WANDA M. GORE,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONSBANC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendant.
Johnson & Lambeth, by Maynard M. Brown, for plaintiff
appellant.
Kennedy Covington Lobdell & Hickman, L.L.P., by John H.
Capitano, for defendant appellee.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
This is a breach of contract claim arising out of an accident
and health insurance policy issued by Nationsbanc Insurance
Company, Inc. (Nationsbanc), to plaintiff Wanda M. Gore. The facts
leading to the lawsuit are as follows: In May 1995, plaintiff Gore
and her husband refinanced their home. As part of the refinancing,
Nationsbanc sold plaintiff an accident and health insurance policy.
Under the terms of the policy, if plaintiff became totally disabled
during the term of the policy, Nationsbanc would pay “Accident and
Health monthly benefits” equal to the amount of plaintiff's monthly
loan payment amount, $719.33. The policy further stated that the
Loan Term Period was 180 months and that the “Benefit Term Period”
was 120 months. Additionally, the policy stated that benefits werelimited to the term of the policy, or a maximum of thirty-six
“monthly benefit payments . . . , whichever is less.” Plaintiff
subsequently became disabled and Nationsbanc began making the
monthly benefit payments pursuant to the policy. After thirty-six
months, Nationsbanc refused to make further payment.
On 8 August 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking damages
for breach of contract. Nationsbanc answered and admitted making
thirty-six payments pursuant to the terms of the policy. On 29
October 2001, Nationsbanc moved for judgment on the pleadings. On
11 January 2002, the trial court determined there was no genuine
issue of material fact and defendant was entitled to dismissal of
all of plaintiff's claims as a matter of law, pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(c) (2001). Plaintiff appealed.
Plaintiff's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in granting Nationsbanc's motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Plaintiff contends that nowhere in the policy were the
terms “Benefit Term Period” or “Monthly Benefits” defined.
Plaintiff therefore argues that the policy is ambiguous on its face
and should be construed in her favor so as to provide coverage for
the full 120-month “Benefit Term Period.” After careful review of
the record, briefs and contentions of the parties, we disagree with
plaintiff's arguments and affirm the order of the trial court.
This Court has stated:
“Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule
12(c), is appropriate '“when all the material
allegations of fact are admitted in thepleadings and only questions of law remain.”'
The trial court must '“view the facts and
permissible inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party[],”' taking
all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
non-moving party's pleadings as true.
When ruling on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the trial court 'is to consider
only the pleadings and any attached exhibits,
which become part of the pleadings.'”
Judgments on the pleadings are disfavored in law,
and the trial court must view the facts and permissible
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.
Groves v. Community Hous. Corp., 144 N.C. App. 79, 87, 548 S.E.2d
535, 540 (2001) (citations omitted). Here, the only issue in
dispute is the term of the monthly benefit payments. Plaintiff
contends the benefits should extend for 120 months, the “Benefit
Term Period” listed in the policy. However, benefit payments
clearly were limited to a term of thirty-six months in three
portions of the policy. First, the policy states that “[b]enefits
hereunder are limited to the term shown in the schedule or a
maximum total of thirty six (36) monthly benefit payments during
the term of this policy, whichever is less.” (Emphasis added.) On
page two of the policy, it is again stated that “[t]he amount of
Monthly Benefit Payment shall be LIMITED TO A MAXIMUM OF THIRTY-SIX
(36) Monthly Benefits. . . .” (Emphasis in original.) Finally,
the policy states that “ [t]he CUMULATIVE TOTAL of ALL MONTHLY
BENEFITS SHALL NOT EXCEED THIRTY-SIX (36) BENEFITS times the
benefit amount shown in the schedule [$719.33].” (Emphasis in
original.) This Court has stated:
Our courts have established several rules
pertaining to the construction of insurance
policies, the most rudimentary being that the
language of the policy controls its
interpretation. “The various terms of an
insurance policy are to be harmoniously
construed, and if possible, every word and
every provision is to be given effect.”
“Where the language of a contract is
plain and unambiguous, construction
of the agreement is a matter of law;
and the court may not ignore or
delete any of its provisions, nor
insert words into it, but must
construe the contract as written, in
light of the undisputed evidence as
to the custom, usage and meaning of
its terms.”
DeMent v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 142 N.C. App. 598, 601, 544
S.E.2d 797, 799-800 (2001) (citations omitted). In this case, even
when the policy is read in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
there is no ambiguity. The contract of insurance plainly and
explicitly limited the term of monthly benefit payments to thirty-
six months. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not
err, and defendant was entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge HUDSON concur.
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