STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
ROBERT WARREN PRATT
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Jeffrey R. Edwards, for the State.
Leonard Law Firm, by Robert K. Leonard, for defendant
appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
On 1 May 2001, a jury found Robert Warren Pratt (“defendant”)
guilty of one count of first-degree rape, two counts of first-
degree sexual offense, two counts of first-degree kidnapping, and
one count of second-degree kidnapping. For the reasons stated
herein, we find no error in the judgments of the trial court.
At trial, the State presented evidence tending to show the
following: On the evening of 13 September 1995, Nyssa Matson
(“Matson”) and Todd Hinson (“Hinson”) encountered defendant while
walking their dogs on a trail at Duke Forest in Orange County,
North Carolina. Defendant, armed with a gun and wearing dark
glasses, a false beard and a wig, approached Hinson and Matson and
demanded money. When they replied that they had no money,defendant ordered them into the woods, stating that, “If you resist
me, I'll kill you.”
As Hinson and Matson entered the woods, defendant approached
a third individual, Charles Neuman (“Neuman”), who was also walking
his dog. Defendant demanded money from Neuman, who attempted to
give defendant his wallet. Defendant never took the proffered
wallet, but instead ordered all three off the trail and into the
forest. When they reached a level area in the woods, defendant
told the victims to lie on their stomachs and place their hands
behind their backs, whereupon he bound their hands and eyes with
duct tape. Defendant repeatedly threatened that, “If you don't do
what I tell you, I will kill you.” Defendant then approached
Matson and informed her that, “You have a choice. I can rape you
or I'll kill you. Make a decision.” After taping Matson's mouth,
defendant removed her clothing and digitally penetrated her vagina.
He also penetrated her vaginally with his penis and sodomized her
several times.
Upon completing his assault on Matson, defendant informed the
victims that, “Well, you've done what you were supposed to do, so
I guess I'll let you live[,]” and departed. The victims thereafter
freed themselves and summoned law enforcement. Defendant's palm
prints were later identified on the duct tape collected from the
scene, and DNA testing of the semen samples taken from Matson
matched DNA samples taken from defendant.
On 26 March 2001, the court held a competency hearing to
determine defendant's ability to stand trial. Dr. Robert Rollins,a forensic psychiatrist at Dorthea Dix Hospital, testified as an
expert witness for the State. Dr. Rollins opined that, although
defendant suffered from schizophrenia, he was nevertheless able to
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him and
to assist in his own defense. Defendant presented two expert
witnesses, forensic psychiatrist Dr. James Bellard, and forensic
psychologist Dr. Christopher Norris. Dr. Bellard testified that,
while defendant knew and understood the charges against him, his
paranoid delusions prevented him from effectively assisting in a
defense on his behalf. Specifically, Dr. Bellard explained that
defendant believed himself to be cursed, and that anyone attempting
to assist him would be hindered by this curse, and that therefore
it was futile to provide names of witnesses who might testify on
his behalf. Dr. Norris similarly testified that defendant suffered
from paranoia and schizophrenia, but had no conclusive opinion as
to whether defendant could assist in his own defense.
Upon hearing all of the evidence, the trial court found
defendant competent to stand trial. On 1 May 2001, the jury found
defendant guilty of all charges, whereupon the trial court
sentenced him accordingly. From these judgments, defendant
appeals.
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Defendant presents three issues on appeal, arguing that the
trial court erred in (1) finding defendant competent to stand
trial; (2) excluding evidence that defendant was mentally unsound
when he committed the crimes; and (3) denying defendant's motion todismiss or, alternately, to lower the first-degree kidnapping
charges to that of second-degree kidnapping. For the reasons
stated herein, we find no error by the trial court.
By his first assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred when it found him competent to stand trial.
Defendant asserts that the trial court's decision is unsupported by
the evidence and the law concerning competency. We disagree.
