STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Guilford County
Nos. 99 CRS 109254-257
PERRY VINCENT KNOWLES
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General Douglas A. Johnston, for the State.
Walter T. Johnson, Jr., for defendant appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
On 19 May 2000, a jury found Perry Vincent Knowles
("defendant") guilty of conspiring to traffick in cocaine by
possession and guilty of trafficking in cocaine by possession and
by transportation. The State presented evidence at trial tending
to show the following: On 20 November 1999, Detective Richard
Melton ("Detective Melton") of the Guilford County Sheriff's
Department received information from an informant concerning
possible drug trafficking at Piedmont Triad International Airport
("the airport"). The informant, an airline company employee, had
provided reliable information to Detective Melton on previous
occasions. When Detective Melton met with the informant, the
informant provided him with a list of persons whom the informantsuspected of drug trafficking. The list recited the following
names: John Wilson, Marvin Taylor, Perry Knowles, Lonnie Coleman,
Tonithia Gilliam and Gary Sweeting. The informant told Detective
Melton that the named persons frequently traveled with AirTran
Airlines to and from the south Florida area, remaining only two or
three days on each trip and using one-way airline tickets each
time. Moreover, one individual, Tonithia Gilliam ("Gilliam"),
always purchased the airline tickets for all of the other persons
named on the list, and she always paid for the tickets with cash.
The informant noted that the suspects carried no luggage or only
carry-on items, and that one of the persons, Gary Sweeting
("Sweeting"), had traveled under an alias on at least one occasion.
Finally, Detective Melton learned that the suspects were scheduled
to leave on a flight departing later that evening to Fort
Lauderdale, Florida.
After speaking with the informant, Detective Melton went to
the airport in order to observe individuals waiting to depart on
the Fort Lauderdale flight. After observing the passengers board
the airplane, Detective Melton developed suspicions about four
individuals. He conferred with the informant, who verified that
Detective Melton had chosen the following persons: Sweeting,
Gilliam, John Wilson ("Wilson"), and Mark Bastian ("Bastian").
Upon further investigation, Detective Melton learned that the
addresses given to the airline by Sweeting and Gilliam did not
exist. Detective Melton also learned that when Gilliam purchased
the tickets for the Fort Lauderdale flight, she also purchasedtickets in the names of defendant and Larry Coleman ("Coleman") for
a flight departing to Miami, Florida, the following morning.
On 22 November 1999, Detective Melton returned to the airport
in order to review videotaped surveillance filmed by the airport
security cameras. On the videotape, Detective Melton observed two
men who identified themselves as defendant and Coleman preparing to
depart on the Miami flight. Upon further investigation, Detective
Melton learned that defendant, along with Wilson and Bastian, was
scheduled to return on a Delta Airlines flight arriving 24 November
1999. Detective Melton then arranged for additional law
enforcement officers to assist him in his observation of defendant
and the other suspects.
Detective Melton, accompanied by several other officers,
returned to the airport on 24 November 1999 in order to await the
arrival of defendant's flight. None of the officers was in
uniform. At approximately 12:30 a.m., Detective Melton observed
defendant, Sweeting, Wilson, Bastian, and a woman later identified
as Crystal Lovett ("Lovett"), exit the airplane and walk up the
south concourse to the main terminal area. Detective Melton noted
that the persons walked as a group and frequently turned their
heads, looking around the airport. Defendant was carrying only a
small duffle bag. Detective Melton and the other officers followed
defendant as he exited the airport with the group. After exiting
the airport, defendant, Sweeting, and Lovett began walking swiftly
away from the others, at which point Detective Melton decided to
stop and question the group. Detective Melton and accompanying lawenforcement officers then approached the group and asked to speak
to each person separately.
Detective James Steven Anders ("Detective Anders") approached
defendant. Detective Anders showed defendant his identification
badge and advised him that he was a deputy sheriff with the
Guilford County Sheriff's Department. Defendant agreed to speak
with Detective Anders. Detective Anders informed defendant that he
was conducting a routine drug investigation and, after viewing
defendant's airline ticket and identification, requested
defendant's consent to search his duffle bag, which consent
defendant gave. After searching defendant's bag, Detective Anders
asked if he "could pat [defendant] down for narcotics." Defendant
agreed to the pat-down, but requested that they return to the
inside of the airport terminal to conduct the search. Detective
Anders and defendant then went back inside the airport and to a
men's restroom, where defendant proceeded to remove his coat.
