EVELYN POWELL, MAMIE WHITEHEAD, McARTHUR KING, MOTHER'S CARE AND
INFANTS CENTER and MORNINGSTAR BAPTIST CHURCH, INC.,
Plaintiffs
v
.
WALTER PHILLIP BULLUCK, VICKY LYNN BULLUCK, and HANOR COMPANY,
INC.,
Defendants
Land Loss Prevention Project, by Marcus Jimison and Pamela
Thombs, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Poyner & Spruill, LLP, by J. Nicholas Ellis; and Etheridge,
Sykes, Britt & Hamlett, LLP, by Raymond M. Sykes, Jr., for
defendants-appellees Walter Phillip Bulluck and Vicky Lynn
Bulluck.
Hunton & Williams, by Jason S. Thomas, for defendant-appellee
Hanor Company, Inc.
WALKER, Judge.
Prior to filing their original complaint, plaintiffs Evelyn
Powell and Morningstar Baptist Church, Inc. (Morningstar) and
Concerned Citizens of Edgecombe II (CCE II), a group of Morningstar
residents joined to oppose the operation of industrial-sized hog
farms in the Morningstar community, requested and participated in
pre-litigation mediation concerning a hog farm nuisance dispute
against defendants. The mediation did not resolve the dispute, and
on 11 February 1999, the mediator certified an impasse. On 15 June1999, plaintiffs Evelyn Powell, Morningstar and others, including
CCE II, initiated a hog farm nuisance action against defendants.
On 14 June 2000, Superior Court Judge Russell Duke dismissed
plaintiffs Powell and Morningstar without prejudice and dismissed
CCE II with prejudice for failing to allege in its complaint that
it had complied with pre-litigation mediation requirements. On 4
June 2001, plaintiffs including Powell and Morningstar filed the
present farm nuisance action against defendants, who counterclaimed
alleging malicious and false statements and intentional
interference with contractual relations. Subsequently, defendants
moved for costs and to dismiss plaintiffs pursuant to N.C.R. Civ.
P. 12(c) for failing to initiate pre-litigation mediation.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim
and sought N.C.R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against defendants for
filing their counterclaim.
All motions were heard, and on 10 October 2001, the trial
court entered an order allowing defendants' motion to dismiss
plaintiffs Whitehead, King and Mother's Care and Infants Center
(Mother's Care) and defendants' motion for costs. The trial court
denied plaintiffs' motions for sanctions and to dismiss defendants'
counterclaim. Plaintiffs appealed, alleging the trial court erred
in dismissing plaintiffs Whitehead, King and Mother's Care,
awarding costs to defendants and in denying their motions for
sanctions and to dismiss defendants' counterclaim.
First, we consider the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs
Whitehead, King and Mother's Care. We note that this issue isinterlocutory, but in our discretion, we elect to treat plaintiffs'
appeal on this issue as a petition for writ of certiorari as it
affects the proper parties to the lawsuit. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-32(c) (2001); N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1); Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
Consol. v. Durham Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 141 N.C. App. 569, 574,
541 S.E.2d 157, 161 (2000).
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial
court is to consider only the pleadings and any attached exhibits,
which become part of the pleadings. Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App.
76, 78, 318 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1984); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,
Rule 12(c) (2001). In a Rule 12(c) motion, [n]o evidence is to be
heard, and the trial judge is not to consider statements of fact in
the briefs of the parties or the testimony of allegations by the
parties in different proceedings. Minor, 70 N.C. App. at 78, 318
S.E.2d at 867; see Cash v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 137 N.C.
App. 192, 202, 528 S.E.2d 372, 378 (2000). In reviewing a Rule
12(c) motion, the trial court must accept all material allegations
in the complaint as true and accurate and consider them in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Affordable Care,
Inc. v. North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners, __ N.C. App.
__, __, 571 S.E.2d 52, 57 (2002); Garrett v. Winfree, 120 N.C. App.
689, 691, 463 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1995).
Prior to initiating a farm nuisance action, a party is
required to submit to pre-litigation mediation. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-38.3(c) (2001). The purpose of this mandatory mediation is to
facilitate ... settlement ... and to make civil litigation moreeconomical, efficient, and satisfactory to litigants and the
State. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1(a) (2001). If a party brings a
farm nuisance action before a farm resident or any other party
has initiated pre-litigation mediation, then that action shall,
upon the motion of any party prior to trial, be dismissed without
prejudice by the court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.3(c). Farm
nuisance pre-litigation mediation is conducted pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1 which provides that parties shall attend the
mediated settlement conference unless excused by rules of the
Supreme Court or by order of the senior resident superior court
judge. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1(f) (2001).
