William M. Willis, IV, for respondent-appellant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Diane Martin Pomper, for the State.
WYNN, Judge.
This appeal presents an issue of first impression: Did the
trial court err by requiring as a special condition of probation
that a juvenile offender publicly wear a 12" x 12" sign with the
words “I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL”? We answer, yes, and therefore,
reverse the order of the district court.
On 1 October 2000, Appellant, a 14-year old female juvenile,
and three other juveniles broke into a middle school and caused
approximately $60,000 of damage to school property. As a result of
the offense, Appellant was expelled from the ninth grade for the
remainder of the school year.
On 18 January 2001, Appellant, who had no prior history of
delinquency, admitted allegations supporting the offenses of Felony
Breaking and Entering and Felony Possession of Burglary Tools. On
19 February 2001, the district court entered its Disposition Order,
Supplemental Order, and Conditions of Probation. As conditions ofAppellant's twelve-month probation, the court ordered her (1) to
pay $250 in restitution; (2) to complete 50 hours of community
service; (3) to follow the curfew established by the Court
Counselor; (4) not to associate with codefendants; (5) not to go on
the property of the damaged school; (6) not to use firearms,
controlled substances, or alcohol; and (7) to submit to random drug
testing.
As a special condition of probation, the court ordered
Appellant “to wear a sign around her neck, 12" x 12" with the words
- I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL - written in large letters.” Moreover,
the court provided that: “The Juvenile is to wear this sign
whenever out in public, whenever she is away from her own
residence.” The court further ordered Appellant to wear the sign
“until the school year term would have ended if the juvenile would
have been attending school.” This condition of probation is the
sole issue on appeal.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510 states the law governing the
imposition and conditions of juvenile probation in North Carolina.
The section provides that “[t]he court may impose conditions of
probation that are related to the needs of the juvenile and that
are reasonably necessary to ensure that the juvenile will lead a
law-abiding life . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(a) (2001).
Although the section lists thirteen specific conditions of
probation that may be applied, the trial court can require “the
juvenile [to] satisfy any other conditions determined appropriate
by the court.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(a)(14). “In deciding theconditions of probation, the trial judge is free to fashion
alternatives which are in harmony with the individual child's
needs.” In re McDonald, 133 N.C. App. 433, 434, 515 S.E.2d 719,
721 (1999) (upholding a special condition of probation restricting
a juvenile's access to television for a one year period).
Appellant contends the discretion of the trial court to
fashion alternative conditions of probation is limited by specific
statutory language protecting the confidentiality of juvenile
offenders. To illustrate this first contention, Appellant points
to two sections in the Juvenile Code. First, Appellant points to
N.C. Gen. Stat § 7B-3100 which provides that: “Disclosure of
information concerning any juvenile under investigation or alleged
to be within the jurisdiction of the court that would reveal the
identity of that juvenile is prohibited . . . .” Second, Appellant
points to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2102(d) which provides that
fingerprints and photographs taken pursuant to the Juvenile Code
are not public records, and are not subject to public examination
or inspection. Furthermore, Appellant notes that the Juvenile Code
and the Criminal Law prohibit state agencies and law enforcement
from releasing the names of juveniles who are registered sex
offenders. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.29 (2001) (providing that:
“Under no circumstances shall the registration of a juvenile
adjudicated delinquent be included in the county or statewide
registries, or be made available to the public via internet”).
Accordingly, Appellant argues that “if it is unlawful to
disseminate a photograph of a juvenile to the public, logically itis not proper to require a juvenile to conduct her public business
in open while wearing a sign that brands her as a 'juvenile
criminal.'”
As a second contention, Appellant argues that the special
condition of probation violates the “focus of the juvenile justice
system” which “is not on punishing the juvenile offender but on
achieving an individualized disposition that meets the juvenile's
needs and promotes [her] best interests.” In re Groves, 93 N.C.
App. 34, 36, 376 S.E.2d 481, 482-83 (1989) (emphasis in original).
In support of this contention, Appellant points to a North Carolina
Supreme Court decision noting that the “[d]isposition of a juvenile
. . . involves a philosophy far different from adult sentencing.”
In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 666, 260 S.E.2d 591, 607 (1979)
(holding that “a delinquent child is not a 'criminal.' The
inference is that a juvenile's disposition is not intended to be a
punishment but rather an attempt” at rehabilitation.); see also, In
re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529-30, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886-87 (1969).