According to Detective Anders, defendant stated that he had "been
through this several times before" and that he "was going to take
all of his clothes off." Detective Anders informed defendant that
the pat-down did not necessitate the removal of defendant's
clothing, but defendant continued to unbutton his shirt. Defendant
then requested Detective Ander's identification again, which
Detective Anders produced and showed to defendant. Defendant asked
Detective Anders to remove the identification badge from his
wallet, but Detective Anders declined defendant's request.
Defendant "started raising his voice, stating that [DetectiveAnders] wasn't the police. [Defendant] started shouting that
several times. He then walked out of the bathroom, leaving the
coat and the duffle bag on the floor." Detective Anders followed
defendant out of the restroom and advised him to speak more
quietly, but defendant continued to shout. When Detective Anders
moved closer to defendant, he "swung around with his arms and
knocked [Detective Anders] away." Defendant then ran away, and
Detective Anders pursued him through the airport exit and parking
lot, over a fence, through a field and to a wooded area, where
Detective Anders stopped and called for assistance. Law
enforcement officers soon arrived and surrounded the wooded area.
A canine unit was dispatched, and defendant emerged from the woods
a few moments later. Defendant was no longer wearing his shirt,
which the officers retrieved from the woods. In the near vicinity
of defendant's shirt beneath some foliage, officers also discovered
"two Ace bandage ankle wraps with some duct tape on them" and four
packages sealed with duct tape. Although it was raining lightly at
the time, the packages and bandages were dry. The packages
contained between four to five pounds of cocaine. When law
enforcement officers searched defendant, they discovered that his
lower legs were red and showed signs of hair loss. The officers
who searched Sweeting found identical packages of cocaine strapped
with duct tape to his calves, and officers recovered a similar
duct-taped package of cocaine from Lovett.
Defendant testified that he was a resident of Nassau, Bahamas.
Defendant stated that he had only traveled to Greensboro, NorthCarolina, twice in order to visit his girlfriend in Winston-Salem.
Defendant asserted that his friend, John Wilson, whom he identified
as Ian Morley, purchased the 24 November 1999 ticket as a favor to
defendant. Defendant stated that although he was acquainted with
Sweeting and other members of the group, he was not friends with
them, nor had he ever traveled with them. Defendant explained that
he did not know that Sweeting and the others were on the 24
November 1999 flight until they exited the airplane together,
whereupon defendant agreed to give them a ride from the airport.
Defendant testified that he consented to a search of his
duffle bag and person, but requested that the search take place
inside the airport. According to defendant, Detective Anders
directed him to the restroom and requested that he remove his coat.
After patting him down, Detective Anders began asking defendant
questions, at which point defendant demanded to see Detective
Ander's identification. Detective Anders refused, and defendant
became scared and left the restroom. Once outside, defendant
shouted for "someone [to] call the police, because this guy is
pretending to be a police[man]." Detective Anders attempted to
seize defendant by his arm, and he began running. Defendant
asserted that he lost his shirt while climbing over the fence.
After running into the woods, defendant stated that he re-emerged
after seeing flashing blue police lights. Defendant informed the
officers that "someone's chasing me." Defendant stated that his
leg was bruised from falling down, and he denied the State's claim
that the hair on his legs had been pulled out. Defendant furtherdenied any knowledge of the cocaine found in the woods and on
Sweeting and Lovett.
The jury found defendant guilty of conspiring to traffick in
cocaine by possessing 400 grams or more, trafficking in cocaine by
transporting 400 grams or more, and trafficking in cocaine by
possessing 400 grams or more. The trial court sentenced defendant
to a minimum term of 175 months of imprisonment and a maximum term
of 219 months of imprisonment, which conviction and sentence
defendant now appeals.
_____________________________________________________
The issues on appeal are (1) whether the detention of
defendant was legal; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying
defendant's motion to suppress; and (3) whether the trial court
erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss. For the reasons
set forth herein, we find no error by the trial court.
Defendant first argues that law enforcement officers had no
reasonable grounds to suspect that he was engaged in criminal
activity, and that therefore, his detention was illegal. We
disagree. We note initially that defendant's brief cites no
authority for his argument, nor does it appropriately identify the
assignments of error. Rule 28(b)(5) of the North Carolina Rules of
Appellate Procedure states that, "[a]ssignments of error not set
out in the appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or
argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned."
