IN THE MATTERS OF: TASHA JOHNSTON, JESSICA JOHNSTON, and PAUL
ALEXANDER
Leslie C. Rawls for respondent-appellant.
Alan B. Edmonds for petitioner-appellee.
THOMAS, Judge.
Respondent, Jacqueline Johnston, appeals an order terminating
her parental rights to her children, Tasha Johnston, Jessica
Johnston, and Paul Alexander. She sets forth three assignments of
error. For the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
Tasha was born on 28 February 1987, Jessica on 15 April 1989,
and Paul on 4 January 1995.
The Departments of Social Services of Mecklenburg, Iredell,
and Gaston counties have at various times been involved with
Johnston's family since 1992. Neglect of Tasha, Jessica, and
another child, Q DJ Johnston, who is not a part of this appeal, was
first substantiated in 1992 due to unsanitary living conditions in
the home and Johnston's history of mental illness and drug use. Tasha and Jessica were temporarily placed with their aunt in
Arizona and Q DJ was placed in the legal custody of the Youth and
Family Services (YFS) in Mecklenburg County.
In 1995, after Paul was born, neglect was again substantiated
due to “filthy living conditions in the family home.” In 1997,
Tasha, who was then ten years old, had been left in charge of her
siblings. A complaint was made to YFS based on inappropriate
supervision. The children remained in the home and their behavior
deteriorated even while a social worker was involved with them.
A new petition based on neglect and dependency was filed on 6
November 1997, alleging that: (1) the children are poorly
supervised, with specific instances of extremely inappropriate
conduct by the children noted; (2) the housekeeping has remained in
poor shape or worse; (3) the children are neglected because they
live in an environment injurious to their health and do not receive
proper care, supervision or discipline and are denied necessary
medical or remedial care; and (4) the children are dependent
because they are in need of placement or assistance. The trial
court adjudicated the children dependent and concluded it was in
their best interests to be placed in the custody of YFS.
Petitions for termination of Johnston's parental rights to
Tasha, Jessica, and Paul were filed in December 1999, alleging,
inter alia, that the children were: (1) neglected; (2) willfullyleft in foster care for more than twelve months without a
satisfactory showing of progress; and (3) not supported by their
parents, despite the parents being physically and financially able
to do so.
On 9 January 2001, Johnston's parental rights to Tasha,
Jessica, and Paul, and Larry Alexander's rights to Paul, were
terminated. Johnston appeals. Tasha's father, Leon Beisner,
executed a surrender of his parental rights and is not a party to
this appeal. Jessica's father, Jeff Martin, was not served and is
not a party to this appeal. Paul's father, Larry Alexander, did
not appeal the ruling terminating his parental rights and therefore
is also not a party to this appeal.
There is a two-step process in a termination of parental
rights proceeding. In the adjudicatory stage, the trial court must
establish that at least one ground for the termination of parental
rights listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 exists. N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-1109. See also In re Matherly, ___ N.C. App. ___, 562 S.E.2d
15 (2002). In this stage, the court's decision must be supported
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence with the burden of proof
on the petitioner. In re Matherly, ___ N.C. App. ___, 562 S.E.2d
15 (2002). Once one or more of the grounds for termination are
established, the trial court must proceed to the dispositional
stage where the best interests of the child are considered. There,the court shall issue an order terminating the parental rights
unless it further determines that the best interests of the child
require otherwise. Id.; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a).
By her first and second assignments of error, Johnston argues
the trial court erred in that the trial court's findings of facts
were not supported by the evidence and thus did not support the
conclusions of law. She also contends the trial court made
findings of facts that were technically conclusions of law and
vice-versa. We disagree.
If the trial court's findings of fact are supported by
competent evidence, and they support its conclusions, they are
binding on appeal. Sain v. Sain, 134 N.C. App. 460, 517 S.E.2d 921
(1999). “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or
with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the
entry of the appropriate judgment.” N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1).
Findings of fact are defined as “[d]eterminations from the evidence
of a case . . . concerning facts averred by one party and denied by
another.” Black's Law Dictionary 632 (6th ed. 1990). Conclusions
of law are defined as “[f]inding[s] by [a] court as determined
through [the] application of rules of law.” Id. at 290.
In the instant case, Johnston contends there was no evidence
to support the trial court's finding that:12. The mother made little progress in the
practical application of instructions to
supervise her children. The mother could
articulate what she was to do, but could not
put what she was taught by social workers into
practice. A specific example of this was a
disastrous series of overnight visits which
occurred in July, 1999.
13. Similarly, the mother was not able to put
into practice what she had learned in the
parenting classes. The mother could
articulate what she was taught in the
parenting class, but during the overnight
visits in July 1999, she used corporal
punishment on Paul and curse words with
Jessica.
However, Angenette S. Stephenson, a social worker with YFS,
testified that:
[Johnston] could probably teach a parenting
class. She has a lot of knowledge about the
subject. But when it actually came down to
parenting the children as demonstrated in the
visits, she was not so skilled. Specifically,
although she had learned timeout skills and
had learned how to distract children when
they're doing inappropriate behaviors with
more positive things and she had learned a lot
of different techniques. When she actually had
a chance to parent them in the first visit,
she used corporal punishment and she used a
curse word while yelling at Jessica.
Therefore, there was evidence to support these findings of the
trial court. The trial court complies with the requirement to make
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law so long as it
distinguishes the findings of fact from the conclusions of law in
some recognizable fashion. Highway Church of Christ v. Barber, 72N.C.App. 481, 325 S.E.2d 305 (1985). See also Matter of Wills of
Jacobs, 91 N.C. App. 138, 370 S.E.2d 860 (1988). After a careful
review of the record in this case, we hold the trial court's
findings of fact are supported by the evidence and support the
trial court's conclusions of law. Accordingly, we reject
Johnston's arguments.
By Johnston's third assignment of error, she argues the trial
court prejudicially erred by admitting evidence of and making
findings of fact concerning Q DJ's special needs, Johnston's
inability to deal with his issues, and her subsequent voluntary
surrender of her parental rights to him. We disagree.
Under the statutory definition of “neglected juvenile,” the
trial court is allowed to consider as relevant evidence “whether
[the] juvenile lives in a home . . . where another juvenile has
been subjected to abuse or neglect by an adult who regularly lives
in the home.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2001). One of the
allegations in the petition for termination here is neglect and
another is unsatisfactory progress. It is of critical importance
for the trial court to have a thorough understanding of any
circumstance that reasonably impacts the children and is related to
the grounds for termination. How another child in the same home
has been treated, and the current status of that child, are clearly
relevant. This assignment of error is rejected. By Johnston's final assignment of error, she argues the trial
court erred in terminating her parental rights to Tasha, Jessica,
and Paul. We disagree.
We have held that the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by competent evidence and the conclusions of law are
supported by the findings of fact. The trial court found, inter
alia, that Johnston wilfully left the children in foster care for
more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress to
correct the conditions which led to the children's removal. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2001). The finding of any of the
factors listed in section 7B-1111 is sufficient to support a
termination based on the best interests of the child. Matherly,
___ N.C. App. at ___, 562 S.E.2d at 17 (2002); In re Hardesty, ___
N.C. App. ___, ___, 563 S.E.2d 79, 83 (2002); In re Blackburn, 142
N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). Accordingly, we
reject Johnston's argument and affirm the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
Judges MARTIN and TYSON concur.
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