STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
HAROLD WESLEY JONES,
Defendant
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Robert J. Blum, for the State.
David J. P. Barber for defendant-appellant.
EAGLES, Chief Judge.
Defendant Harold Wesley Jones was indicted and tried on
charges of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, first-
degree forcible rape, first-degree statutory rape, first-degree
statutory sexual offense and two counts of first-degree forcible
sexual offense for his role in the kidnapping, rape and murder of
ten-year-old T.L. Defendant was convicted on all counts except
first-degree statutory rape, for which the jury returned a verdict
of not guilty.
The evidence tended to establish the following. At the time
of the offense defendant was sixteen years old and had been living
with his twenty-three-year-old sister Al-Nesia Jones and his
thirteen-year-old nephew J. J. Defendant moved in with his sister
following the death of his mother in 1997, leaving his father, whocontinued living in New Jersey. Until 29 September 1998, defendant
lived in a rental house located at 614 Lakeside Avenue in
Burlington, approximately one block away from the victim's home.
However, on 16 October 1998, defendant was living on Morningside
Drive in Burlington. Defendant's seventeen-year-old girlfriend, D.
B., frequently visited defendant and occasionally lived with him
and the other members of his family. Consequently, the defendant,
D. B., and J. J. all knew the ten-year-old, female victim, T. L.
After school on 16 October 1998, defendant, D. B. and J. J.
went to Elmira Park near Lakeside Avenue in Burlington. Defendant
and D. B. watched from the Elmira Recreation Center while J. J.
played football with some of his friends. At some point in the
afternoon, the victim walked by the park and recreation center on
her way home from a local convenience store. Defendant and D. B.
followed the victim away from the park on foot, in the direction of
Lakeside Avenue. J. J. left the park a short time later, also in
the direction of Lakeside Avenue. J. J. caught up with the victim
sometime thereafter and accompanied her to the house located at 614
Lakeside Avenue, which had been vacant and under repair since
defendant and his family moved out.
Once the defendant, the victim, J. J. and D. B. were all
inside the house, J. J. began strangling the victim with a piece of
coaxial television cable that he found in the house. D. B.
directed defendant and J. J. to pull down the victim's pants.
After J. J. did so, J. J. pushed the victim to the ground. D. B.
then held the victim down while J. J. engaged in vaginalintercourse and defendant engaged in anal intercourse with the
victim. Once this was over, D. B. and J. J. attempted to clean up
the victim. When their efforts proved to be unsuccessful,
defendant watched as J. J. and D. B. beat the victim about the head
with a wooden bed rail that was found in the house. However, the
victim did not die, so J. J. again wrapped the coaxial wire around
the victim's neck and strangled her. Defendant then held the door
while J. J. and D. B. dragged the victim's body out of the house by
the coaxial cable wrapped around her neck. The victim was covered
with a large piece of cloth and left between the fence and an oil
drum in the back yard. She later died as a result of blunt force
trauma to the head. In the days following discovery of the
victim's body, the defendant, as well as J. J. and D. B. were all
identified by police as suspects in the victim's death.
On 17 October 1998, two non-uniformed investigators with the
Burlington Police Department went to defendant's home to see if he
would agree to be interviewed. Al-Nesia Jones, D. B. and J. J.
were also there. All three suspects were asked, in Al-Nesia's
presence, if they would come to the police department to talk about
T. L.'s death. Each was told they were not under arrest, did not
have to go to the police department and were under no obligation to
give any statements. Each agreed to talk with the officers and
thereafter were driven by police to the Burlington Police
Department. Defendant was directed into an interview room where he
was interviewed separately from D. B. and J. J. by the two
investigators who had driven them to the station. Before theinterview began, the defendant was again told that he was not under
arrest, was free to leave at any time and was under no obligation
to speak. Defendant said he understood and agreed to talk to the
officers. During the interview, defendant told police that he had
not been back to 614 Lakeside Avenue since he moved approximately
three weeks earlier. Defendant initially denied knowing the victim,
however, he later admitted that he had met her once while living on
Morningside Avenue. Defendant denied any involvement in the
victim's death. The interview lasted approximately thirty to
thirty-five minutes and defendant was taken home by police at the
conclusion of the interview.