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(5) (2001). Although defendant has failed to
properly preserve this issue for appellate review, we neverthelessaddress defendant's argument in our discretion under Rule 2. See
N.C.R. App. P. 2 (2001).
Defendant contends that the information provided by the
informant, along with the information gathered by Detective Melton,
was insufficient to form reasonable grounds for defendant's
detention and subsequent search by law enforcement officers. Upon
appellate review, we must determine "whether the trial judge's
underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in
which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether
those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate
conclusions of law." State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d
618, 619 (1982). Although the factual findings made by the trial
court are binding if supported by the evidence, we review de novo
the trial court's conclusions of law. See State v. Mahaley, 332
N.C. 583, 592-93, 423 S.E.2d 58, 64 (1992), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995).
In the instant case, the trial court made thirty-four findings
of fact supporting its conclusion that "law enforcement officers
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant was
engaged in criminal activity, and that none of the defendant's
federal or state constitutional rights were violated."
Specifically, the trial court found, inter alia
(4) That on November 20, 1999, Detective
Melton received communications from an
employee at the Piedmont Triad International
Airport in Greeensboro, North Carolina. The
airport employee believed that certain persons
were engaging in illegal activity at the
airport. The employee is a person whom
Detective Melton considered a confidential andreliable source of information, who had
provided him with reliable information in the
past.
(5) That on November 20th, Detective Melton
went to the airport and met with a
confidential source, and told him the name of
four or five individuals, one female and four
males, who had made repeated trips to the
South Florida area over the past four weeks.
The female would purchase one-way tickets to
Miami, Florida, for each of the individuals,
and she would always pay in cash. They would
return to Greensboro a day or two later. They
only carried small carry-on bags. One of the
males had flown using an alias. The names of
the individuals were John Wilson, Marvin
Taylor; Lonnie Coleman; Tameka . . . Gilliam
. . . ; Gary Sweeting . . . ; and Perry
Knowles, the defendant. All the trips were
via the AirTran Airline, and the destination
was always to the South Florida area with a
stopover in Atlanta.
. . . .
(9) That later on the evening of November
20th, Detective Melton returned to the
Sheriff's Department and entered the names of
the six individuals into various law
enforcement computer [data] bases, in an
attempt to further identify them. The names
of Sweeting and Gilliam were found, and
[Detective Melton] was able to retrieve a
photograph for both of them that matched two
of the individuals he had seen at the airport.
(10) That Detective Melton also learned that
the home addresses given by Sweeting and
Gilliam were non-existent, that is,
fraudulent.
(11) That Detective Melton determined that the
individuals met many of the indicators of a
drug courier: (a) they purchased one-way
tickets; (b) they paid in cash; (c) they only
carried small carry-on bags; (d) an alias was
used by one member in the group; (e) two
individuals of the group used a fraudulent
home address; (f) several individuals in the
group boarded the airplane last; and (g) theyhad made repeated flights to the South Florida
area, where they only stayed one or two days.
(12) That these factors are indicators because
people traveling to buy and return with drugs
normally only buy one-way tickets because they
are not certain of the exact date they will
return, and it is more difficult for others to
learn of their date of return. They pay cash
so as not to leave a paper trail of their
trip. They only carry small carry-on luggage
because they only intend to stay a short
period of time. They use aliases and false
addresses to prevent others from learning of
their identity or whereabouts. They board the
airplane last because it makes it more
difficult for the airline to place their name
on the flight passenger manifest.
. . . .
(16) That at approximately 12:30 a.m. on
November 24th, Detective Melton and two other
officers went down the concourse of the
airport to observe the individuals as they
left the airplane, in an attempt to identify
the individuals before they disbanded. Other
officers were stationed in other areas of the
airport.
(17) That as passengers exited the airplane,
Detective Melton's attention was drawn to a
group of people who were Gary Sweeting, John
Wilson, Mark Bastian, Crystal Lovett, and the
defendant, Perry Knowles. They exited the
airplane together and walked up the concourse
together. They appeared to be talking to each
other as they walked. . . . Each of the
individuals [was] carrying a carry-on bag.
. . . .
(20) That the group walked together to the
Down escalators and proceeded down to thelower level. Members of the group
continuously looked around. Detective Melton
and other detectives followed the group the
entire time.
