G. WAYNE OVERTON,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
.
CAMDEN COUNTY and the CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
Respondents-Appellants.
Hornthal, Riley, Ellis & Maland, L.L.P., by Donald I. McRee,
Jr., for petitioner-appellee.
Herbert T. Mullen, Jr. and Shelley T. Eason, for respondents-
appellants.
McGEE, Judge.
G. Wayne Overton (petitioner) is the owner of property located
at 1330 South NC 343 in Camden County, North Carolina (the
property). Petitioner first placed a mobile home on the property
in 1972. Petitioner replaced the original mobile home on the
property with another mobile home (replacement mobile home) in 1995
without obtaining a building permit or a conditional use permit
from Camden County. The Camden County Code Enforcement Officer
(Enforcement Officer) mailed petitioner a certified letter on 18
February 2000 advising petitioner of violations of sections 3.02,
3.05, 7.07(C-4), and 8.06 of the Camden County Zoning Ordinance
(CCZO). The CCZO was enacted and effective on 20 December 1993.
It was replaced on 1 January 1998, by the Camden County UnifiedDevelopment Ordinance (UDO). Petitioner appealed the Enforcement
Officer's decision to the Camden County Board of Adjustment (Board
of Adjustment) on 6 March 2000.
The Board of Adjustment issued a decision on 10 April 2000
finding (1) petitioner in violation of the "adopted ordinance" for
failing to secure a building permit before replacing the original
mobile home with the replacement mobile home; (2) allowing the
replacement mobile home to remain on the site upon petitioner
obtaining a building permit and the paying of a fifty dollar fine;
and (3) subjecting petitioner to the additional conditions that the
replacement mobile home must be removed if vacated for more than
sixty days, that the lot must be maintained, that only one person
could live in the replacement mobile home, and that the replacement
mobile home must have been manufactured after 1 July 1976.
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari for
review by the Camden County Superior Court on 9 May 2000. He
contended that the Board of Adjustment had no authority to impose
the additional conditions cited above on its decision to allow the
replacement mobile home to remain on the property. The trial court
entered an order on 25 October 2001 concluding, inter alia, that:
(1) the "Board of Adjustment erroneously applied the [CCZO] to
Petitioner, the [replacement] mobile home, and the Property where
such ordinance had been replaced as of January 1, 1998 by the
. . . UDO"; (2) the "Board of Adjustment erroneously failed to
apply the . . . UDO"; (3) "Petitioner's replacement mobile home
constituted a 'nonconforming situation' . . . protected under the. . . UDO, and Article 14 of the UDO [did] not require a
conditional use permit for Petitioner's continued use of his mobile
home as a 'nonconforming situation'"; (4) "[t]he only permit
required of Petitioner under the UDO was a building permit"; and
(5) the "Board of Adjustment was without authority to impose the
[additional] conditions . . . ." The order vacated the Board of
Adjustment's decision and remanded the matter to the Board of
Adjustment for issuance of a building permit for the replacement
mobile home, without the unauthorized conditions, upon payment by
petitioner of the required seventy-five dollar fee and fifty dollar
fine. Respondents appeal the order.
When a superior court grants certiorari to review the decision
of a board of adjustment, "the superior court sits as an appellate
court, and not as a trier of facts." Sun Suites Holdings, LLC v.
Board of Alderman of Town of Garner, 139 N.C. App. 269, 271, 533
S.E.2d 525, 527, disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 280, 546 S.E.2d 397
(2000) (quoting Tate Terrace Realty Investors, Inc. v. Currituck
County, 127 N.C. App. 212, 217, 488 S.E.2d 845, 848, disc. review
denied, 347 N.C. 409, 496 S.E.2d 394 (1997)). The superior court's
review is limited to determinations of whether
"1) the [b]oard committed any errors in law;
2) the [b]oard followed lawful procedure; 3)
the petitioner was afforded appropriate due
process; 4) the [b]oard's decision was
supported by competent evidence in the whole
record; and 5) [whether] the [b]oard's
decision was arbitrary and capricious."
Capital Outdoor, Inc. v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Adjust., ___ N.C.
App. ___, 567 S.E.2d 440, 441 (2002) (quoting Capital Outdoor, Inc.v. Guilford Cty. Bd. of Adjust., 146 N.C. App. 388, 390, 552 S.E.2d
265, 267 (2001), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 355 N.C. 269,
559 S.E.2d 547 (2002). If the superior court is reviewing either
the sufficiency of the evidence or whether the board's decision was
arbitrary and capricious, the superior court applies the "whole
record test." Westminster Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary Zoning Bd.
of Adjust., 140 N.C. App. 99, 102, 535 S.E.2d 415, 417 (2000),
aff'd, 354 N.C. 298, 554 S.E.2d 634 (2001). Errors of law are
reviewed de novo. Id. An appellate court's review of the trial
court's zoning board determination is limited to determining
whether the superior court applied the correct standard of review,
and to determine whether the superior court correctly applied that
standard. Id. at 102-03, 535 S.E.2d at 417.
