STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
ERIC STEPHEN BLYMYER
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Thomas B. Wood, for the State.
J. Clark Fischer for defendant-appellant.
THOMAS, Judge.
Defendant, Eric Stephen Blymyer, was convicted of assault with
a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. He
was sentenced to a term of 108 to 132 months imprisonment.
Defendant appeals, contending the State failed to present
substantial evidence of intent to kill. Based on the reasons
herein, we find no error.
The State's evidence tends to show defendant visited the home
of Richard Lee Ronquest at approximately 11:30 p.m. on Christmas
Eve, 1999. Ronquest, Martha Clodfelter, who is Ronquest's sister,
and Valerie Furman were all present.
According to Ronquest, problems started between defendant and
him when defendant spoke disrespectfully to Furman. Ronquest told
defendant to "chill out" after defendant cursed at Furman. Defendant cursed again and threw a full, open can of beer on the
floor. When defendant refused to clean it up, Ronquest cursed in
telling him to leave. The two men then briefly fought, wrestling
on the floor, with defendant eventually agreeing to leave.
Defendant left but shortly returned to Ronquest's home. The
two scuffled and exchanged words a second time. Ronquest shoved
defendant into the hamper, held him down, and told him that unless
he agreed to leave he would not be let up. Defendant agreed,
Ronquest let him up, and defendant walked onto the porch "cussing
and carrying on real loud." Ronquest also walked outside. While
standing in the doorway of his truck, defendant "flipped off"
Ronquest.
Ronquest then stepped from the porch to an area underneath a
canopy in front of his home. Defendant jumped in the truck and
locked the door. He revved the engine, with Ronquest telling him,
"Just go, Just go." As defendant began to back out of the
driveway, Ronquest turned to walk inside. Suddenly, Ronquest heard
roaring tires spinning in the gravel and turned to see two
headlights coming toward him.
Defendant drove directly at Ronquest, striking him with the
truck. With Ronquest pinned against the mobile home and telling
defendant to get the truck off of him, defendant pumped the clutch
a couple of times and stated, "How's that feel, you son of a
bitch." After defendant finally drove away, Ronquest dragged
himself to the porch and collapsed. As a result, Ronquest suffered multiple pelvic fractures and
other internal injuries. He underwent approximately twenty
surgeries.
Dr. Wayne Cline, Jr., an expert in urology, testified he
examined Ronquest after the incident and that Ronquest's pelvic
fractures resulted from significant force caused by a high speed
impact or being crushed against an immovable object.
Eddie Christopher Howard, a deputy with the Rowan County
Sheriff's Department, went to defendant's residence shortly after
the incident and discovered defendant fighting with his two
brothers. Howard broke up the fight. According to Howard,
defendant appeared agitated and was using profane language.
Defendant also had a strong odor of alcohol.
Howard testified defendant made several spontaneous
utterances, including, "I guess the next time I'll just have to
stab his ass in the neck and kill him next time," and "I guess I'll
just have to stab him, stab him next time."
Defendant did not present any evidence.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of
all the evidence. Specifically, defendant argues the State failed
to present substantial evidence that he intended to kill Ronquest.
He asks this Court to set aside his conviction and enter judgment
on the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury. We disagree with defendant's
contention. A motion to dismiss is properly denied if "there is
substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense
charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense."
State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State v.
Franklin, 327 N.C. 162, 171, 393 S.E.2d 781, 787 (1990). "When
ruling on a motion to dismiss, all of the evidence should be
considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State
is entitled to all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from
the evidence." State v. Davis, 130 N.C. App. 675, 679, 505 S.E.2d
138, 141 (1998). The dispositive issue here is whether the State
presented substantial evidence that defendant intended to kill
Ronquest.
"An intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the
assault, the manner in which it was made, the conduct of the
parties, and other relevant circumstances." State v. Thacker, 281
N.C. 447, 455, 189 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1972).
In State v. Hinson, 85 N.C. App. 558, 355 S.E.2d 232 (1987),
this court addressed the issue of whether the evidence was
sufficient to support an intent to kill where the alleged deadly
weapon was a motor vehicle. In Hinson, the defendant drove a truck
toward a road where five sheriff's deputies were standing, waved
one arm out the window, and screamed, "Stand right there, you son
of a bitches. I'll kill you." He drove the truck straight at the
deputies before colliding with two automobiles and running into aditch. This Court held that such evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the State, raised a reasonable inference
that defendant acted with the requisite specific intent to kill the
deputies. Id. at 565, 355 S.E.2d at 236.
Here, the State's evidence tends to show defendant had been
involved in two altercations with Ronquest in Ronquest's home on
the night in question. He had been instructed both times to leave.
Prior to getting into his truck after the second incident,
defendant "flipped off" Ronquest. Defendant then drove the truck
directly at Ronquest. After pinning him against the mobile home,
defendant pumped the clutch a couple of times and said, "How's that
feel, you son of a bitch." Following the incident, defendant
stated, "I guess the next time I'll just have to stab his ass in
the neck and kill him next time," and "I guess I'll just have to
stab him, stab him next time." We find this evidence sufficiently
similar to the evidence presented in Hinson to mandate a similar
conclusion.
We further note that Ronquest's injuries were life-
threatening. He suffered internal injuries to his organs, as well
as bone fractures, and had to undergo approximately twenty
surgeries.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence
raises a reasonable inference that defendant acted with the
requisite intent to kill Ronquest. Accordingly, the trial courtdid not err in denying defendant's motions to dismiss and allowing
the issue to be submitted to the jury.
No error.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge MARTIN concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***