On 21 October 1998, police again sought to interview the
defendant concerning T. L.'s death. This time, two different non-
uniformed investigators went to defendant's school to see if he
would come to the police department for another interview. Before
going to the school, the investigators contacted the school
resource officer assigned to defendant's school. This officer went
to defendant's class and escorted defendant to the principal's
office where he met with the investigators.
The investigators introduced themselves to defendant as
members of the Burlington Police Department investigating the death
of T. L. They told defendant that they wanted to interview him
again and asked if he would be willing to come to the police
department. The investigators told defendant that he was not under
arrest and did not have to speak or go with them if he did not want
to. Defendant was further told that if he came to the policedepartment, he could leave at any time and the officers would see
that he was driven home. Defendant said he understood and agreed
to speak with the officers. Defendant rode in the front passenger
seat of the investigators' car. Defendant was neither searched
before he got in the car nor restrained once inside. The
conversation on the way consisted mainly of general discussion
about school and how long defendant had lived in Burlington.
Defendant was not questioned about T. L.'s death on the way to the
police department.
After arriving at the Burlington Police Department, the
investigators escorted defendant to Lieutenant Jackie Sheffield's
office. The office was of average size, carpeted, wall-papered and
had four windows to the outside. The office was furnished
comfortably with pictures and plants, as well as three extra office
chairs arranged around a living-room type end table. Defendant
went in and sat in one of the three chairs. The investigators
followed, closing the door behind them and sitting in the remaining
two chairs near the end table.
Once the investigators sat down, they produced a written
Miranda waiver form and went over it with defendant, each line
being read aloud by one of the investigators. Defendant also
followed along on the page as the words were read to him. Reading
the form verbatim, the investigators reintroduced themselves to
defendant, told him the purpose for the interview, and gave
defendant each of his Miranda warnings. In addition, defendant was
also told that he had the right to have a parent or guardianpresent with him during questioning and that if he chose to answer
questions without a guardian, he had the right to stop anytime he
decided he wanted one present. Following the reading of each
individual right, the investigators paused and asked defendant if
he understood or had any questions. Defendant indicated each time
that he understood, both verbally and by initialing or writing
“yes” on the page next to the clause that had just been read to
him. The investigators then read the waiver portion of the
document aloud to defendant and again asked defendant if he
understood and wanted to answer their questions. Defendant said he
did and so indicated by signing the waiver. Defendant was then
asked if he needed anything to drink or a break to use the
bathroom. After indicating that he did not, defendant was told
that he could stop the interview anytime he needed to take a break.
Defendant said he understood and the interview began.
Defendant's initial interview lasted approximately two hours.
During most of this period, defendant denied any involvement in T.
L.'s death. At the end of this period, however, defendant admitted
that he was at 614 Lakeside Avenue the day T. L. was killed.
Following this admission, the investigators took a break and again
asked defendant if he needed to go to the bathroom or wanted
anything to drink. Defendant declined. The investigators then left
defendant alone in the office while they stepped out into the
hallway. While the first two investigators were out of the room, a
third plain-clothes investigator went into the office alone and
asked defendant if he knew what happened to T. L. This timedefendant said he did and gave an oral statement detailing his
involvement in the victim's death. The first two investigators then
came back into the office and memorialized defendant's statement in
writing. Defendant made corrections on the written statement which
he initialed and signed each page of the statement.
Defendant moved to suppress his statements, contending they
were made involuntarily because he lacked the mental capacity to
knowingly and understandingly waive his Constitutional rights. An
evidentiary hearing was conducted on defendant's motion from 18
September 2000 to 21 September 2000. Defendant's evidence included
testimony from Dr. John Warren, an expert in the field of clinical
psychology with specialization in forensic and medical psychology.