We first decide whether the trial court exercised the
appropriate scope of review. The issues presented for review at
each stage of these proceedings relate to which ordinance to apply
and the proper interpretation of that ordinance, both of which
present questions of law, requiring a de novo review. Id. at 103,
535 S.E.2d at 417. The trial court applied the de novo standard
of review, and therefore, we must determine whether the trial court
was correct in its exercise of the de novo review. Id.
Respondents argue that the trial court erred in applying the
UDO to petitioner's zoning violation, instead of the CCZO. Our
State's courts have not decided the issue of which zoning ordinance
to apply when an alleged violation occurs while one ordinance is in
effect, but enforcement is sought only after a new ordinance hasreplaced the previous ordinance. At the time of the alleged
violation, being the replacement of a mobile home by petitioner in
1995, the CCZO was the zoning ordinance in effect. However, when
the enforcement action was brought by Camden County, the UDO had
superceded the CCZO.
In Naegele Outdoor Advertising v. Harrelson, 336 N.C. 66, 442
S.E.2d 32 (1994), our Supreme Court reversed the majority's
decision from this Court which had stated that application for
permits must be viewed under the facts and laws as they existed at
the time of the application, not at the ultimate time of decision
by the court. Naegele, 112 N.C. App. 98, 101-02, 434 S.E.2d 244,
246 (1993), rev'd per curium, 336 N.C. 66, 442 S.E.2d 32 (1994).
The Supreme Court reversed this Court's decision for the reasons
stated in the dissenting opinion by Judge Greene. 336 N.C. at 66,
442 S.E.2d at 33. Judge Greene's dissent "disagree[d] with the
majority's conclusion that [the petitioner's] application must be
viewed at the time it was made, without regard to the fact that the
Department of Transportation had a subsequent statutory obligation
to screen the junkyard." 112 N.C. App. at 102, 434 S.E.2d at 247
(Greene, J., dissenting). Naegele rejects the proposition that a
court or board need not look at subsequent changes in the law when
Board of Adjustment decisions are made.
Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed similar
questions. "'It is well settled that the zoning ordinance in
effect at the time the case is ultimately decided is controlling'
. . . . The purpose of this principle is to effectuate the currentpolicy declared by the legislative body." Dinizo v. Planning Board
of the Town of Westfield, 711 A.2d 425, 428 (N.J. Super. 1998)
(citations omitted); see also MacDonald Advertising Co. v.
McIntyre, 536 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he general
rule is that the law to be applied is that which was in effect at
the time of the decision.") (citation omitted); Enviro-Gro
Technologies v. Bockelmann, 594 A.2d 1190, 1198 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App.), cert. denied, 599 A.2d 447 (Md. 1991); Shiloh Gospel Chapel,
Inc. v. Roer, 566 N.Y.S.2d 382, 382 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("[I]t is
well-settled that a court will apply the zoning ordinance in
existence at the time of its decision.") (citations omitted). "The
majority rule . . . is that the zoning law or regulation in effect
at the time of the decision of a court is controlling as opposed to
that in effect when the proceedings were instituted or when the
administrative agency entered its decision upon the application."
McCallum v. Inland Wetlands Com'n of Avon, 492 A.2d 508 (Conn.
1985) (citing 4 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 25.31),
superceded by statute as stated in McNally v. Zoning Com'n of City
of Norwalk, 621 A.2d 279, 282-83 (Conn. 1993) (noting that a
statute specifically changed the common law rule as stated above in
Connecticut). Respondents have not directed us to any statute that
would prevent the application of such a rule in North Carolina.
Other jurisdictions have recognized exceptions to this "time
of decision rule." Dinizo, 711 A.2d at 428 (citation omitted)
(noting the vested right exception and calling for a reevaluation
of the "time of decision" rule); MacDonald Advertising Co., 536N.W.2d at 252 (noting a bad faith exception but finding
insufficient evidence to apply the exception); Shiloh Gospel
Chapel, Inc., 566 N.Y.S.2d at 383 (noting a "special facts
exception" pursuant to which a former ordinance might still be
deemed controlling if there is evidence of bad faith, conspiracy,
or undue delay by the board). However, in the case before us there
is no evidence that any such circumstances were present to warrant
the use of such an exception by this Court.
