STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
ARTIS TAMAR PERKINS
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Steven F. Bryant, for the State.
Ligon and Hinton, by Lemuel W. Hinton, for defendant-
appellant.
McGEE, Judge.
Artis Tamar Perkins (defendant) was indicted for the murder of
Louis Santos on 23 October 2000. The evidence presented at trial
tended to show the following. Tiyonia Miller (Miller) was walking
to defendant's apartment in Raleigh, North Carolina with her baby
in her arms on 16 September 2000. As she walked up the steps of
the apartment, Louis Santos (Santos) and Antwoin Watkins (Watkins)
complimented Miller on her baby. Lushawna Jeffreys (Lushawna) was
standing on the balcony above and said that the baby was ugly.
Miller entered defendant's apartment and told those in the
apartment, including Shaquanna Henderson (Shaquanna) and Kenyatta
Henderson (Kenyatta), what Lushawna had said.
Lushawna left her apartment and Miller went outside to
confront her. They were soon joined by Shaquanna, Kenyatta, andothers, including Latisha Jeffreys (Latisha), and an argument
ensued. Latisha punched Shaquanna in the jaw and a fight started.
Santos and Watkins broke up the fight by pushing Lushawna and
Latisha back into the apartment. Santos had called for a taxi and
it arrived. Santos, Watkins, Lushawna, and Latisha left the
apartment. Shaquanna, Kenyatta, and Miller stood outside their
apartment and Santos and Watkins stayed between the young women to
prevent another fight.
As Santos, Watkins, Lushawna, and Latisha entered the taxi,
Kenyatta and Miller threw bottles at the vehicle. The taxi driver
refused to drive the four passengers away from the scene and
ordered them out of the taxi. After leaving the taxi, Lushawna and
Latisha went to a neighbor's house to call another taxi while
Santos and Watkins waited outside. When Lushawna and Latisha
returned, they were confronted by Shaquanna, Kenyatta, and another
female, and another fight erupted.
A crowd gathered and some people encouraged the young women to
fight. Santos and Watkins attempted to break up the fight by
pushing the young women apart. Defendant and his friend, Maurice
Davis (Davis), were in the crowd watching the fight. Davis heard
defendant say that Santos and Watkins were hitting defendant's
sister. A couple of weeks earlier, Davis had given defendant a
gun. Davis asked defendant if he had the gun and defendant
responded that he did. When Davis asked defendant what he was
going to do, defendant stated that he was going to "shoot . . . a
m----- f----- that keep messing with my sister." During the fight, the young women and Santos fell to the
ground, with Santos on top of Kenyatta. Santos was hitting
Kenyatta's head against the ground. Defendant removed a gun from
his back pocket and began to shoot it. Defendant fired the gun,
paused, and then fired several more shots. After the shots, Santos
ran from the crowd and said, "I'm shot, I'm shot" before falling to
the ground. Santos was shot once in his back and twice in his left
leg. Bystanders administered CPR until emergency medical personnel
and police arrived. Santos died from the gunshot wound in his
back.
At trial, the trial court determined that due to defendant's
age at the time of the crime, his case would be tried as a
noncapital case. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder and the trial court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment
without parole. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in allowing the State to question defendant about crimes and
bad acts he committed as a juvenile. Defendant argues the State
impermissibly attacked his character with evidence of prior
unindicted bad acts. The trial transcript shows the following
cross-examination of defendant by the State:
Q. Did you used to stand out with Quondell
while he was selling drugs?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor.
COURT: Overruled.
Q. Did you used to stand out with Quondell
over at Cinnamon Ridge while he was
selling drugs?
A. Sometimes.
Q. You sell drugs too?
A. I have.
Q. Did you sell drugs also over by Muffin's
house?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Over in southeast Raleigh anywhere?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Who else would sell drugs out there with
you at Cinnamon Ridge, Maurice?
A. No one sold drugs with me. They did it
on their own.
