trial, the State presented the testimony of the two
officers involved, who testified that defendant fired on them
first. Defendant contended during trial that he shot the officers
in self-defense, and his attorney presented evidence to that
effect. Defendant himself testified that he was running away from
the scene when he heard gunshots behind him, and he shot back at
the officers.
At the close of the State's evidence, the trial court
dismissed the charge of possession of a stolen weapon. On 8 May
2000, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury,possession of cocaine, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, for which he was sentenced to a minimum 362 months and a
maximum 454 months. The court also recommended that defendant
receive mental health treatment while incarcerated. Defendant
appeals his convictions.
In his sole argument, defendant contends that he “received
ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section[] 23 of the North Carolina Constitution by counsel's
failure to introduce expert testimony of defendant's mental illness
to negate the mental state required for the offenses for which
defendant was charged.” Defendant raised six additional
assignments of error in the Record on Appeal, but, as none have
been brought forward, they are deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App.
Proc. 28(a) (2001).
“A defendant's right to counsel includes the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553,
561, 324 S.E.2d 241, 247 (1985) (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 771, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763, 773 (1970)). To obtain relief for
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate
initially that “his counsel's conduct fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 561-62, 324 S.E.2d at 248
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d
674, 693 (1984)). The defendant's burden of proof requires the
following:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requiresshowing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. “The defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694, 80
L. Ed. 2d at 698; see also State v. Montford, 137 N.C. App. 495,
502, 529 S.E.2d 247, 252 (2000) (describing the standard of review
for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
Defendant contends that his attorney erred by not calling Dr.
Bellard to testify during the trial, because Dr. Bellard's
testimony might have negated the defendant's ability to form the
specific intent necessary to commit the crimes charged.
Additionally, he argues that Dr. Bellard's testimony might have
provided the evidentiary basis for an instruction to the jury on
voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity. “The decisions on
what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-
examination, . . . and all other strategic and tactical decisions
are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with
his client. Trial counsel are necessarily given wide latitude in
these matters.” State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 495, 256 S.E.2d
154, 160 (1979) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds byState v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983).
Further, we have reviewed the report which was submitted to
this Court as part of the Record. In part, Dr. Bellard states:
3. Because of his mental illness, Mr. Quick
did not, on the night of the crime, fully
grasp the wrongfulness of his actions. It is
my opinion that Mr. Quick did know right from
wrong at the time of the crime. His mental
illness was not so severe that it rendered him
unable to distinguish from right and wrong.
His mental illness was so severe however as to
make less clear to him the wrongfulness of his
actions. His Mania and drug abuse made him
paranoid and considerably more defensive and
he believed at the time of the crime that he
had “a right to defend himself.”
4. Mr. Quick's prognosis is fair. If he can
be persuaded to be consistent and regular with
taking his medications, he is likely to show a
good improvement from his Bipolar illness.
Also, in an incarcerated setting, he is much
less likely to abuse drugs.
Based on our review, we are not persuaded that, had the doctor
testified at trial, his testimony necessarily would have helped the
defendant. Under these circumstances, we have no basis to conclude
that counsel's decision not to call the doctor as a witness at the
trial was anything other than a sound tactical choice.
Consequently, defendant has not satisfied the first prong of
Strickland, in that he has not shown that his counsel's performance
was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at
693. Thus, we do not reach the second prong of the Strickland
test. See id. Accordingly, given the standard of review of these
issues, we conclude that counsel's failure to call Dr. Bellard to
testify did not render counsel's assistance constitutionally
defective. No error.
Judges GREENE and BIGGS concur.
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