Section 15A-1001(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes
provides in pertinent part that
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced,
or punished for a crime when by reason of
mental illness or defect he is unable to
understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to comprehend his own
situation in reference to the proceedings, or
to assist in his defense in a rational or
reasonable manner.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001(a) (2001). The defendant bears the
burden of persuasion regarding his competency, and the trial
court's findings of fact, if supported by the evidence, are
conclusive on appeal. See State v. Baker, 312 N.C. 34, 43, 320
S.E.2d 670, 677 (1984). “The test for capacity to stand trial is
whether a defendant has capacity to comprehend his position, to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him, to conduct
his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his counsel
. . . .” State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 104, 273 S.E.2d 666, 669
(1981). Evidence that a defendant suffers from mental illness is
not dispositive on the issue of competency. See State v. Cooper,
286 N.C. 549, 566, 213 S.E.2d 305, 317 (1975); State v. Reid, 38N.C. App. 547, 549, 248 S.E.2d 390, 392 (1978), disc. review
denied, 296 N.C. 588, 254 S.E.2d 31 (1979).
In the instant case, all three experts testified that
defendant understood the nature of the proceedings against him,
despite his mental illness. Dr. Rollins further opined that
defendant was capable of assisting in his own defense. Dr. Bellard
testified that defendant's delusions impaired his ability to assist
in his defense, in that defendant was “reluctant” and “emotionally
[un]able” to provide his counsel with the names of potential
witnesses. Dr. Bellard conceded that defendant was otherwise
capable of providing such information, however, and that
defendant's reluctance to provide names would not prevent his
attorney from investigating potential witnesses. Moreover, the
trial judge had the opportunity to personally observe defendant and
draw independent conclusions regarding his capacity to proceed, the
determination of which was within the trial court's discretion.
See Jackson, 302 N.C. at 104, 273 S.E.2d at 669 (noting that the
trial court is not required to adopt the psychiatric report of
either the State or the defense, but may arrive at an independent
conclusion). Finally, defendant was present in court for the
hearing and for trial and did not disrupt the proceedings or
interfere with his attorney's statements in any manner.
Defendant argues that the case of State v. Reid, cited supra,
controls the instant case. We disagree. In Reid, the “State
relied totally on the testimony and psychiatric report” of its
expert witness, who stated that “he had no current opinion as tothe defendant's capacity to proceed.” Id. at 549, 248 S.E.2d at
392. This admission by the expert witness “left the State without
any evidence to contest the defendant's motion[,]” or to properly
support the trial court's determination that the defendant was
competent to stand trial. Id. at 550, 248 S.E.2d at 392.
Accordingly, this Court reversed the trial court.
In contrast to Reid, there was sufficient evidence in the
instant case to support the trial court's decision, even
disregarding the testimony of the State's expert witness.
Defendant's own expert witnesses both testified that defendant knew
of and understood the proceeding against him. Further, Dr. Bellard
opined that defendant's mental illness prevented defendant from
working effectively with counsel in that defendant “would be able
to name witnesses but would be reluctant to do so because of his
delusion that any witness would have been affected by the curse
that he believes in.” Dr. Norris had no conclusive opinion on the
subject. The trial court could properly conclude, based on this
and other evidence presented at the hearing, that defendant's mere
reluctance to provide his counsel with the names of potential
witnesses did not otherwise preclude defendant from assisting in
his own defense.
Our Supreme Court has noted that
a defendant does not have to be at the highest
stage of mental alertness to be competent to
be tried. So long as a defendant can confer
with his or her attorney so that the attorney
may interpose any available defenses for him
or her, the defendant is able to assist his or
her defense in a rational manner.
State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 689, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989).
There was evidence in the case at bar from which the court could
find that defendant was able to assist in his defense in a rational
manner, and we perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial court
in concluding that defendant was competent to stand trial. We
therefore overrule this assignment of error.
