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All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the
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NO. COA02-296
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 3 December 2002
SHEILA M. ARNOLD,
Employee, Plaintiff
v
.
WAL-MART STORES, INC.
Employer,
and
INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Carrier, Defendants.
Appeal by defendants from the Opinion and Award of the North
Carolina Industrial Commission filed 5 December 2001. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 14 November 2002.
Kathleen G. Sumner, for plaintiff-appellee.
Young Moore and Henderson P.A., by J.D. Prather and Zachary C.
Bolen, for defendants-appellants.
TYSON, Judge.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (employer) and Insurance Company of
the State of Pennsylvania (carrier) appeal the award of temporary
and permanent partial disability to Sheila M. Arnold (employee)
by the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission). We
vacate the Commission's award and remand the case to the Commission
for further findings.
I. Facts
Employee had worked for employer for approximately two and a
half years. On 4 May 1998, employee was attempting to lift a
broken dock plate on a door when she felt pain in her back, hip andleg. Prior to the incident, employee had not complained of any
pain in those areas. After the injury, she continued to experience
pain. Martin Chipman, M.D., a neurologist, treated employee for
her pains through physical therapy, aqua therapy, and ordered
restrictions on employee's carrying heavy loads, sleeping on a hard
bed, and sitting in a high back chair.
On 13 July 1998, employee was released to return to light duty
with restrictions but employer did not allow her to return. Dr.
Chipman gave employee a 10 percent permanent partial disability
rating to her back as a result of the incident. On 13 May 1999,
employee began work with Dollar General stores at the same or
greater wages than she was receiving at the time of the incident.
The Commission concluded in part the following:
1. [Employee] sustained an injury by accident
on May 4, 1998 while in the course and scope
of employment with Wal-Mart. [Employee] is
entitled to receive workers' compensation
benefits as a result of the injuries.
2. [Employee] is entitled to receive
disability benefits for the periods she was
unable to earn wages as a result of the
injuries she sustained.
3. [Employee] is entitled to receive medical
benefits for so long as they continue to
effect a cure, give relief and/or lessen
[employee's] period of disability.
4. [Employee] sustained a 10 percent permanent
partial disability to the back and is entitled
to be compensated for the same after her
temporary total income ended.
The Commission awarded employee temporary total disability from 6
May 1998 through 13 May 1999. It further awarded permanent partial
disability for 30 weeks following 13 May 1999 for the 10 percentpermanent partial disability rating to her back. It also awarded
all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by [employee] as
a result of her compensable injury.
II. Issues
Defendants contend that the Commission erred in (1) awarding
compensation for permanent disability, (2) awarding compensation
after 21 August 1998, and (3) awarding future medical compensation.
III. Standard of Review
Upon appeal of an award from the Commission, this Court's
review is limited to whether there is any competent evidence to
support the Commission's findings of fact and whether those
findings support the Commission's conclusions of law. Effingham v.
Kroger Co., 149 N.C. App. 105, 109, 561 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2002).
The findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if there is competent
evidence to support them, even if evidence is presented to the
contrary. Id. The Commission's conclusions of law are reviewable
de novo. Id.
IV. Permanent Disability
An injured employee seeking compensation generally has two
options under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). First, an
employee may seek benefits by showing that the employee has
suffered a loss of wage-earning capacity pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 97-29 or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-30. Knight v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 149 N.C. App. 1, 10, 562 S.E.2d 434, 441 (2002). If
the loss of wage-earning capacity is total, an employee may seek
recovery under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29. If the loss of wage-earning capacity is partial, an employee may seek recovery under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-30. Second, an employee may seek benefits by
showing the employee has a specific physical impairment that falls
under the schedule set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31, regardless
of whether the employee has, in fact, suffered a loss of wage-
earning capacity. Id. at 11, 562 S.E.2d at 442.
If an employee has a scheduled injury under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
97-31 and a loss of wage-earning capacity, the employee may elect
to seek benefits under whichever section will provide the more
favorable remedy. Id. This election does not allow for an
employee to recover from both methods simultaneously. Farley v.
N.C. Dep't of Labor, 146 N.C. App. 584, 587, 553 S.E.2d 231, 233
(2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31. However, an employee who has
suffered an injury listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31 and suffers a
partial or total loss of wage-earning capacity during the healing
period may seek (1) compensation for loss of wage-earning capacity
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-29 or N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-30 during the
healing period and (2) compensation for the specific listed
injury for the statutorily prescribed period of time under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 97-31 once the healing period has ended. Knight,
149 N.C. App. at 12, 562 S.E.2d at 442.
The end of the healing period determines the beginning of
statutory compensation under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31. The ending
of the healing period under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31 is when the
injury has stabilized, referred to as the point of 'maximum medical
improvement' (or 'maximum improvement' or 'maximum recovery')(MMI). Id. The Commission must find the date on which the
employee reached MMI with regard to the specific scheduled injury
before awarding compensation from that date based on the statutory
number of weeks set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31.
Here, the Commission did not specify under which section of
the Act it awarded compensation. We infer that the Commission
awarded compensation based on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31, because it
found that employee had returned to work at the same or higher
wages and that employee did not lose wage-earning capacity. The
Commission found that employee had a 10 percent permanent
impairment rating and awarded benefits for the scheduled statutory
injury starting on 13 May 1999, the date employee returned to
employment. However, under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31, the date of
returning to employment and the employee's wage-earning capacity
are irrelevant. What is relevant is the end of employee's healing
period or the date employee reached MMI. The Commission failed to
find the date the healing period ended or the date employee
reached MMI. Without such a finding, the Commission could not
award benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-31. We vacate the award
of the Commission and remand further findings of fact regarding the
date employee reached MMI.
IV. Future Medical Compensation
Employer contends the trial court erred in granting future
medical compensation to employee because she has not proven that
any ongoing complaints are causally related to the her [sic]
incident at work on May 4, 1998. We disagree. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25 states that medical compensation
shall be provided by the employer. If the Commission determines
that continuing medical treatment is necessary, it may, in its
discretion, order such treatment and require the employer to pay
for it. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25 (1991).
Here, the Commission found that employee sustained a
compensable injury on 4 May 1998. It ordered employer to pay for
all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by [employee] as a
result of her compensable injury when bills for same have been
submitted, for so long as such evaluations, treatments and
examinations may reasonably be required to effect a cure, give
relief and/or lessen [employee's] period of disability. There is
competent evidence in the record to show that plaintiff may incur
ongoing medical expenses related to the compensable injury.
We find the Commission did not abuse its discretion by
ordering employer to pay future medical expenses incurred as a
result of [employee's] compensable injury.
V. Conclusion
The award of the Commission is vacated and remanded for
further findings as to disability. The Commission did not abuse
its discretion in awarding future medical expenses which employee
may incur as a result of her compensable injury.
Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part.
Judges WALKER and MCCULLOUGH concur.
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