Dr. Warren testified that defendant suffered from fetal alcohol
syndrome and was mentally retarded, with full scale I.Q. scores
that ranged somewhere between 56 and 65. According to Dr. Warren,
I.Q. scores between 100 and 90 were average; scores between 90 and
80 were low average; scores between 80 and 70 were borderline; and
below 70 was the mentally retarded range.
Dr. George Baroff, an expert in clinical psychology with
specialization in mental retardation, also testified for defendant.
Dr. Baroff testified on cross-examination that the scores reflected
in Dr. Warren's report did not coincide with the scores that
appeared on the test administered to defendant. Dr. Baroff further
testified that the results on the test indicated that defendant's
full scale I.Q. score was 69, with scores of 72 on both the verbaland performance sub-tests. This placed defendant only one point
below the threshold for mild mental retardation.
To further rebut defendant's assertion that he could not
competently understand and waive his rights, the State presented
the testimony of Art Dunn, a special education teacher at Western
Youth Institute. Dunn testified that defendant performed
satisfactorily on the reading comprehension assignments given to
him while he was at Western Youth Institute. The State also
presented testimony concerning two instances where defendant was
previously questioned by police in matters unrelated to T. L.'s
death. Finally, Deputies Hester Rastle and Jeffrey Svedek testified
that while transporting prisoners including the defendant, they
overheard defendant assure three other prisoners that jail
officials “can't prove anything,” during a conversation concerning
charges pending against defendant and the other prisoners.
The trial court entered an order concluding there was no
custodial interrogation and that the statements made by defendant
on 21 October 1998 were given freely, voluntarily and knowingly.
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress. At trial
defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping, first-degree forcible rape, first-degree statutory
sexual offense and two counts of first-degree forcible sexual
offense. Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the statements he made to police. Specifically,
defendant contends that his confession was the product of custodialinterrogation and therefore inadmissible because given his age and
mental capacity, he was incapable of voluntarily and intelligently
waiving his Constitutional rights. After a careful review of the
record and trial transcript, we disagree.
We begin by noting that “the standard of review in evaluating
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is that the trial
court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by
competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.” State v.
Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). “However,
the determination of whether a defendant was in custody, based on
those findings of fact, is a question of law that is fully
reviewable by this Court.” State v. Patterson, 146 N.C. App. 113,
120, 552 S.E.2d 246, 253 (2001), disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 578,
559 S.E.2d 548 (2001). “[T]he trial court's conclusions . . . must
be legally correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable
legal principles to the facts found.” State v. Golphin, 352 N.C.
364, 409, 533 S.E.2d 168, 201 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931,
149 L. Ed. 2d 305 (2001).
Here, the trial court concluded that defendant was not in
custody on 21 October 1998, based on the criteria set forth in
State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 459 S.E.2d 747 (1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996), and State v.
Sanders, 122 N.C. App. 691, 471 S.E.2d 641 (1996). Since these
decisions reiterate the appropriate test for determining whether a
person is “in custody,” we conclude that the trial court applied
the correct legal standard. “[C]ustodial interrogation . . . mean[s] questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966). See also, State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332,
337, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). “[I]n determining whether a
suspect is in custody, an appellate court must examine all the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive
inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827. This involves “'an
objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of
the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had
been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.'”
State v. Sanders, 122 N.C. App. 691, 693, 471 S.E.2d 641, 642
(1996)(quoting State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730,
737 (1992)).
In Sanders, the defendant agreed to accompany detectives to
the police station for an interview. The interview lasted
approximately two hours and was conducted in an interview room by
two detectives who were joined for a brief time by a third officer.
Upon request, defendant was allowed to go to the bathroom and take
a break and was never threatened or promised that he would not be
prosecuted or obtain a lesser sentence by cooperating with police.
