In re: KIEAFA LOCKLEAR
J. Hal Kinlaw, Jr. for petitioner-appellee.
Tiffany Peguise-Powers for respondent-appellant.
THOMAS, Judge.
Gwendolyn Sue Locklear Smith, respondent, appeals the
termination of her parental rights to her son, Kieafa Ladarian
Armandi Locklear.
Smith argues four assignments of error: (1) the trial court
committed reversible error in finding as a fact that grounds
existed to terminate her parental rights; (2) the trial court
committed reversible error in finding as a fact that it was in
Kieafa's best interests that Smith's parental rights be terminated;
(3) the trial court committed reversible error in concluding as a
matter of law that grounds existed to terminate Smith's parental
rights; and (4) the trial court committed reversible error in
ordering that Smith's parental rights be terminated. We addressassignments of error (1) and (3). For the reasons discussed
herein, we reverse and remand and do not reach assignments of error
(2) and (4).
Kieafa was born 19 March 1995, but the Robeson County
Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved with Smith as
early as 1990 concerning her other children. DSS received several
reports of Smith failing to take proper care of her children and
using crack cocaine since Kieafa's birth. Further, Smith has
previously lost custody of three of her children. One of those
three, Jareka, is still in the custody of DSS and Smith's
visitation with her had to be stopped because of domestic violence.
In 1996, Kieafa was adjudicated neglected. Smith had left
Kieafa, who suffers from severe asthma, with Frank Williams,
stating that she was going to buy Kieafa some shoes. Instead,
Smith went to stay with Mark McNeill, did not return for several
days, and did not contact Williams. He became concerned that Smith
may have become a victim of a drug dealer, who was supposedly
looking for her and had threatened her with bodily harm. He
eventually took Kieafa to the Robeson County Sheriff's Department.
DSS was notified and filed a petition alleging neglect. On 1
July 1996, the trial court adjudicated Kieafa neglected and placed
him in the custody of DSS. He was later returned to her care.
However, DSS filed another neglect petition in June 1997because Smith again left Kieafa with a neighbor, said she would
return in “a few hours,” but did not. The first neighbor had
another neighbor watch Kieafa that night. On the following day,
Smith still did not return. Five days after initially leaving
Kieafa with a neighbor, Smith's whereabouts remained unknown. DSS
eventually obtained custody.
At the adjudicatory hearing, Smith explained that she had
traveled to Newton Grove with her boyfriend and he had left her
there. She claimed to have spent the five days attempting to
return home.
The trial court adjudicated Kieafa neglected and again placed
him in the custody of DSS.
On 19 March 1999, DSS filed a petition to terminate the
parental rights of Smith. We note that when the petition was
filed, Chapter 7A of the North Carolina General Statutes governed
termination of parental rights and is therefore the controlling
authority in the instant case. By the time the case was heard,
however, Chapter 7B had been enacted.
There is a two-step process in a termination of parental
rights proceeding. In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246
(1984). In the adjudicatory stage, there must be established that
at least one ground for the termination of parental rights listed
in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.32 (now codified as section 7B-1111)exists in order to proceed to disposition. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-289.30 (1998) (now codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109). In
this stage, the court's decision must be supported by clear, cogent
and convincing evidence with the burden of proof on the petitioner.
In re Swisher, 74 N.C. App. 239, 240, 328 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1985). We
note that Chapters 7A and 7B interchangeably use the “clear, cogent
and convincing” and the “clear and convincing” standards. It has
long been held that these two standards are synonymous.
Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 109, 316 S.E.2d at 252.
Once one or more of the grounds for termination are
established, the trial court must proceed to the dispositional
stage where the best interests of the child are considered. There,
the court shall issue an order terminating the parental rights
unless it further determines that the best interests of the child
require otherwise. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.31(a) (1998) (now
codified as section 7B-1110(a)). See also In re Blackburn, 142
N.C. App. 607, 543 S.E.2d 906 (2001).
In terminating the parental rights of Smith, the trial court
found:
That the [sic] prior to filing the petition the juvenile's
mother has not [sic]:
(a) failed to cooperate with the
Department of Social Services for the return
of the juvenile; (b) has willfully left the juvenile in
custody of the Department in foster care for
at least twelve months;
(c) has paid no child support towards
the care of the juvenile;
(d) has not visited the juvenile on a
regular basis.
Beyond these findings, most of the trial court's findings concern
the efforts made by DSS to reunify the family.
The North Carolina General Statutes provide that, in the
adjudicatory stage, “[t]he court shall take evidence, find the
facts, and shall adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of
the circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B-1111 which authorize the
termination of parental rights of the respondent.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1109(e) (2001). However, in the instant case, the trial court
failed to: (1) find that Smith had the ability to pay support; (2)
find that Smith had not addressed the concerns which led to
Kieafa's removal; and (3) specifically list the conditions that
Smith had not met. Further, the trial court attempts to
incorporate by reference another order dated 15 March 1995 into its
findings. See In re Brownlee, 301 N.C. 532, 272 S.E.2d 861 (1981).
But that order was not included as a part of the record.
Additionally, the findings were stated in the double negative. The
findings are actually problematic not only because some of them
were in the double negative, but also because the few others were
not adequately specific. Our review on appeal is limited to determining whether the
trial court's findings are based on clear, cogent and convincing
competent evidence. In re Allen, 58 N.C. App. 322, 293 S.E.2d 607
(1982). If they are, then the findings are binding on appeal. Id.
Here, the trial court's findings are clearly insufficient to
establish grounds for termination.
Due to a lack of adequate findings, we reverse the trial
court's order terminating Smith's parental rights and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial court shall
determine whether it is appropriate to allow additional evidence
prior to making findings and conclusions.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges MARTIN and TYSON concur.
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