Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 3 October 2000 by
Judge Russell J. Lanier, Jr. in Robeson County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 November 2001.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
John P. Scherer, II, for State.
Public Defender Angus B. Thompson, II, by Assistant
Public Defender Ronald H. Foxworth, for defendant.
BIGGS, Judge.
This appeal arises from the trial court's denial of
defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an
investigatory stop. Based on the reasons herein, we affirm the
trial court.
The evidence presented at the suppression hearing tended to
show the following: On 31 October 1997, Officer Barbara Jacobs, of
the Lumberton Police Department, was investigating complaints in an
area of drug activity known as “The Hill”. She had received
several complaints from a confidential informant and concerned
neighbors that a female named Angie Hunt would allegedly make callsfrom a pay phone at Ogie's Laundromat to a drug dealer for drugs.
The complaints further stated that after the call, a car would pull
up to Hunt's house, park in the backyard with its lights off and
conduct a drug sale. The informant had spoken with Officer Jacobs
on several occasions pertaining to this activity.
After receiving this information, Officer Jacobs observed Hunt
on 31 October 1997, make a phone call from the laundromat and
return to her residence where she stood in her backyard in the
dark. She further observed a green vehicle pull up to Hunt's
residence with its lights turned off and park in her backyard.
Hunt approached the vehicle and conducted a transaction. Officer
Jacobs, however, testified that the “hand-to-hand” transaction was
not included in her report.
Once the vehicle left Hunt's residence, Officer Jacobs
followed it and shortly thereafter made a vehicle stop. She
approached defendant on the passenger side of the vehicle while
another officer, approached the driver's side. She observed a
small bag of marijuana in defendant's right hand and subsequently
placed him under arrest. Incident to the arrest, defendant was
searched whereby cocaine was discovered on his person. Defendant
was thereafter charged with felonious possession with the intent to
sell and deliver a controlled substance in violation of N.C.G.S. §
90-95(a)(1) (1999).
On 17 December 1997, defendant filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized as a result of the stop as well as statements made
alleging that such evidence was obtained as a result of an illegaldetention, search, and seizure.
On 3 August 1998, defendant was indicted for felonious
possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine arising out of
the earlier charge. On 14 October 1999, the motion to suppress was
heard. The trial court entered an order in open court denying the
motion to suppress and found that the officer had a reasonable and
articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle and search defendant.
On 3 October 2000, approximately one year after the hearing on
the motion to suppress, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the
offenses set forth above pursuant to a negotiated plea while
reserving his rights to appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-979(b)
(1999). Defendant entered notice of appeal in open court.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a
vehicular stop, in that the police officers lacked reasonable and
articulable suspicion to justify such a stop. We disagree.
In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress,
this Court must determine:
whether the trial judge's underlying findings
of fact are supported by competent evidence,
in which event they are conclusively binding
on appeal, and whether those factual findings
in turn support the judge's ultimate
conclusions of law.
State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d. 618, 619 (1982)
(citations omitted). While the trial court's factual findings are
binding if sustained by the evidence, the court's conclusions based
thereon are reviewable
de novo on appeal.
State v. Mahaley, 332N.C. 583, 423 S.E.2d. 58 (1992),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130
L. Ed. 2d 649 (1995).
It is well established that police officers may conduct a
brief investigatory stop of a vehicle without probable cause when
justified by specific, articulable facts which would lead a police
officer to “'reasonably [] conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot.'”
State v. Battle, 109 N.C. App.
367, 370, 427 S.E.2d. 156, 158 (1993) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)). A minimal level of
objective justification, although something more than an
“unparticularized suspicion or hunch,” is the sole requirement for
such a stop.
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 104 L. Ed. 2d
1, 10 (1989) (citation omitted).
In determining on appeal whether the standard of a
“reasonable” and “articulable” suspicion,
id., has been met, a
reviewing court “must examine both the articulable facts known to
the officers at the time they determined to approach and
investigate the activities of the [suspects] . . . and the rational
inferences which the officers were entitled to draw from those
facts.”
State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E.2d 776, 779
(1979). The foregoing circumstances are to be viewed as a whole
“'through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on
the scene, guided by his experience and training.'”
Id. (quoting
U.S. v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976))
; see also, State
v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 446 S.E.2d 67 (1994) (police officers may
draw inferences based upon personal experiences). In the case
sub judice, the following circumstances provided
a sufficient basis for drawing a reasonable inference “that
criminal activity was afoot”;
thus, warranting the investigative
stop: Officer Jacobs' six years of experience in “drug work”; her
prior knowledge of the noted connections between “The Hill” and
drug activity; personal observations of events identical to the
descriptions given by the informant and the neighbors; her
familiarity with the informant; and her witnessing what she
believed to be a“hand to hand” transaction.
The totality of the facts and circumstances arising during the
police officers' investigation of the vehicle in which defendant
was a passenger provided objective justification beyond a mere
hunch to support a “common sense conclusion[],”
United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981), “that
criminal activity may [have] be[en] afoot.”
Battle, 109 N.C. App.
at 370, 427 S.E.2d. at 158 (citation omitted).
We conclude that the stop was supported by a reasonable and
articulable suspicion and thus was lawful. Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to
suppress.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge MARTIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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