Sanders, 122 N.C. App. at 694, 471 S.E.2d at 643. This Court held
“that a reasonable person in defendant's position would not havebelieved himself to be “in custody” for Miranda purposes.” Id.
(emphasis supplied).
Here, defendant attempts to distinguish Sanders on grounds
that a sixteen-year-old, mentally retarded boy would have believed
himself to be in custody the moment he was removed from his class
and brought to the principal's office by a school officer.
The test for determining whether the interrogation was
custodial is 'whether a reasonable person in the
suspect's position would believe that he had been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way,' or whether the suspect
felt free to leave. This is an objective test, based upon
a reasonable person standard, and is 'to be applied on a
case-by-case basis considering all the facts and
circumstances.'
State v. Hall, 131 N.C. App. 427, 432, 508 S.E.2d 8, 12 (1998),
aff'd, 350 N.C. 303, 513 S.E.2d 561 (1999)(citation omitted). See
also State v. Medlin, 333 N.C. 280, 291, 426 S.E.2d 402, 407
(1993). The subjective belief of the defendant as to his freedom
to leave is not in and of itself determinative. Hall, 131 N.C. App.
at 432, 508 S.E.2d at 12. Instead, “we must examine the record as
a whole and, applying the reasonable person standard set out above,
determine as a matter of law whether [the] defendant was in
custody.” Id. Therefore, “the only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324, 128 L. Ed.
2d 293, 299 (1994).
Here, the trial court made detailed findings of fact with
regard to the interview which took place on 21 October 1998. The
trial court found that two plain-clothes Burlington police officerswent to defendant's school and asked defendant if he would
accompany them to the police department for an interview. Prior to
this, the officers contacted another officer assigned to
defendant's school and had defendant brought to the principal's
office to meet them. The officers told defendant he was not under
arrest and did not have to speak with them. Defendant was further
told that if he did go with the officers, he could leave at any
time and the officers would take him home if he needed them to.
Defendant voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police
department, where he was interviewed in a comfortably furnished
office by two, unarmed, plain-clothes officers. Defendant was
offered the use of the bathroom as well as given the opportunity
for a break whenever he desired, both of which he declined.
Defendant was fully advised of his rights, which he acknowledged
and waived in writing. Defendant was not shackled or handcuffed; no
threats or promises were made; and no pressure was exerted upon
defendant during the course of the interview. Defendant had three
prior police contacts in 1998, one of which involved a similar
interview by police on 17 October 1998.
Evidence elicited during the suppression hearing is also
relevant to this inquiry. First, the interview of 17 October 1998
took place in an interview room, not an office. Defendant
understood then that he was free to leave at any time and made no
incriminating statements. Following the interview, defendant was
allowed to leave the police station, just as he had been promised.
Next, defendant demonstrated a marked level of familiarity with thecriminal justice system, particularly principles of proof. Finally,
defendant was left unattended in Lt. Sheffield's office while the
interviewing officers took a break.
On the record before us, the trial court's findings are
sufficient to support the conclusion that a reasonable person in
defendant's position would not have believed himself to be in
custody. Furthermore, these findings are amply supported by the
evidentiary record. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was not
in custody when he gave the statements in question.
Defendant next argues that he was incapable of effectively
waiving his constitutional rights due to his age and sub-normal
mental capacity. As a result, defendant contends his confession was
inadmissible because it was not given voluntarily. Because we find
that defendant was not in custody at the time he confessed, it is
unnecessary for us to determine whether defendant properly waived
his constitutional rights under Miranda. Even assuming arguendo
that defendant was in custody, we conclude he effectively waived
his rights.
In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by the decisions of
our own Supreme Court:
We have consistently held that a defendant's
subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered
when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver
of rights has been made. Such lack of intelligence does
not, however, standing alone, render an in-custody
statement incompetent if it is in all other respects
voluntarily and understandingly made.
Although age is also to be considered by the trial
judge in ruling upon the admissibility of a defendant's
confession, the fact that the defendant is youthful willnot preclude the admission of his inculpatory statement
absent mistreatment or coercion by the police officers.