The New York courts have held that a later act, which covers
the entire subject of the earlier act and is clearly intended to
set forth exclusive rules, operates as a repeal of an earlier act,
wiping it out for all purposes and preventing enforcement
thereunder. See Fleetwood v. Manor, Inc. v. Village of Huntington
Bay, 115 N.Y.S.2d 615 , 618-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952); Inzerilli v.
Pitney, 30 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131-32 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). However,
other states' courts have held if there is a savings clause in the
amending ordinance, the enforcement may continue. See Town of
Ogunquit v. McGarva, 570 A.2d 320, 321 (Me. 1990); City of New
Orleans v. Leeco, Inc., 76 So.2d 387, 390 (La. 1954); City of
Rochester v. Crittenden Park Riding Academy, 238 N.Y.S. 215, 215
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930).
In light of Judge Greene's opinion in Naegele, 112 N.C. App.
at 102, 434 S.E.2d at 247 (Greene, J., dissenting), and the rules
applied in other types of cases involving decisions by boards of
adjustment from other jurisdictions, we hold that the zoning
ordinance in effect at the time of the Board of Adjustment's decision is the correct ordinance to apply. The Board of
Adjustment should have applied the UDO in the present case and the
trial court did not err in applying the UDO.
Respondents next argue that even if the UDO governs the case
before us, the trial court erred by finding that the replacement
mobile home constituted a nonconforming use under the UDO. Section
1402.1 of the UDO provides that "non-conforming situations that
were otherwise lawful on the effective date of this ordinance may
be continued." Therefore, the issue is whether the replacement
mobile home was a nonconforming use that was otherwise lawful at
the effective date of the UDO, which was 1 January 1998. If so,
the replacement mobile home could continue as a nonconforming use
under the UDO; if not, the replacement mobile home would be subject
to section 1210 of the UDO, requiring a conditional use permit.
Respondent argues that the replacement mobile home was neither
a nonconforming use, nor was it "otherwise lawful," at the
effective date of the UDO. The definition of a nonconforming
situation under the UDO is "a situation that occurs when, on the
effective date of this Ordinance, an existing lot or structure or
use of an existing lot or structure does not conform to one or more
of the regulations applicable to the district in which the lot or
structure is located." Under the language of the UDO, the
replacement mobile home comes within the definition of a
nonconforming situation in that it was in place at the effective
date of the UDO and did not conform to the regulations applicable
to the district in which it was located. However, a nonconforming use under the UDO can continue only
if it was "otherwise lawful on the effective date of the
ordinance." Although the Board of Adjustment and the trial court
must apply the UDO, the language in sections 107 and 1402 of the
UDO mandates that we look at the previous laws and ordinances
affecting the property in question to determine whether the
nonconforming use under the UDO was "otherwise lawful" on the UDO's
effective date. See Town of Ogunquit, 570 A.2d at 321; City of New
Orleans, 76 So.2d 387 (La. 1954); City of Rochester, 238 N.Y.S. at
215. In the case before us, we must therefore reference the CCZO
to determine whether the replacement mobile home was "otherwise
lawful." If the replacement mobile home violated the terms of the
CCZO, it would not be "otherwise lawful" as required by the UDO.
Section 107 of the UDO states that "[i]n particular, a
situation that did not constitute a lawful nonconforming situation
under the previously adopted Zoning Ordinance does not achieve
lawful nonconforming status under [the UDO] merely by repeal of the
[CCZO]." In fact, Camden County has previously evinced such a
desire to interpret their zoning ordinances to encompass violations
of previous ordinances in their new zoning ordinances. In section
1.04 of the CCZO, the ordinance states that "[i]n addition, no land
being used in violation of the old Zoning Ordinance shall obtain
status as an allowed non-conforming use by virtue of the enactment
of this new Zoning Ordinance, but all land in violation of the old
Zoning Ordinance shall continue to be in violation of the [CCZO]."
The replacement mobile home was not "otherwise lawful" on theeffective date of the UDO. Petitioner originally had a
nonconforming manufactured home on the property under the CCZO.
However, when he replaced the mobile home in 1995, section 5.02(F)
of the CCZO required petitioner to obtain a conditional use permit
pursuant to section 8.04 of the CCZO. Petitioner failed to apply
at any time for a conditional use permit for the replacement mobile
home and was therefore in violation of the CCZO when the UDO was
adopted.
In addition, petitioner did not obtain a building permit when
he moved the original mobile home off of the property and replaced
it. The Board of Adjustment found this to be a violation of the
"adopted zoning ordinance." There was no disagreement from
petitioner that he needed a building permit to replace the original
mobile home on the property, as evidenced by his willingness to pay
the fine, obtain the building permit, and thereafter continue with
the use of the replacement mobile home.
