STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Beaufort Coun
ty
No. 00CRS004142
HORACE SUMPTER
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Special Deputy
Attorney General W. Dale Talbert, for the State.
Edwin M. Hardy, for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Horace Sumpter (defendant) was found guilty of possession of
cocaine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of
marijuana. He was sentenced to an active term of forty-five days
for possession of drug paraphernalia. The remaining convictions
were consolidated and defendant was sentenced to a suspended term
of six to eight months.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the court erred in denying
defendant's motion to suppress because the officers executing a
search warrant did not knock and announce their presence prior to
entering defendant's residence. We find no error.
An officer executing a search warrant is statutorily required,
prior to entering the premises, to give appropriate notice of his identity and
purpose to the person to be searched, or the
person in apparent control of the premises to
be searched. If it is unclear whether anyone
is present at the premises to be searched, he
must give the notice in a manner likely to be
heard by anyone who is present.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-249 (1999). Following a voir dire hearing,
the court made findings of fact that show the following. Detective
J. W. Davis of the Washington Police Department obtained a warrant
on 7 June 2000 to search the premises at 601 East Fourth Street for
the presence of controlled substances. In executing the search
warrant, Detective Davis opened an unlocked exterior door to enter
the residence. As he pushed the door open, he announced, in a
voice sufficiently loud to be heard by all occupants of the
residence, his identity and purpose to wit[:] 'police officer,
search warrant.' Other officers following Detective Davis into
the residence uttered the same words. Prior to entering the
residence, Detective Davis had received information from informants
and other officers that controlled substances were being bought and
sold within the residence, sometimes in exchange for sexual acts.
Detective Davis also had observed approximately ten persons, some
he knew as drug dealers or users, come and go through the same
unlocked door without knocking or being invited inside by an
occupant.
The court concluded that the simultaneous announcement of
identity and purpose upon the officers' entry into the residence
sufficiently satisfied the requirement of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-249
that officers executing a search warrant give notice of theiridentity and purpose prior to entering the premises. The court
further concluded that even if proper notice prior to entry was not
given, the violation did not constitute a substantial violation of
statutory provisions. The court noted that the deviation was
slight, that the entry was not the result of any deviousness or
ruse on the part of the officers, and that no evidence was seized
which would not have been discovered had the entry not been as
described.
Defendant does not assign error to any of the findings of
fact; therefore, the scope of our review is limited to determining
whether the court's findings of fact support its conclusions of
law. State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245, 147 L. Ed. 2d 965 (2000). Evidence
must be suppressed if it is obtained as a result of a substantial
violation of the Criminal Procedure Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
974(2) (1999). Whether a violation is substantial is dependent
upon the particular circumstances, including the importance of the
interest violated, the extent of the violation from lawful conduct,
the extent to which the violation was willful, and the extent to
which exclusion of the evidence will deter future misconduct. Id.
By not announcing his identity and purpose prior to opening
the door and entering the residence, Detective Davis violated the
literal requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-249. We thus must
examine the circumstances to determine whether this violation was
substantial. 'The knock and announce rule has three purposes:
(1) to protect law enforcement officers and household occupants from potential violence; (2) to prevent the unnecessary destruction
of private property; and (3) to protect people from unnecessary
intrusion into their private activities.' State v. Harris, 145
N.C. App. 570, 582, 551 S.E.2d 499, 506 (2001) (quoting Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998)), appeal dismissed and
disc. review denied, N.C. , 560 S.E.2d 146 (2002).
Detective Davis testified that, based on his training and
experience, persons who use and sell crack cocaine usually carry
weapons and that firearms and ammunition are often found during
searches for drugs pursuant to search warrants. Detective Davis
observed a number of persons enter through the door without
knocking or receiving an invitation from an occupant to enter. The
door was unlocked at the time the officers entered.
The amount of time required between the giving of notice and
entering the premises is dependent upon the circumstances of each
case. State v. Gaines, 33 N.C. App. 66, 69, 234 S.E.2d 42, 44
(1977). In Gaines we upheld entry onto premises immediately after
the officer announced his presence and identity, noting that no one
objected to the officer's entry, which was through an unlocked and
open door. Id. Here, Detective Davis announced his presence and
purpose simultaneously with the opening of the door and entry into
the dwelling. As in Gaines, no occupant in the present case
objected to the officers' entry through the unlocked door.
We also have not found a substantial violation when the
immediate entry is effected to prevent destruction of the
contraband sought when the contraband is easily destructible. See,e.g., State v. Edwards, 70 N.C. App. 317, 320, 319 S.E.2d 613, 615
(1984), rev'd on other grounds, 315 N.C. 304, 337 S.E.2d 508
(1985); State v. Willis, 58 N.C. App. 617, 623, 294 S.E.2d 330, 333
(1982), aff'd per curiam, 307 N.C. 461, 298 S.E.2d 388 (1983).
Detective Davis testified that drugs such as crack cocaine, the
object of the search, may be destroyed within a matter of seconds
by flushing them down the toilet.
For these reasons, we hold the trial court properly concluded
that the violation was not substantial and that the court properly
denied the motion to suppress.
No error.
Judges MARTIN and BRYANT concur.
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