Thus, Appellant contends that requiring a juvenile to wear a sign
stating “I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL” undermines the policy that a
juvenile is not a criminal and unnecessarily subjects the juvenile
to pubic humiliation and embarrassment.
In response to Appellant's first argument, the State concedes
that many statutes restrict the dissemination of information about
juvenile cases. The State contends, however, that various statutes
permit disclosure of juvenile records “by order of the court.” See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-3001(b). The State argues that this statutorypower, in conjunction with the court's authority under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-2506(16) to “require the juvenile to comply with any
other reasonable conditions . . . that are designed to facilitate
supervision,” provides a legal basis for the trial court's special
condition of probation. Specifically, the State argues that
because the juvenile was expelled from school, and because the
juvenile's family dynamics did not ensure sufficient supervision,
the trial court's order was reasonable in order to facilitate
community supervision over the juvenile by alerting community
members that the juvenile was in need of supervision.
In response to Appellant's second argument, the State contends
that the sign does not undermine the policy of treating juveniles
as delinquent because the sign is not a criminal punishment.
Although the sign identifies the juvenile as a “criminal,” the
State contends that the sign is intended to emphasize the
accountability and responsibility of the juvenile, and not the
juvenile's criminal acts. Furthermore, the State argues that the
sign does not cause unnecessary embarrassment, because the juvenile
is not required to wear the sign: The juvenile is free to remain
at home at all times.
We find the State's arguments unpersuasive. The State's first
contention, that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-3001(b) gives the trial court
the discretion to open juvenile records to public display, is based
on a misinterpretation of the relevant statute. Section 7B-3001(b)
provides that “all law enforcement records and files concerning a
juvenile . . . shall be withheld from public inspection.” (emphasisadded). Section 7B-3001(b) provides five exceptions to this
general principle; namely, the juvenile, the juvenile's parents,
the prosecutor, the juvenile court counselor, and law enforcement
officers may examine juvenile records without a court order.
“Otherwise, the records and files may be examined or copied only by
order of the court.” Id.
Indeed, the State's reliance on this section to support the
proposition that a court can order a juvenile to publicly disclose
her status as a juvenile delinquent is misplaced. At most, this
section provides a mechanism for individuals to obtain juvenile
records upon a showing of need. This section does not grant the
court authority to place juvenile records in a public display case
on the courthouse steps. This is precisely the situation we face
today. The court's order, requiring the juvenile to wear a sign
stating “I AM A JUVENILE CRIMINAL,” opens the juvenile's records to
public display rather than permitting individual inspection of
juvenile records authorized “by order of the court” under Section
7B-3001(b). The special condition of probation in the present
case, transforms the privilege of an individual to obtain access to
juvenile records, upon a showing of need, into a punishment against
the juvenile. This is impermissible.
The State's second contention, that the sign is a reasonable
means of facilitating community supervision, violates the Juvenile
Code. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(b)(5), the court may
authorize the court counselor to order the juvenile to comply with
conditions of “intense supervision.” The court, however, “shallnot” give the chief counselor the authority to order “intense
supervision” unless the juvenile is subject to a class 2
disposition. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(b)(5). Here, the
Appellant has no prior record and, therefore, the Appellant is a
class 1 disposition under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-2507, 2508.
Accordingly, Appellant is not subject to the condition of
“intensive supervision,” and the State's justification for the sign
is without merit.
Finally, the State argues that Appellant is not required to
wear the sign, because Appellant can choose to stay home. While
this argument would solve the State's problems associated with
“intensive supervision” and confidentiality in the State's first
two arguments, it too is unpersuasive. Essentially, the State is
arguing that Appellant has a choice between public ridicule and de
facto house arrest. As noted previously, the first choice violates
the Juvenile Code and public policy. The alternative choice, house
arrest, is a remedy only available against class 2 juvenile
dispositions. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-2506(18), 2508(d). Here,
Appellant is a class 1 disposition. Accordingly, the State's
attempt to place the juvenile under a de facto house arrest is
without statutory authority.
In sum, we reverse the trial court's special condition of
probation requiring the Appellant to wear a sign reading “I AM A
JUVENILE CRIMINAL.” We, therefore, remand this matter to the
district court for modification of the Conditions of Probation.
Reversed and Remanded. Judges HUDSON and CAMPBELL concur.
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