However, it is not clear whether the Board of Adjustment ruled
this failure a violation of the CCZO or the UDO. If it was simply
a violation of the UDO's provision on building permits, section
1703, such a violation standing alone would not authorize the
imposition of a conditional use permit and the applications of
conditions to petitioner's use of the property. However, if the
failure to obtain a building permit was a violation of the CCZO,
then this would fall under the "otherwise lawful" limitation in
section 1402.1 of the UDO, disqualifying the replacement mobile
home from remaining as a continuing nonconforming use under theUDO. However, the record does not contain the complete version of
the CCZO, and it is unclear what section required petitioner to
obtain a building permit to replace the mobile home on the
property. While it may be the case that the CCZO required a
building permit, the Board of Adjustment's assertion that the
replacement mobile home required a building permit, when
unsupported by the record cannot stand. Nevertheless, the failure
of petitioner to obtain a conditional use permit as required under
the CCZO, disqualifies the replacement mobile home as a continuing
nonconforming use under section 1401.1 of the UDO.
The proper application of the UDO requires petitioner to seek
a conditional use permit for the mobile home on his property. The
failure of the Board of Adjustment to do so at the first hearing
does not prevent such a requirement at this stage. City of
Winston-Salem v. Concrete Co., 47 N.C. App. 405, 414, 267 S.E.2d
569, 575, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980)
("A city cannot be estopped to enforce a zoning ordinance against
a violator due to the conduct of a zoning official in encouraging
or permitting the violation."). While the Board of Adjustment
could not attach conditions to the replacement mobile home if it
continued as a nonconforming use, when issuing a conditional use
permit, the Board of Adjustment can attach reasonable conditions.
A board of adjustment "may impose reasonable and appropriate
conditions and safeguards upon [conditional use] permits." N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 153A-340(c) (2001).
A reviewing court will normally defer to a board of adjustmentso long as a condition is reasonably related to the proposed use,
does not conflict with the zoning ordinance, and furthers a
legitimate objective of the zoning ordinance. See Chambers v.
Board of Adjustment, 250 N.C. 194, 195, 108 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1959)
(noting that Boards of Adjustment cannot waive requirements under
a zoning ordinance); Bernstein v. Board of App., Village of
Matinecock, 302 N.Y.S.2d 141, 146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) ("The
conditions imposed cannot go beyond the ordinance, which is the
source of the Board's power, [t]hey must be directly related to and
incidental to the proposed use of the property, and the conditions
stated must be sufficiently clear and definite that the permittee
and his neighbors are not left in doubt concerning the extent of
the use permitted.") (citations omitted) (cited in Godfrey v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Union County, 317 N.C. 51, 344 S.E.2d
272 (1986)); see also 3 A. Rathkopf & D. Rathkopf, The Law of
Zoning and Planning § 61.49 (Supp. 2001). Section 1915 of the UDO
allows the Board of Adjustment to impose
such reasonable requirements in addition to
those specified in this Ordinance as will
ensure that the development in its proposed
location: (a) will not endanger public safety;
(b) will not endanger the value of adjoining
or abutting property; (c) will be in harmony
with the area in which it is located; (d) will
be in conformity with the land use plan . . .
or other plan officially adopted by the Board;
and (e) will not exceed the county's ability
to provide adequate public facilities . . . .
In this case, the Board of Adjustment imposed several
conditions on petitioner's use of the replacement mobile home: (1)
that the replacement mobile home satisfy inspection that it is "upto code"; (2) that one individual inhabit the replacement mobile
home at all times; (3) that the replacement mobile home not be
vacated for more than thirty days, with thirty additional days to
find a new resident, for a total of sixty days; (4) that the lot be
kept in condition with the standards for that area; and (5) that
the replacement mobile home be built after July 1, 1976. After
reviewing the UDO and the above conditions, we see no reason to
strike any of the conditions as unreasonable or inappropriate. See
N.C.G.S. § 153A-340(c). These conditions are not in contravention
of the UDO, and in fact would further the purposes of the UDO as
emphasized in section 1915. Further, all of these conditions
relate in some way to the use of the property. We find the
imposition of such conditions by the Board of Adjustment
appropriate, if attached to a conditional use permit. The decision
of the trial court is vacated and this matter is remanded to the
trial court for remand to the Camden County Board of Adjustment for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the
issuance of a conditional use permit to petitioner for the
replacement mobile home with any reasonable conditions attached to
the conditional use permit.
Vacated and remanded.
Judges HUDSON and BIGGS concur.
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