I. Facts
On 18 June 2000, City of Monroe police officers, Pierce and
McAllister, responded to a call at the Economy Inn. The police
spoke with two women arguing over possession of a motor vehicle and
other issues in the parking lot of the motel.
One of the women invited the officers to Room 54 where the
officers first saw Billy Revarn Howie, (“defendant”). Defendant
invited the officers inside the room to continue the discussion
about the incident in the parking lot. Officer Pierce conducted aweapons search in the room. Consent to search was neither asked
for nor given to the officers.
Officer Pierce noticed that one of the “knobs” on the bathroom
sink was off, and that plastic bags were located in the cavity.
Officer Pierce called Officer McAllister to look at the bags. The
officers determined the bags may have “illegal narcotics” in them.
They removed the bags and concluded the contents to be “crack
cocaine.”
Defendant was apprised of his rights against self-
incrimination and the right to counsel. He signed a statement that
he had rented the room and that the cocaine belonged to him. A
further search was conducted, and seizure of more drugs occurred.
Defendant was placed under arrest, transported to the police
department, and charged with felony possession of cocaine. At
trial, defendant presented no evidence prior to the sentencing
phase. The jury convicted defendant of cocaine possession and
found him to be a habitual felon. Defendant appeals.
() Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible
error by allowing the state to introduce into evidence the cocaine
seized from a motel room pursuant to a search without (a) consent
of defendant or the other occupant of the room, (b) a search
warrant, (c) exigent circumstances, or (d) sufficient probable
cause. (2) The defendant also contends that the trial court's
denying defendant's motions to dismiss the cocaine charges and to
set aside the guilty verdict where the charges were based onillegally obtained evidence constitutes reversible error. (3) The
defendant also asserts that the denial of defendant's motion to
dismiss the indictment for being a habitual felon because the
cocaine charge, which served as the substantive, predicate felony
for habitual felon status, was based upon illegally seized evidence
was reversible error.
All of defendant's arguments rest upon defendant's first
assertion that the trial court erred in allowing the cocaine seized
pursuant to an illegal search to be introduced into evidence. The
legality of the search is a threshold question with respect to our
review of the other contentions. Defendant alleges that the search
took place without either consent of defendant or the other
occupant of the room, a search warrant, exigent circumstances, or
sufficient probable cause. Defendant made general objections to
the admission of this evidence at trial.
A motion to suppress made before or during trial is required
to properly preserve for appeal an objection to the admissibility
of evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(d) (2001) states, “[a] motion to
suppress evidence made pursuant to this Article is the exclusive
method of challenging the admissibility of evidence upon the
grounds specified in G.S. 15A-974.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-974 (2001)
outlines the procedure for excluding evidence seized in violation
of the Constitutions of the United States and North Carolina as
well as for substantial violations of North Carolina Criminal
Procedure statutes. Defendant contends that the search of his motel room was
illegal because it was conducted without either consent, a search
warrant, exigent circumstances or sufficient probable cause. These
prerequisites for a legal search derive from the constitutional
protection prescribed by the 4
th and 14
th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution and by Article I, § 20 of the N.C. Constitution.
Defendant did not preserve these arguments pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
15A-979(d).
Our Supreme Court has held that failure to raise the
admissibility question for evidence obtained in an allegedly
unlawful search by a motion to suppress constituted a waiver by the
defendant of his objection to the admission of the evidence.
State
v. Hill, 294 N.C. 320, 333, 240 S.E.2d 794, 803 (1978). In
Hill,
the trial court found that defendant had a “reasonable opportunity
to move to suppress the evidence ....”
Id. at 333-34, 240 S.E.2d
at 803.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-975(a) specifies that a defendant must move to
suppress evidence prior to trial unless the defendant did not have
reasonable opportunity to make the motion before trial or unless a
motion to suppress is allowed during trial under subsection (b) or
(c).
Subsections (b) and (c)
authorize a motion to suppress during trial
'when the State has failed to notify the
defendant's counsel or, if he has none, the
defendant, sooner that 20 working days before
trial, of its intention to use the evidence,'
and the evidence is of a specified nature; or
when 'additional pertinent facts have been
discovered by the defendant which he could not
have discovered with reasonable diligence
before' the denial of his pretrial motion.
State v. Drakeford, 37 N.C. App. 340, 345, 246 S.E.2d 55, 59
(1978)(quoting N.C.G.S. § 15A-975(b), (c)).
Our Court in
State v. Drakeford held that “15A not only
requires the defendant to raise his motion according to its
mandate, but also places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate
that he has done so.”
Id. at 345, 246 S.E.2d at 59. The facts in
Drakeford are similar to those in the present case.
Defendants did
not move to suppress the evidence as the fruits of an alleged
illegal search of a motel room prior to trial and made only general
objections to that evidence at trial.
Id. at 344, 246 S.E.2d at
58. This Court held that a motion to suppress is “the exclusive
method of challenging the admissibility of evidence on
constitutional or statutory grounds.”
Id. at 345, 246 S.E.2d at 59
(citation omitted).
Defendant merely raised general objections at trial and failed
to move to suppress. Defendant waived his objections to the
admissibility of the evidence. We find no error.
No Error.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge THOMAS concur.
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