State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8, 305 S.E.2d 685, 690
(1983)(citation omitted). Accord, State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578,
268 S.E.2d 458 (1980)(mildly retarded defendant with I.Q. of 60
capable of waiving rights under Miranda); State v. Thompson, 287
N.C. 303, 214 S.E.2d 742 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S.
908, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1213 (1976)(nineteen-year-old defendant with an
I.Q. of 55 capable of waiving rights).
The test for voluntariness in North Carolina requires our
review of the totality of the circumstances to determine if the
confession is “'the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker.'” State v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207,
222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994)(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 225, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 862 (1973)).
Factors to be considered in this inquiry are whether
defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived,
whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was
held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation,
whether there were physical threats or shows of violence,
whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the
familiarity of the declarant with the criminal justice
system, and the mental condition of the declarant.
Id. See also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862.
Applying these principles to the facts here, we conclude that
the defendant's confession was voluntarily given. Defendant argues
that the nature of the interrogation and the psychiatric testimony
concerning his mental capabilities compel us to conclude that his
confession was not voluntarily given. We disagree. Here, the initial interview lasted approximately two hours.
After a short break in the interview, the first two investigators
left the room and a third investigator resumed the interview alone.
We agree with the trial court that State v. Sanders, 122 N.C. App.
691, 471 S.E.2d 641 (1996), is instructive and weighs against a
finding that the circumstances here were sufficient to render
defendant's “will . . . overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
225-26, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 862.
Furthermore, the trial court was confronted with conflicting
evidence concerning defendant's true mental capacity. One of
defendant's own experts testified on cross-examination that
defendant's actual full scale I.Q. score placed him only one point
below the threshold for mental retardation. Moreover, defendant's
verbal and performance test scores placed him two points above that
threshold. “When the voir dire evidence is conflicting . . . the
trial judge must weigh the credibility of the witnesses, resolve
the crucial conflicts and make appropriate findings of fact. When
supported by competent evidence, his findings are conclusive on
appeal.” State v. Jenkins, 300 N.C. 578, 584, 268 S.E.2d 458, 463
(1980). On this record, there is ample evidence to support the
trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law that
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.
Likewise, we find no evidence in the record before us that
indicates defendant was in any way mistreated or coerced by the
police. State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 305 S.E.2d 685 (1983), isinstructive. In Fincher, the defendant argued that his consent to
the search of his apartment was ineffective because it was not
voluntarily and intelligently given. Our Supreme Court explained
that the legal principles involved in determining the voluntariness
of an inculpatory statement made by a mentally deficient defendant
“are equally apposite to situations where the voluntariness of a
consent to search is at issue.” Id. 309 N.C. at 8, 305 S.E.2d at
690.
In Fincher, a seventeen-year-old defendant was arrested and
handcuffed, read his Miranda warnings, and immediately taken from
his apartment to a patrol car. The arresting officer presented
defendant with a written consent to search form for his apartment
and defendant agreed to sign the form in the presence of at least
ten city police officers. During voir dire, defendant introduced
psychiatric testimony that he was mentally retarded, suffered from
a schizophreniform disorder and had an I.Q. of 50 although his
verbal I.Q. was estimated to be 65. The Fincher Court concluded
that defendant was capable of “giving a valid consent to search as
a matter of law,” id. 309 N.C. at 8, 305 S.E.2d at 690-91, and held
that these facts supported the conclusion that defendant
“voluntarily, willingly and understandingly consented to the search
. . . .” Id. 309 N.C. at 9, 305 S.E.2d at 691.
In light of Fincher, nothing on the record before us indicates
that defendant waived his rights as a result of mistreatment or
coercion at the hands of the police. Accordingly, we hold that
defendant was capable of effectively waiving his constitutionalrights and did so. Therefore, the trial court properly denied
defendant's motion to suppress and the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges MARTIN and HUNTER concur.
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