Q. So you just sold drugs on your own, you
didn't sell for anybody?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Where did you get them from?
A. Does it really matter?
Q. Where did you get them from?
A. I got it from a guy.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor.
COURT: Overruled.
A. I got it from a guy.
Q. Who?
A. I don't know.
"In order to preserve a question for appellate review, a party
must have presented the trial court with a timely request,
objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling
sought if the specific grounds are not apparent." State v. Eason,328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991); see N.C. R. App. P.
10(b)(1). The trial transcript shows that counsel for defendant
only made two general objections to questions regarding defendant's
drug sales during the challenged cross-examination and failed to
object to the State's repeated questions concerning defendant's bad
acts. Defendant's counsel also failed to state specific grounds
for the basis of the objections. "A general objection, when
overruled, is ordinarily not adequate unless the evidence,
considered as a whole, makes it clear that there is no purpose to
be served from admitting the evidence." State v. Jones, 342 N.C.
523, 535, 467 S.E.2d 12, 20 (1996). Defendant's counsel gave no
basis for the objections and the transcript does not clearly
demonstrate grounds for the objections. Accordingly, defendant
failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. See State v.
Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 447, 340 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1986).
Defendant nonetheless argues the admission of evidence of his
prior bad acts constituted plain error and should be reviewed by
this Court accordingly. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). Plain error
review is appropriate when a defendant fails to preserve the issue
for appeal by properly objecting to the admission of evidence at
trial. State v. Rourke, 143 N.C. App. 672, 675, 548 S.E.2d 188,
190 (2001).
Plain error is an error which was "so
fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of
justice or which probably resulted in the jury
reaching a different verdict than it otherwise
would have reached." State v. Bagley, 321
N.C. 201, 213, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036, 99 L.Ed.2d 912
(1988). To prevail under a plain erroranalysis, a defendant must establish not only
that the trial court committed error, but that
absent the error, the jury probably would have
reached a different result. See State v.
Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697
(1993).
State v. Jones, 137 N.C. App. 221, 226, 527 S.E.2d 700, 704 (2000).
Our Supreme Court has stated that
"[t]he plain error rule . . . is always to be
applied cautiously and only in the exceptional
case where, after reviewing the entire record,
it can be said the claimed error is a
'fundamental error, something so basic, so
prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that
justice cannot have been done,' or 'where [the
error] is grave error which amounts to a
denial of a fundamental right of the accused,'
or the error has '"resulted in a miscarriage
of justice or in the denial to appellant of a
fair trial."'"
State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 255, 536 S.E.2d 1, 18 (2000) (quoting
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)
(quoting United States v McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982) (emphasis
omitted))).
Defendant argues that admitting evidence of defendant's prior
bad acts as a juvenile was overly prejudicial and rose to the level
of plain error. Defendant further argues that his defense relied
largely upon his credibility, which was effectively destroyed by
admission of the prior bad acts. Defendant also argues that he is
entitled to a new trial under State v. Wilson, 118 N.C. App. 616,
456 S.E.2d 870 (1995). In holding that the defendant in Wilson was
prejudiced by the admission of improper evidence, this Court stated
that "'[a] defendant is prejudiced by errors . . . when there is areasonable possibility that, had the error . . . not been
committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial
out of which the appeal arises.'" Id. at 620, 456 S.E.2d at 873
(quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (1988)). While defendant
states this standard correctly, we must review defendant's argument
for plain error rather than under this standard because defendant
failed to properly preserve the issue for appeal.
Defendant also argues that the General Assembly has sought to
protect juvenile defendants when they are tried as adults.
Defendant cites N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 609(d) and argues that
public policy requires an extension of the criminal convictions
exclusion to include prior bad acts under Rule 608. However,
defendant offers no authority that suggests the General Assembly
intended such a result and we find no argument that would justify
such an extension.
