Appeal by defendant from orders entered 30 March 2001 and 2
April 2001 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr., in Yadkin County Superior
Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 15 May 2002.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Jill F. Cramer, for the State.
William Randell, pro se.
PER CURIAM.
The Honorable William Z. Wood, Jr., was conducting court
during the 30 March 2001 Criminal Session of Yadkin County Superior
Court. At 11:09 a.m., the court called for a morning recess, and
the bailiff called for all to rise. A person in the courtroom,
later identified as defendant William Randell, did not obey the
call to rise. Defendant continued to remain seated even after
Judge Wood called for all to rise. The transcript reflects the
subsequent exchange between defendant and Judge Wood:
THE COURT: Come on up, sir.
MR. RANDELL: For what?
THE COURT: You're in custody. Thirty &n
bsp;
days.
MR. RANDELL: For what?
THE COURT: Contempt of court.
MR. RANDELL: I was getting my books.
THE COURT: You didn't stand up. What's
your name?
MR. RANDELL: As a matter of fact . . .
THE COURT: . . . what is your name . . .
MR. RANDELL: . . . The law doesn't require
me to stand . . .
THE COURT: . . . what's your name?
MR. RANDELL: (No response).
THE COURT: What's your name?
MR. RANDELL: My name is William Randell.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Randell, I'll be glad
you hear later on [sic]. He's
in custody, sheriff.
Defendant was brought back into the courtroom by Judge Wood
later on the same day. At this point, Judge Wood gave defendant an
opportunity to be heard on the contempt of court charge. Defendant
claimed that he did not believe that he was in contempt because
there was no law that required him to stand. Judge Wood clarified
that defendant was going to be punished for not giving his name
when the court asked for it in addition to not standing when
summoned to do so. To this, defendant responded that he believed
that he was not obligated to do so because there was no apparent
reason. Judge Wood again had defendant removed from the courtroom
and into custody. At this point, it was 3:38 p.m. on Friday
afternoon, 30 March 2001. Judge Wood signed an order the same day,
finding defendant in contempt of court. It contained the following
facts: the bailiff asked for all to rise; then the judge asked forall to rise, and a man in the back still did not stand; the man did
not stand after further motions from the bailiff to do so; when
that man was called to the front, the judge asked him his name, to
which he replied, “Why do you need to know my name?”; he further
stated that the law did not require him to stand up.
On Monday, 3 April 2001, defendant was brought back into the
courtroom before Judge Wood. Defendant was again told that he
“refused to stand up, and then you didn't tell me your name when I
asked you.” Defendant argued federal case law and that the court
was adjourned, thus he could not have interrupted business. At
this point, while the trial court continued to find defendant in
contempt of court, the court released him for time served.
Defendant appeals.
I.
The law on summary criminal contempt is found in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 5A-14 (2001). Recently, this Court visited this area in
State v. Terry, ___ N.C. App. ___, 562 S.E.2d 537 (2002):
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14(a):
The presiding judicial official may
summarily impose measures in
response to direct criminal contempt
when necessary to restore order or
maintain the dignity and authority
of the court and when the measures
are imposed substantially
contemporaneously with the contempt.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14(a) (1999). However,
Before imposing measures under this
section, the judicial official must
give the person charged with
contempt summary notice of thecharges and a summary opportunity to
respond and must find facts
supporting the summary imposition of
measures in response to contempt.
The facts must be established beyond
a reasonable doubt.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14(b) (1999). The
Official Commentary to the statute notes that
it:
was intended not to provide for a
hearing, or anything approaching
that, in summary contempt
proceedings, but merely to assure
that the alleged contemnor
had an
opportunity to point out instances
of gross mistake about who committed
the contemptuous act or matters of
that sort.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-14 (Official Commentary
1999) (emphasis added).
Terry, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 562 S.E.2d at 540-41.
Terry, relying
on the case of
In re Owens, 128 N.C. App. 577, 496 S.E.2d 592
(1998),
aff'd, 350 N.C. 656, 517 S.E.2d 605 (1999), stated further
that this Court noted that the “requirements of [§ 5A-14] are meant
to ensure that the individual has an opportunity to present reasons
not to impose a sanction.”
Terry, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 562 S.E.2d
at 541 (quoting
Owens, 128 N.C. App. at 581, 496 S.E.2d at 594).
We hold that the trial court failed to comply with the
statutory requirements by failing to give defendant a “summary
opportunity to respond” to the charge of criminal contempt.
See
Peaches v. Payne, 139 N.C. App. 580, 533 S.E.2d 851 (2000). The
record shows that defendant was not accorded the summary hearing
before being found guilty of contempt. Although the trial court
did give defendant ample opportunity to explain himself after thefact, such does not serve to correct the previous error. We
therefore reverse the contempt order.
Though we reverse the present contempt order, we note that
defendant's actions were indeed contemptuous. Defendant asserted
at the trial court level as well as on appeal that one is not
required to rise when asked to do so by the trial court, and such
conduct is not a proper basis for contempt. We emphatically
disagree.
Criminal contempt
“is a term applied where the judgment is in
punishment of a[ ] [completed] act . . .
tending to interfere with the administration
of justice[.]” Accordingly, “[c]riminal
[contempt] proceedings are those brought to
preserve the power and to vindicate the
dignity of the court and to punish for
disobedience of its processes or orders.”
State v. Reaves, 142 N.C. App. 629, 632-33, 544 S.E.2d 253, 256
(2001) (citations omitted). North Carolina has not dealt with the
question of whether a refusal to rise while court is adjourning and
leaving the courtroom is sufficient grounds for contempt. While
federal courts have taken differing positions,
see, e.g., In re
Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972) (yes);
United States v. Snider,
502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974) (no), federal contempt powers
are more
limited than those of the state, being limited to preventing actual
obstruction of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (2000);
see also
Snider, 502 F.2d at 665 (“[s]ince [this court's ruling] is not
based upon federal constitutional grounds, it need have no effect
upon the various States in the Circuit.”). Courtroom decorum and function depends upon the respect shown
by its officers and those in attendance. Unexcused refusals to
stand creates a rift in that respect and interrupts the normal
proceedings of court. Those who refuse to stand, for whatever
reason, must yield “to the imperative need of the community in
having an established forum in which controversies between man and
man and citizen and sovereign may be decided in a calm, detached,
neutral atmosphere.”
Id. (Widener, J., dissenting). Our trial
court judges must be allowed to maintain order, respect and proper
function in their courtrooms. Failure to stand when one is capable
of doing so is indeed a contemptuous act in North Carolina.
Reversed.
Panel consisting of:
Judges WALKER, McCULLOUGH and BRYANT.
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