By his second assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred by excluding from evidence a statement given by
Matson to law enforcement officers. Specifically, Matson told
officers that, “[w]hen [defendant] began walking toward them, she
immediately thought that his body language was abnormal. It
reminded her of a schizophrenic type of personality and it made her
uneasy.” While Matson was on the stand, the State objected to such
evidence, arguing that Matson's assessment of defendant's mental
condition was not within the purview of lay opinion and was thus
inadmissible. After argument from both sides, the trial court
sustained the State's objections. Defendant now argues that
Matson's statement was relevant evidence tending to show that
defendant was legally insane when he committed the acts for which
he was tried, and that the exclusion of her statement constitutes
reversible error. Defendant's argument is wholly without merit.
Although the trial court initially excluded Matson's statement
from evidence, the trial transcript reveals that defense counsel
later elicited the identical statement made by Matson during direct
examination of another witness. Because the evidence which
defendant asserts was relevant and improperly excluded was, infact, before the jury, defendant can show no prejudice arising from
this alleged error. We therefore overrule defendant's second
assignment of error.
In his third assignment of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the charge of first-
degree kidnapping as to the third victim, Neuman. Defendant
contends that there was no evidence that Neuman did not consent to
being restrained or moved. Alternatively, defendant argues that
the trial court erred by declining to reduce the charge to second-
degree kidnapping, because Hinson and Neuman were released in a
safe place. We disagree.
When considering a motion to dismiss, the trial court
determines whether there is substantial evidence of each essential
element of the offense charged and whether the defendant is the
perpetrator of the offense. See State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62,
65-66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651 (1982). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265
S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980). The trial court must consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State, granting the State the
benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom. See
State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 450, 439 S.E.2d 578, 585 (1994).
Where the State presents such substantial evidence of every
element, the motion to dismiss is properly denied. See State v.
Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988). Under section 14-39 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
any person who, unlawfully and without consent, confines,
restrains, or removes from one place to another any other person is
guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is
for one of several purposes outlined in the statute, including
“[f]acilitating the commission of any felony” and “terrorizing the
person so confined[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a)(2),(3) (2001).
To prove the crime of kidnapping, the State must show an unlawful,
nonconsensual restraint, confinement or removal from one place to
another for the purpose of committing or facilitating the
commission of one of the statutorily enumerated acts. See State v.
Thompson, 306 N.C. 526, 532, 294 S.E.2d 314, 318 (1982). There are
two degrees of kidnapping in North Carolina:
If the person kidnapped either was not
released by the defendant in a safe place or
had been seriously injured or sexually
assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the
first degree and is punishable as a Class C
felony. If the person kidnapped was released
in a safe place by the defendant and had not
been seriously injured or sexually assaulted,
the offense is kidnapping in the second degree
and is punishable as a Class E felony.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(b). It should be noted that section 14-
39(b) “implies a conscious, willful action on the part of the
defendant to assure that his victim is released in a place of
safety.” State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 262, 307 S.E.2d 339, 351
(1983).
Ample evidence before the trial court indicated that Neuman
and Hinson were confined and restrained against their will.
Defendant ordered both men into the woods at gunpoint, where hebound their hands and wrapped their faces with duct tape.
Defendant repeatedly threatened to kill the men if they did not
comply with his demands. We conclude that there was sufficient
evidence that Neuman and Hinson were unlawfully confined,
restrained and removed from one place to another without consent.
See State v. Owen, 24 N.C. App 598, 603, 211 S.E.2d 830, 834
(stating that “the removal of the victim only a few feet could be
sufficient to constitute kidnapping”), cert. denied, 287 N.C. 263,
214 S.E.2d 435 (1975).
Furthermore, there was evidence before the trial court to
indicate that defendant did not leave the victims in a safe place.
On the contrary, defendant left the victims bound and gagged in the
woods at nighttime. We therefore hold that the trial court did not
err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss or to reduce the
charge of first-degree kidnapping. Defendant's third assignment of
error is overruled.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the trial court did
not err in finding defendant competent to stand trial and in
denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of first-degree
kidnapping.
No error.
Judges GREENE and HUNTER concur.
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