Specifically, all individual parties and counsel for each
party must physically attend until an agreement is reduced to
writing and signed ... or an impasse has been declared. N.C.R.
Super. Ct. Mediated Settlement Conf. Rule 4 (2002). However, the
attendance requirement will be excused or modified, including the
allowance of that party's or person's participation without
physical attendance ... [b]y agreement of all parties and persons
required to attend and the mediator.... Id.
Here, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint:
On April 29, 1997, Plaintiffs initiated pre-
litigation mediation of a farm nuisance
dispute. Plaintiffs have completed pre-
litigation mediation as required by N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-38.3. See Attachment A to
Complaint, Report of Mediator. Attorney Henry
Gorham served as mediator for this farm
nuisance pre-litigation mediation. The
mediation impassed and Plaintiffs filed suit
on August 27, 1999. The original complaint
was dismissed without prejudice on June 14,
2000. By order of the Court, Plaintiffs weregiven one year from June 14, 2000 to re-file
suit. Plaintiffs now re-file.
The pre-litigation mediation request was submitted by Powell, CCE
II and Morningstar. The report of the mediator attached to
plaintiffs' complaint indicated that pre-litigation mediation was
conducted, and the report did not list any party as being absent.
Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and for costs
asserting plaintiffs Whitehead, King and Mother's Care should have
been dismissed because the pleadings with attachments showed that
they did not request pre-litigation mediation. After a hearing,
the trial court dismissed the complaints of Whitehead, King and
Mother's Care without prejudice and allowed defendants' motion for
costs. Plaintiffs' motions to dismiss and for sanctions were
denied.
Even though the pre-litigation mediation request does not list
the names of all of the plaintiffs, the action is not subject to
dismissal as to those plaintiffs. The statute does not require
that all interested parties, who may later become plaintiffs, join
in the request for mediation. The statute providing for pre-
litigation mediation specifically states that a farm resident or
any other party may initiate mediation. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-
38.3.
Here, the pleadings allege that plaintiffs participated in
pre-litigation mediation, and the mediator's report does not list
any party as being absent. Taking the pleadings with attachments
in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we find that
plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for requesting andparticipating in pre-litigation mediation as required by our rules
and statutes.
Next, we consider defendants' argument to dismiss the appeal
as interlocutory. Although the trial court allowed defendants'
motion for costs and denied plaintiffs' motions for sanctions and
to dismiss defendants' counterclaim, significant issues remain in
this case. Also, the trial court did not certify this case as
immediately appealable pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b). Judgments
and orders that are not a final determination of the entire
controversy as to all parties are interlocutory. Carriker v.
Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73, 511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999). As a general
rule, there is no right of immediate appeal from interlocutory
orders. McCall v. McCall, __ N.C. App. __, __, 531 S.E.2d 894, 895
(2000); See Veazy v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377
(1950). However, plaintiffs claim the trial court's orders are
appealable because they affect a substantial right.
An order, though interlocutory, is immediately appealable if
it affects a substantial right that would be lost, prejudiced or
less than adequately protected if an immediate appeal were not
allowed. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) (2001). The burden is on the
appellant to show (1) the judgment affects a right that is
substantial; and (2) the deprivation of that substantial right will
potentially work injury to him if not corrected before appeal from
final judgment. Collins v. Talley, 135 N.C. App. 758, 760, 522
S.E.2d 794, 796 (1999). The denial of a motion to dismiss is not immediately
appealable, without showing a substantial right is affected.
Thompson v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 140 N.C. App. 115, 120-21, 535
S.E.2d 397, 401, (2000). Contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, a
denial of their motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim does not
affect a substantial right entitling them to an immediate appeal.
Id.
Finally, under uncomplicated circumstances, where a court
directs a party to pay fees or costs, no substantial right is
involved that would allow an immediate appeal, Frost v. Mazda Motor
of America, Inc., 353 N.C. 188, 194, 540 S.E.2d 324, 328 (2000);
see Cochran v. Cochran, 93 N.C. App. 574, 577, 378 S.E.2d 580, 582
(1989), and absent a showing that a substantial right is involved,
an order refusing to impose sanctions is not immediately
appealable, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dean, 148 N.C. App. 405, 560
S.E.2d 886 (2002); Routh v. Weaver, 67 N.C. App. 426, 428, 313
S.E.2d 793, 795 (1984).
Reversed in part and dismissed in part.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and THOMAS concur.
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