(21) That the group exited the lower level of
the terminal building and began walking
together toward the taxicab and parking lot
area. Detective Melton, Detective James
Anders, and three other officers followed the
group closely.
(22) That several people in the group looked
behind them and appeared to notice the
officers following them. Three of the
individuals began to walk faster, speeding
ahead of the group. The three individuals
were Crystal Lovett, Gary Sweeting, and the
defendant Knowles.
. . . .
(24) That Detective James Anders, with his
badge and identification in his hand, walked
up behind the defendant and told the defendant
that he was a deputy sheriff, and asked the
defendant if he could speak with him. The
defendant stopped walking and agreed to speak
with Detective Anders . . . . Defendant
carried a duffle bag.
In determining whether the investigatory stop of defendant was
permissible, we examine the totality of the circumstances to decide
if the standard announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed.
2d 889 (1968), has been met. See State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703,
706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 778, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L. Ed. 2d
143 (1979). The test under Terry in assessing the conduct of law
enforcement officers in effecting a warrantless "seizure" of an
individual is whether specific and articulable facts known to theofficers at the inception of the investigatory stop, together with
any rational inferences to be drawn therefrom, reasonably warrant
the intrusion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906;
Thompson, 296 N.C. at 706, 252 S.E.2d at 779. Such circumstances
"should be viewed as a whole 'through the eyes of a reasonable and
cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and
training.'" Thompson, 296 N.C. at 706, 252 S.E.2d at 779 (quoting
United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
Because much of the information known to law enforcement officers
at the inception of their investigatory stop of defendant was
provided by an informant, we now assess the quality of the
information supplied by the informant as found by the trial court.
Where an informant's tip contains sufficient indicia of
reliability, such information may provide the reasonable suspicion
necessary for a Terry stop. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
330, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990); State v. Sanchez, __ N.C. App.
__, ___ S.E.2d ___ (filed 18 December 2001, COA00-1075). An
"informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge [are]
important factors" in considering whether the informant's tip
provides law enforcement officers with reasonable and articulable
suspicion of criminal activity necessary for a Terry stop. State
v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 205, 539 S.E.2d 625, 629 (2000).
Corroboration by law enforcement officers of information provided
by an informant strengthens the indicia of reliability. See id.
In the instant case, the trial court found that the informant
was an airline employee who had previously provided accurate anduseful information to Detective Melton. The informant met with
Detective Melton on several occasions and provided specific details
regarding defendant's identity and actions, including his name and
travel patterns. The information indicated that defendant was one
of a group of persons making brief but regular trips to the south
Florida area using one-way airline tickets purchased by one person
and paid for in cash. The informant further indicated that one of
the persons in the group had traveled under an alias, and that the
persons carried little or no luggage. Detective Melton
corroborated the information provided by the informant and
discovered that two members of the group had given false addresses
to the airline. The trial court further found that these actions
by defendant and the others met several profiles used by law
enforcement officers in identifying individuals engaged in drug
trafficking. Moreover, Detective Melton observed defendant arrive
at the airport with several members of the group on the 24 November
1999 flight identified by the informant. Defendant remained with
the group as it exited the airport.
We hold that the above-stated evidence, as detailed in the
trial court's findings, adequately sustained a reasonable and
articulable suspicion by law enforcement officers that defendant
was engaged in criminal activity. Thus, Detective Anders was
justified in detaining defendant for an investigatory stop, and we
therefore overrule defendant's first assignment of error.
By his second assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized bylaw enforcement officers. Specifically, defendant objected to the
admission of more than 400 grams of cocaine, two bandages with duct
tape, and a shirt identified as belonging to defendant. Defendant
argues that these items were obtained as a result of an illegal
detention and search and therefore should have been excluded at
trial. Defendant's argument has no merit.
The evidence to which defendant objected was not obtained by
law enforcement officers as a result of their search of defendant.
Rather, the evidence was discovered in the woods after defendant
emerged therefrom. At trial, defendant claimed to have no
knowledge of the evidence seized. Because the evidence was not
obtained as a result of a search of defendant's person or property,
defendant had no standing to contest its admission. See State v.