Defendant fails to show that the jury probably would have
reached a different result had the evidence of prior bad acts not
been admitted. He also fails to demonstrate that the admission of
the evidence resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. In
light of the compelling evidence of defendant's guilt presented at
trial, we hold the trial court did not commit plain error in
admitting evidence of defendant's prior bad acts. See State v.
Parks, 148 N.C. App. 600, 609, 560 S.E.2d 179, 185 (2002).
Defendant also contends the State impermissibly attacked his
credibility through the use of prior juvenile convictions. The
trial transcript shows the following cross-examination of defendantby the State:
Q. Did your mother teach you right from
wrong?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. Did she tell you it was wrong to shoot
people?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. Did she tell you it was wrong to steal?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she tell you it was wrong to fight
people or hurt them?
A. She told me not to do it unless like I'm
protect[ing] myself.
Q. Did she tell you it was wrong to lie?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. But you do all those things, don't you?
A. No, I don't.
Q. You don't steal?
A. I have -- I don't do it anymore.
Q. You're on probation for that, aren't you?
A. Not on probation anymore.
Q. Because you got arrested for murder?
A. Yes.
Q. You've gotten in fights before too,
haven't you?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. You've been convicted of being in fights
too, haven't you?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor.
A. No.
COURT: Overruled.
Q. Have you not been convicted of assault?
A. No.
Q. You weren't put on probation for assault?
A. No.
Q. On [10 February] 2000, you weren't placed
on probation for assault?
A. I was placed on probation for stealing.
Q. And after you got placed on probation for
stealing, you were also convicted of
assault, weren't you?
A. No, I wasn't.
Q. You didn't get an assault and have them
have to extend your probation for
stealing because you got in trouble
again?
A. No.
As discussed previously, an objection to evidence must be
timely and specific in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
Eason, 328 N.C. at 420, 402 S.E.2d at 814; see N.C. R. App. P.
10(b)(1). The trial transcript shows that defendant made only one
general objection to the State's questions regarding prior juvenile
convictions. The objection came after defendant answered the
question concerning his conviction for assault and provided no
grounds for the ruling sought. Defendant did not object to
testimony regarding a prior juvenile conviction for stealing or to
the four successive questions concerning defendant's alleged
probation for assault after the initial objection. This issue wastherefore not properly preserved for appeal.
Defendant argues the admission of prior juvenile convictions
was plain error and urges this Court to review the issue
accordingly. As we have previously discussed, the burden on
defendant to demonstrate plain error is high. "To prevail under a
plain error analysis, a defendant must establish not only that the
trial court committed error, but that absent the error, the jury
probably would have reached a different result." Jones, 137 N.C.
App. at 226, 527 S.E.2d at 704.
Defendant argues the General Assembly labeled the admission of
juvenile convictions as plain error by enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. §
8C-1, Rule 609(d) (2001). Under Rule 609(d), a defendant cannot be
impeached by a juvenile adjudication in a criminal case. Id.
While admission of defendant's juvenile conviction for stealing and
questions concerning an assault conviction were inappropriate, the
General Assembly's decision to exclude such testimony does not mean
its admission is plain error. Defendant has cited no authority
that would compel such an interpretation of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence.
While defendant objected once to the admission of his prior
juvenile conviction for assault, there is no evidence that he was
unfairly prejudiced by the question. Defendant responded "no" to
the first question before an objection was given and no extrinsic
evidence of the juvenile adjudication was admitted into evidence.
No evidence therefore was admitted concerning a juvenile conviction
for assault that could have prejudiced defendant. Defendant has failed to show that exclusion of evidence of his
prior juvenile convictions probably would have resulted in a
different outcome at trial. He has also failed to demonstrate that
admission of the evidence resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the
jury to convict defendant absent the admission of the evidence in
question. In light of the compelling evidence of defendant's
guilt, we hold the admission of prior juvenile convictions did not
constitute plain error. We find this assignment of error to be
without merit.
We hold that defendant received a fair trial, free of
prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges HUDSON and BIGGS concur.
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***