Jones, 299 N.C. 298, 306, 261 S.E.2d 860, 865 (1980) (holding that
where a defendant has no possessory interest or reasonable
expectation of privacy in the property searched, he lacks standing
to contest evidence seized therefrom). The trial court properly
denied defendant's motion to suppress this evidence.
Defendant also argues that the trial court should have
suppressed a videotape created by the Guilford County Sheriff's
Department from several hours of the airport's surveillance
cameras. Defendant contends the video was produced as a
consequence of his illegal detention. Defendant's argument has no
merit. As stated supra, we conclude that defendant's detention was
lawful. Moreover, the recordings in question were originally taken
by an airport employee in charge of surveillance as part of routinesecurity at the airport, not by law enforcement officers. The
Guilford County Sheriff's Department merely reduced the footage of
defendant to a single video at trial in order to simplify viewing
by the jury. Finally, the videotape was not admitted into evidence
and was used for illustrative purposes only. The trial court
properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the videotape. We
therefore overrule defendant's second assignment of error.
In his third assignment of error, defendant argues the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Defendant contends
there was insufficient evidence that he possessed cocaine or was
engaged in drug trafficking. We disagree.
Upon a motion to dismiss in a criminal action, the trial court
must view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State. See State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 491, 488 S.E.2d 576, 588
(1997). Contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence must be
resolved by the jury, and the State should be given the benefit of
any reasonable inference. See State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566,
313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984). The trial court must then decide
whether there is substantial evidence of each element of the
offense charged. See State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d
164, 169 (1980). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Id. at 78-79, 265 S.E.2d at 169.
In the instant case, defendant was charged and found guilty of
trafficking in cocaine by possessing and by transporting 400 grams
or more, and of conspiring to traffick in cocaine by possessing 400grams or more. Under the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act,
"[a]ny person who . . . transports, or possesses 28 grams or more
of cocaine . . . shall be guilty of . . . 'trafficking in
cocaine.'" N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3) (1999). In order to
convict defendant of trafficking in cocaine by possession, the
State was required to prove that defendant knowingly possessed the
nearly five pounds of cocaine found in the woods near the airport.
See State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 403, 333 S.E.2d 701, 702 (1985).
In order to prove that defendant trafficked in cocaine by
transportation, the State must show that defendant knowingly
transported cocaine from one place to another. See State v.
Outlaw, 96 N.C. App. 192, 197, 385 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1989), disc.
review denied, 326 N.C. 266, 389 S.E.2d 118 (1990).
In the instant case, the State offered uncontroverted evidence
that law enforcement officers located two packages sealed with duct
tape containing four to five pounds of cocaine in the woods shortly
after defendant emerged therefrom. Although it was raining, the
packages were dry. Further, officers recovered two bandages edged
with duct tape and noticed red welts and hair loss on defendant's
calves. The officers seized similar packages containing cocaine
from other persons associated with defendant, including Sweeting,
who had smuggled the cocaine packages through the airport by
attaching them to his lower legs with duct tape. A reasonable jury
could conclude from this evidence that the packages of cocaine
found in the woods belonged to defendant, and that he had also
smuggled the cocaine through the airport by taping the packages tohis calves with duct tape. Based on the circumstances of
defendant's arrest, we hold the trial court did not err in denying
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges of trafficking in cocaine
by possession and transportation.
We further hold that there was adequate evidence to support
defendant's conviction of conspiracy to traffick in cocaine. "A
criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to
do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful manner."
State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 658, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991).
In order to prove conspiracy, the State need not prove an express
agreement; evidence tending to show a mutual, implied understanding
will suffice. See State v. Bell, 311 N.C. 131, 141, 316 S.E.2d
611, 617 (1984). The existence of a conspiracy may be supported by
circumstantial evidence. See id. In the case sub judice, the
State presented sufficient evidence that defendant conspired with
others to traffick in cocaine. Two of the members of the group
were arrested after officers discovered packages containing large
quantities of cocaine taped to their bodies. Officers discovered
identical packages of cocaine in the woods shortly after defendant
emerged therefrom. A reasonable jury could conclude from the
evidence presented that defendant was a member of a group of
persons involved in drug trafficking. Given the evidence in the
instant case, we hold the trial court properly denied defendant's
motion to dismiss the charge of conspiracy to traffick in cocaine.
We therefore overrule defendant's third assignment of error. In conclusion, we hold defendant received a fair trial, free
from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judge McGEE and BIGGS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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